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Abstract
The Thomistic habit of synderesis innately inclines moral agents to the first principles of
natural law which state that good is to be done and pursued and evil to be avoided. Serving as
an ethical foundation in moral development, these primary moral principles direct practical
reason to those acts that actualise the essence of human nature. Since the act of synderesis
involves pre-cognitive (intuitive) and cognitive (apprehensive) processes, moral formation is
necessary for the formal knowledge of the primary moral principles to inchoately foment
through virtue habituation. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, virtues are habitual acts that
form moral agents to become virtuous people and inform them, too, of which acts are morally
apt for human flourishing. In this human process where ignorance, passion, weak will, vices,
sin and concupiscence may vitiate the intended moral outcome, synderesis and moral virtues
correlatively work together to set the ends to moral virtues and to determine which acts to do,
pursue and avoid respectively. Specifically, the acquired moral virtue of prudence, which
Aquinas considers as right reason applied to action, enables the proper discernment of the
primary moral principles that temporally address the contingencies and particularity of
everyday human historicity. A human faculty that assists in facilitating this discernment
process is the interior sense called moral imagination (vis imaginativa). While Aquinas has
considered imagination as one of the sources of human knowledge, his treatment of prudential
moral inquiry, however, appears to be underdeveloped without the consideration of
imagination as one of the quasi-integral parts of prudence. In view of developing the seed of
insight which Aquinas has sowed into the reality of imagination, the beneficence of imaginative
prudence will be argued on account of its capacity to dispose practical reason to synthetically
evaluate (productive imagination) and to ingeniously explore (creative imagination) various
facets of given moral situations while integrating the primary moral principles in prudential
moral inquiries. Apart from considering arguments from the theological and philosophical
perspectives, the Imagination Ethic Theory of Darcia Narvaez will be explored to demonstrate
how modern scientific research in psychology affirms the integrity and indispensability of
moral imagination in realising natural law’s ends via prudential moral inquiry.
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“Synderesis” is said to be the law of our mind,
because it is a habit containing
the precepts of the natural law,
which are the first principles of human actions.
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a.1, ad. 2
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Chapter 1
Introduction

“That world which is the theatre of man’s history”1 serves as the moral agent’s “moral
universe”2 where the perennially recurring seduction of human reason by the “tree of
knowledge of good and evil”3 confronts the limits of human volition and affectivity. This same
theatre has already witnessed the fall of the primordial moral agents which tragically resulted
in the fracture of the created order brought about by that original human decision to go against
the interior disposition to do and pursue the good and to shun evil.4 The post-lapsarian state of
moral agents has since then been marred by inner discords which reflect the secularised
society’s penchant for dissonance. Human reason has been corrupted, the will has been
weakened, and passions have been disordered. Nonetheless, though fallen and consumed,
moral agents still inherit something from the original self: the innate disposition called
synderesis5 which “is said to incite to good and murmur at evil.”6 Synderesis, originally called
synteresis,7 acts as the vestigial link between the fallen state of moral agents and the enduring

1

Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes (Vatican
City: Librebria Editrice Vaticana, 7 December 1965), § 2,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-etspes_en.html.
2
Darcia Narvaez, Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality: Evolution, Culture, and Wisdom
(NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 2014), 6.
3
Gn 2:9 (NRSV).
4
See Gn 3:23-24.
5
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. trans. Robert William Mulligan, SJ, James V. McGlynn,
SJ, and Robert W Schmidt, SJ, The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas. 3 vols. (Chicago, IL: Henry
Regnery Co., 1952-1954), InteLex Past Masters, q. 16, a. 1.
6
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, The Collected Works
of St. Thomas Aquinas (NY: Benzinger, 1947; repr. 1993), InteLex Past Masters, I, q. 79, a. 12.
7
St. Jerome introduced the term, synderesis, from the Stoic Greek term, synteresis, which means “preservation,”
“safekeeping,” “keeping something in mind,” and “warning.” See Katarzyna Stępień, “Synderesis and the
Natural Law,” Studia Gilsoniana 3, no. 3 (2014): 377.

divine presence in humanity.8 Ontologically, owing to divine grace which is unmerited, moral
agents are wonderfully left with that “spark of conscience”9 whose continued existence is a
reminder that human goodness has not been forfeited or lost despite the fall from grace. St.
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274),10 the Angelic Doctor (Doctor Angelicus), believes that the
natural “inclination to good cannot be taken away even from the damned.”11
The innate nature of synderesis is described by Aquinas as “a kind of seed plot containing in
germ all the knowledge which follows [and which] will be ready for use when needed.”12
However, it pertains only to its habitual nature that what synderesis innately contains, which
are “the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions,”13 is
“naturally present [and] always present”14 in moral agents. In this respect, Aquinas asserts that
an “act of knowing is not prerequisite for the power or habit of synderesis, but only for its
act.”15 This implies that while the innate disposition to the first principles of natural law is
naturally given, its epistemology rather requires time and experience. In this regard, this thesis
acknowledges two processes involved in the act of synderesis, viz., pre-cognitive and cognitive
processes, which undergird the inchoative knowledge of the first principles of natural law. It
asserts that moral agency necessarily requires the dynamic elements of time and experience in
grasping developmentally knowledge of the self-evident truths of the primary moral principles.
Aquinas provides the methodology in dealing with these processes:
And since natural reason rises to the knowledge of God through
creatures, while on the other hand the knowledge of God by faith comes
down to us by divine revelation, and since the way of ascent is the same
as that of descent, we must needs proceed by the same way in those
things above reason which are an object of faith, as that which we

8

Robert A. Greene, “Synderesis, the Spark of Conscience, in the English Renaissance,” Journal of the History
of Ideas 52, no. 2 (1991): 196.
9
Bonaventure, Sentences II, d. 39, a. 2, a. 1 in Douglas Langston, “The Spark of Conscience: Bonaventure’s
View of Conscience and Synderesis,” Franciscan Studies 53, no.1 (1993): 85
10
Ralph McInerny and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas,” in The Standford Encylopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edwatd N. Zalta (Summer 2018 Edition).
https://plato.standford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/Aquinas/>.
11
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 3. (St. Thomas Aquinas will be referred hereafter as ‘Aquinas.’)
12
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1.
13
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 1. (In this thesis, the term, first principles or precepts of natural
law, is used interchangeably with similar terms such as first principles or precepts of moral action, first
principles or precepts of practical reason, universal or primary or first moral principles.)
14
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 2.
15
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1.
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followed hitherto in those matters concerning God which we
investigated by reason.16
As moral agents navigate through life in pursuit of the practical moral truth, this thesis explores
this moral passage where, owing to its nature as “a prelude to the act virtue,”17 synderesis sets
the ends to moral virtues, particularly the acquired virtue of prudence, in achieving human
flourishing.
In the moral universe, moral agents exist as historical beings who are naturally capable of selfgovernance and self-transcendence. This statement finds foundation in Aquinas’s anthropology
which states that human operations are founded and are meant to manifest the very nature of
the human essence. This means that “since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is
in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to
virtue.”18 The acquisition of virtue is indispensably the key factor in moral development,
particularly the moral virtue of prudence which, by being moved by synderesis, regulates the
means when it “applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters.”19
This statement underlines one of the propositions being argued in this thesis that when the first
principles of natural law are considered, it need not be exclusively stated as an absolute
metaphysical reality whose practical signification will always be presumed as being universally
valid regardless of the consideration of the contingent historicity of moral agents. The acquired
virtue of prudence mitigates the consideration of the search for the moral truth by assimilating
the primary moral principles and the infinity of singulars in the determination of the morality
of human acts. It relegates divine illumination and physicalism as epistemological extremes
which do not represent Thomistic epistemology.
In considering the act of prudence, this thesis further proposes the consideration of moral
imagination in prudential moral inquiries. Aquinas’s appreciation of what moral imagination
can offer to prudential deliberations is regrettably not directly evident. Though his views were
evidently conditioned by medieval philosophy and psychology prevalent during his time, there
is still definitely much to be admired in Aquinas’s understanding of the moral person. This

16

Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles. trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, The Collected
Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1934), InteLex Past Masters, lib. 4,
cap. 1.
17
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 2.
18
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 3.
19
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 47, a. 6.

3

understanding is renewed most particularly when his doctrine on the natural law is studied via
the moral psychology of Darcia Narvaez in her Triune Ethics Theory. Her scientific research
will demonstrate just how vital moral imagination is in moral development. Specifically
considering her Ethic of Imagination will provide scientific grounding to what this thesis refers
to as imaginative prudence. The habituation of this virtue provides moral agents the benefit of
moral imagination which conjointly facilitates the understanding of the universal moral
principles and of the contingencies of human historicity in the moral consideration of human
acts. Imaginative prudence informs moral agents of those acts which are virtuous.
By and large, with moral agency20 as the overarching focus, the main objectives of this thesis
centre on the following: (i) to explore the ontology and epistemology of Aquinas’s innate
habitual disposition called synderesis, (ii) to investigate the moral development of the first
principles of natural law via the correlation between synderesis and acquired moral virtues, (iii)
to propose the necessity of imagination in prudence’s role in moral development via moral
inquiry, and (iv) to interrelate the Thomistic doctrine of the natural law (legis naturalis) and its
correlative reality of natural inclination (inclinationis naturalis) with the scientific
(psychological) research of Darcia Narvaez on the Ethic of Imagination in moral formation and
development. Two literatures hold primary place in pursuit of the above objectives: St. Thomas
Aquinas’s Summa theologiae and Darcia Narvaez’s Neurobiology and the Development of
Human Morality: Evolution, Culture, and Wisdom.21 Library research and analysis and
synthesis of research materials are facilitated to achieve the originality of the thesis project.
Accruing from these objectives, moral agency as used in this thesis is understood from the
perspective of human agents who may or may not have yet discovered the “truth about God.”22
This research assumes that since it deals with natural law as the basis of moral principles, the
premise of its universality is inherent. It also takes cognisance of the revealed truth that just
like the universal nature of synderesis, “God, who knows the human heart…has made no

20

This Christian anthropological categorisation of moral agency is owed particularly to Karl Rahner, SJ who
conceives of the essence of the ‘historical being’ as the object of divine revelation and salvation which are both
encountered within the moral agent’s historicity. Rahner’s transcendental theology generally accounts for this
conceptualisation whereby moral agents exercise their freedom in responding to God’s self-communication that
brings about self-realisation and self-fulfilment. Note that in this thesis the term moral agency (or moral agent)
is used interchangeably with the term human agency (or human agent) unless stipulated otherwise. See Karl
Rahner, SJ, “The Theological Dimension of the Question About Man,” in Theological Investigations: Jesus,
Man and the Church (NY: Crossroad, 1981) 53-70; Karl Rahner, SJ, “Man (Anthropology)” in Encyclopedia of
Theology: A Concise Sacramentum Mundi, ed. Karl Rahner, SJ (London: Burns and Oates, 1975), 887-893.
21
See footnotes 2 and 6 above for Darcia Narvaez and St. Thomas Aquinas’s literatures respectively.
22
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
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distinction between them and us.”23 The language of ‘natural ends’ proceeds from this
assumption where the reality of the supernatural ends (beatific vision) is further envisaged for
those whose lives commit to the truths about God. This thesis maintains the knowledge of God
is the ultimate goal of every human cognition and operation: “Man naturally desires, as his last
end, to know the first cause. But God is the first cause of all. Therefore man’s last end is to
know God.”24
Outside the parameters of the objectives of this research, the moral agents’ realisation of their
human ends, both natural and supernatural, is not just an essential task based on human selfpromotion; more importantly, it is the moral agents’ moral responsibility based on their human
essence as imago Dei. The potential significance of this research points not just to its
contribution to the world of the academe, i.e., to advance and promote the interdisciplinary
study between Thomistic theology and the science of psychology, but also, to proffer practical
imaginative moral pathways that engender human flourishing on both personal and communal
levels via virtue habituation. The ensuing discussion, therefore, echoing the Thomistic good
construed as an ‘end,’ points to the irrevocable truth that: “Deus est ultimus finis hominis.”25
In view of the above, alongside this current Chapter 1 which gives a general overview of moral
agency, Chapter 2 briefly surveys the history behind the conception of the term, synderesis. Its
history will allude to the alleged transliteration error which, through the passage of time and
community reflection, had given birth to synderesis that is held to dispose moral agents to the
first principles of natural law. Since the subject of synderesis is the intelligent human person,
Chapter 3 focusses on Aquinas’s anthropology whose understanding of the human person as a
hylomorphic being is morally grounded on synderesis. The act of synderesis opens the mind of
moral agents to the reality of the practical moral good and challenges them to persevere in
actuating its practical meaning by acquiring moral virtues. This good is viewed as ‘practical’
since human intellect is ordered by practical reason to perform human acts that are perfective
and completive of the human essence. On the other hand, it is ‘moral’ since it points to the
ethical responsibility of all human persons to fulfil their end (telos) in accordance with natural

23

Acts 15:8-9.
Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 25.
25
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 8. “God is the ultimate end of man.”
24
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law. Aquinas asserts the moral imperative of fulfilling the contents of the natural law “since to
sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature.”26
Chapter 4 discusses the ontology and epistemology of synderesis. It highlights the intelligibility
of moral goods (ends) due to the actuation of synderesis. This research will stress that
synderesis does not only innately dispose moral agents to the primary principles
(intuitive/precognitive/non-cognitive process), but it also assists in the development and
maturation of the epistemic contents of the natural law (apprehensive/cognitive process). This
understanding extends the traditional understanding of synderesis as a disposition to include
its habitual propensity to sustain moral agency within the moral sphere. This ontological
procession will see the correlation between synderesis and virtue. Underpinning the discussion
in this chapter is the introduction of the notion of natural law which will gain further clarity as
the thesis proceeds in its elaboration.
Chapter 5 studies the fundamental ‘material’ elements constitutive of Aquinas’s epistemology.
Although synderesis is innate, the intuition (pre-cognitive; non-cognitive) and apprehension
(cognitive) of the first principles of natural law will still require sensitive knowledge from the
social environment (moral sphere). Aquinas believes that the sources of human knowledge,
apart from the extramental world, also include imagination. As one of the internal senses
(interior sensoria), imagination’s role in epistemology is especially pertinent to moral
development. It is during the turn to phantasm when the process of abstraction unfolds that the
intellectus agens (active or agent intellect) encounters the moral agent’s historicity
(materiality). Moral imagination and synderesis conjointly open human consciousness to the
primary moral principles and their practical consideration of contingent matters.
Chapter 6 elaborates the correlation between synderesis and acquired moral virtues,
particularly the virtue of prudence. Acquiring moral virtues is indispensable for moral
development. Although Aquinas relegates the acquired moral virtues as imperfect in view of
the perfective nature of infused virtues, they have practical significance for moral development
and moral inquiry. Acquired moral virtues form moral agents to be virtuous people while, at
the same time, they inform their behaviour as to whether their actions correspond to their
human nature and those which will yield accordingly the proper human ends. Acquired moral
virtues have, therefore, an essential role in the formation and information of moral agents in
26
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leading them to discover the first principles of natural law and its derivates, and through it,
realise their natural inclinations via virtue habituation. In addition, virtue habituation is
essential for moral exemplars or virtue-enablers, such as parents and grandparents, who have
the specific important role of forming the future generation, most particularly children in their
early sensitive years.
Chapter 7 takes an in-depth look at the beneficence of moral imagination and how it assists and
facilitates the apprehension of the first principles of natural law. This section continues to argue
for the necessity of moral imagination in prudential moral inquiry, an essential intellective and
appetitive process which Aquinas appears to have not fully advanced. The beneficence of
imaginative prudence is proposed as an indispensable reality in fomenting the earlier
apprehended first principles of natural law which innately serves as an ethical foundation in
moral development.
Chapter 8 compares and contrasts Aquinas’s doctrine on synderesis with Darcia Narvaez’s
Triune Ethics Theory. This chapter analytically demonstrates the parallelism between
Aquinas’s teachings on the acquired moral virtues as an essential element in the ongoing
apprehension of the practical good and Narvaez’s scientific observations on moral
development based on the evolutionary and anthropological roots of the three global ethical
mindsets relating to the Triune Ethics Theory. This investigation will show not just how
intimate both studies are in relation to human flourishing, but also, it will provide scientific and
anthropological foundations to the importance of moral imagination in moral development.
Furthermore, it will necessarily take the discussion beyond ecclesial statements allowing for a
broader treatment of the subject matter. Narvaez claims that the Ethic of Imagination, being
the most developed and most complex of the three global ethical mindsets, is the key
behavioural disposition that motivates moral agents to fulfil their human essence.
Chapter 9 analytically compares Aquinas’s doctrine on natural inclinations with Narvaez’s
Triune Ethics Theory. This chapter investigates the traditional debate between the order of
reason and the order of nature in the discovery, understanding and application of the natural
law. The awareness of the natural law is held to be instantaneous although its cognitive
formulation and maturation is inchoative spanning a lifespan. The comparative study will show
that although Aquinas’s moral psychology is obviously medieval, hence lacking the research
methodology that modern science employs, it still proffers qualitative and legitimate assertions
7

that hold validity in modern psychology particularly in the scientific research of Narvaez. This
evinces that there is verity in the moral psychology of Aquinas that still holds relevance in
contemporary practical sciences.
Chapter 10 concludingly explores and demonstrates the viability of imagining the natural law
via scientific and anthropological appropriations in moral inquiries. Using Narvaez’s global
ethical mindsets and her studies on primal wisdom, the natural law that is promoted by the
universal primary principles via natural inclination is explicated. Formally involving the
element of imaginative prudence, the significance of these appropriations is extended to moral
agents’ engagement in discernment exercises which serve as conducive platforms for
imaginative contemplation and imaginative mindfulness. These exercises aim to form moral
agents in realising their role in the community as moral exemplars or as virtue-enablers. This
is in keeping with the fundamental reality that moral development, apart from self-authorship
and self-fulfilment, also requires the community in the virtue-formation of future generations.
Towards the ends, for the first principles of natural law to effectively serve as a moral
foundation, there needs to be the commitment towards the habituation of imaginative prudence
which facilitates the sound assessments of the moral sphere in view of achieving natural and
supernatural ends. Synderesis initiates this intuitive process and sustains even more the
subsequent apprehensive process in order to cause moral agents to remain in the moral sphere
where pathways to moral ascendancy take shape and are realised.
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Chapter 2
Synderesis and Moral Agency

Introduction
Synderesis, the habitus that disposes moral agents to the first principles of natural law, is a
theological concept that flourished and permeated the foray of medieval literature and
discussion between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.1 Historically, had it not been for Peter
Lombard’s Sentences wherein he made a slight reference to St. Jerome’s Commentary on
Ezekiel,2 the term synderesis would have remained in the abyss of forgotten terminologies.
Written during the mid-twelfth century, Lombard’s citation does not reveal much but the
interest it gathered rippled through subsequent centuries:
And so it is rightly said that man naturally wills the good, because he
was established in a good and righteous will; for the higher spark of
reason, which, as Jerome says, even in Cain could not be extinguished,
always wills the good and hates evil. And they say that there is a second
movement of the mind by which the mind, after relinquishing the law
of higher things, subjects itself to sins and takes pleasures in them.3
Though Lombard’s reference was merely concerned with the operation of the will rather than
with the much broader and, at that time, in-vogue topic of moral agency via conscience, his
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Sentences attracted plenty of commentaries. Apart from the rise and expansion of universities
and “the prominence that theology gained within these establishments”4 that provided
enthusiasm amongst medieval authors to deal with the concept of conscience, it was also due
to St. Jerome’s transcription of the Greek word, syneidesis, to synteresis (which later was
transliterated as synderesis or synteresis in Latin and English)5 that contributed to the flux of
commentaries. Timothy Potts provides the English translation of the Commentary on Ezekiel,
1.7:
Most people interpret the man, the lion and the ox as the rational,
emotional and appetitive parts of the soul, following Plato’s division,
who calls them the logikon and thymikom and epithymetikon, locating
reason in the brain, emotion in the gall-bladder and appetite in the liver.
And they posit a fourth part which is above and beyond these three, and
which the Greeks call synteresin: that spark of conscience which was
not even extinguished in the breast of Cain after he was turned out
of Paradise, and by which we discern that we sin, when we are
overcome by pleasures or frenzy and meanwhile are misled by an
imitation of reason. They reckon that this is, strictly speaking, the
eagle, which it not mixed up with the other three, but corrects them
when they go wrong, and of which we read in Scripture as the spirit
‘which intercedes for us with ineffable groaning’ (Romans 8:26). ‘For
no one knows what a man is really like, except the spirit which is in
him (I Corinthians 2:11). And, writing to the Thessalonians, Paul also
entreats for it to be kept sound together with soul and body (I
Thessalonians 5:23). However, we also see that this conscience is cast
down in some people, who have neither shame nor insight regarding
their offences, and loses its place, as is written in the book of Proverbs:
‘When the wicked man reaches the depths of sin, he doesn’t care a
damn.’ (Proverbs 18:3) So they deserve to be told: ‘You have acquired
the face of a prostitute, you refuse to blush’ (Jeremiah 3:3).6
Many authors although they regarded St. Jerome’s transcription as a scribal error saw positive
elements in it. Robert A. Greene acknowledges for example that: “Whatever the origin of the
word…the concept expressed by it appears to have filled a logical need, which probably
accounts for its thorough development and elaboration during the Middle Ages.”7 Douglas
Langston likewise echoes a similar thought: “It is unclear that Jerome meant to distinguish the
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two, but the distinction plays a major role in late medieval discussion on conscience.”8 Tobias
Hoffman is more methodical in his approval:
The text is important for two reasons. First, there Jerome introduces the
term synderesis (presumably a corruption of the Greek word for
conscience, syneidésis) to medieval theologians. Second, the
scholastics treated some of the observations in the text regarding
synderesis and conscience as having axiomatic value, on account of
Jerome’s authority.9
Departing from the above perspective is John Mahoney who, considering St. Paul who used
the popular Greek word, syneidesis, to refer to conscience, accepts that “Jerome used another
and much more rare [sic] Greek term, synteresis, to refer to the scintilla, or spark, of
conscience, a power still flickering in man even after sin.”10 The troublesome text, however,
remains unresolved and Linda Hogan summarises this general state of affairs: “Whether this
corruption was introduced by Jerome or by later scribes is still the subject of debate, however.
Indeed, there is a growing school of thought that disputes the fact that Jerome used the term
synteresis at all.”11
While few authors still mention in their writings the unresolved rationale underlying the
seeming error in the transcription of syneidesis to synderesis, synderesis now enjoys its official
inclusion in Catholic moral theology.12 The Catechism of the Catholic Church makes mention
of synderesis in section number 1780: “The dignity of the human person implies and requires
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uprightness of moral conscience. Conscience includes the perception of the principles of
morality (synderesis).”13
The path that synderesis undertook to reach its current doctrinal level should not be viewed
merely as a necessary logical attribution accepted in time without any serious thought or
reflection. There is also the human side to this process. Hogan reflects on the state of mind of
medieval authors regarding their theological pre-occupation with synderesis:
Indeed it was the reluctance, particularly among medievalists, to
contemplate the possibility of error, that resulted in the creation of
categories of the habitual conscience (synderesis) and the actual
conscience (conscientia), which in turn formed the basis of theology
that could affirm both that ‘conscience in man’s most secret core, and
his sanctuary…[where] he is alone with God whose voice echoes in the
depths’ and also that ‘it often happens that conscience goes astray
through ignorance which it is unable to avoid.’14
Consequently, the inclusion of synderesis in the official Catholic Church teaching, albeit
parenthetically cited, reveals primarily the action of the Church to acknowledge the true reality
of this habit of the practical intellect notwithstanding its indeterminate etymological origin.
Secondarily, the inclusion recognises the consensus fidelium15 that had shaped and had
underpinned the theological evolution of synderesis towards being firmly established in the
moral tradition of the Catholic Church.16 The above revelations underscore the creative efforts
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of the People of God who obviously co-operated with the Spirit of Truth in discovering and
accepting in faith what appears to have been present since the beginning of human creation.
True to her evangelical mission, the Catholic Church played its part by preserving and
communicating the faith and understanding of the People of God regarding synderesis that had
been handed down from one generation to the next. Without doubt, the authority of Aquinas
played a major role in it and the likes of St. Augustine and St. Albert the Great would also have
had a pivotally instrumental role in the magisterial consideration of synderesis. The reasons
cited above persuasively point to the conclusion that conscience always had, as part of its
operation, the perception of the internal principles of the moral order even at that time when it
was not yet named the habit of synderesis. The neologism was perhaps a felix culpa.
The medieval treatment of conscience included the consideration of synderesis due largely to
the more-than-likely scribal error which would have intrigued and challenged medieval authors
to address this new theological concept. Eric D’Arcy explains that before a systematic study of
synderesis was ever undertaken, there was a time of “muddled, uncritical exegesis of the
passage”17 in St. Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel that resulted in a lot of confusion about
what synderesis is all about. Nonetheless, medieval authors engaged with the subject matter
which then provided thematic platforms for ensuing generations. Hogan points out that arising
from the introduction of synderesis into the narrative world of moral theology, medieval
authors dealt with four issues: “(a) whether synderesis is a faculty, (b) whether it belongs to
the intellect or to the will, (c) whether it is something that can be lost and (d) what is the
relationship between synderesis and conscientia.”18 The answers to each of these points are
pertinently crucial in gaining an understanding of synderesis. The next chapter will shed light
on some of these aspects of synderesis.
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Medieval Thematic Treatment of Synderesis
Dalia Marija Stanciene, reflecting on the propensity of medieval authors towards a legalistic
interpretation of conscience, points out the place of synderesis in the prevailing scholarship at
that time:
During the second part of the twelfth century the interest of scholars
was focused on the properties of synderesis…. Does synderesis
necessarily lead man to good or can it bring him to perdition? Can
synderesis be extinguished and condemned in evil doers who see and
desire nothing except evil? Should synderesis be regarded as natural
law?19
The legalistic treatment of conscience was a stark contrast to its historical roots where the
discursive narrative then was focused on the nature and function of conscience.
Retrospectively, during the medieval period when the academia of learning was flourishing
from the thoughts of St. Augustine, Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, St. Bonaventure and
many others, Aquinas joined the theological debate and subsequently rose to unparalleled
prominence with his insights on many theological issues particularly on synderesis. His
contribution in this respect was no doubt cutting-edge and would be decisive in the history of
Catholic moral theology on conscience. Hogan agrees: “The moral theology of Aquinas
represents a high point in the Middle Ages.”20
It is a given historical fact that when Aquinas entered the debate on synderesis, there were
already two prevailing schools of thought. These two conflicting philosophical paradigms were
thought to be brought about by the confusion regarding the relationship between syneidesis21
and the new concept of synderesis. One school, the voluntarists, viewed synderesis as a habit
that disposes the will towards the good. This school followed the thoughts of the early
thirteenth century author, Philip the Chancellor, who wrote the first medieval treatise explicitly
on conscience.22 St. Bonaventure became its most popular adherent. He specifically placed
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synderesis in the affect since he understood it as a passion (desire) for the practical good. He
based his assertion on the fact that when moral agents fail to follow their conscience, the
resulting experience is guilt or regret which emanates from the affect.23 The other school, the
intellectualists, viewed synderesis as a habit of the intellect and specifically as a habit of the
practical reason. The Dominicans, including St. Albert the Great and Aquinas, generally
represented this school of thought. The history of Catholic moral theology should note that
Aquinas’s teaching on synderesis as a habit, and not a faculty, only came about when he wrote
the Summa theologiae. In scholastic theology, an (innate) ‘habit’ denotes that “with which one
is born or supposedly is born”24 while ‘faculty’ refers to “a power, ability, or active potency to
do or to make.”25 Amid their differing theological views, both schools of thought considered
synderesis as infallible and indestructible or inextinguishable.26
The work which Aquinas did on the theological notion of synderesis is described by Potts as a
“tidying-up operation.”27 Indeed, though there were confusions and exaggerations during a
century of debate and reflection, Aquinas’s efforts contributed largely to the development of
the theology of the relationship between synderesis and syneidesis which became the
foundation for later reflections particularly on the Catholic understanding of the nature of
conscience.

Textual Loci of Synderesis in the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas
St. Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine on synderesis is extensively treated in both his Summa
theologiae and Quaestiones disputatae de veritate. He wrote his Summa theologiae for “ad
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eruditionem incipientium” (the instruction of beginners)28 in the Christian religion. He bore in
mind the difficulty of newcomers in understanding the Christian faith due in part to the lack of
an effective methodology during his time. Aquinas spent eight years in writing the Summa
theologiae. Prima pars (First Part) and Prima secundae partis (First of the Second Part) were
first written between 1265 and 1269 in Rome. The Prima pars deals with the themes on Sacred
Doctrine, The Blessed Trinity, Creation, The Angels, The Six Days, Man, and The Government
of Creatures while the Prima secundae partis discusses the themes on Man’s Last End, Human
Acts, Passions, Habits, Vice and Sin, Law, and Grace. Aquinas began writing the Secunda
secundae partis (Second of the First Part) in Rome and completed it in Paris in the year 1271.
He wrote on the following subjects: Faith, Hope, Charity, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude,
Temperance, and Acts Which Pertain to Certain Men. Tertia pars (Third Part) was written
when Aquinas was in Naples in 1272 where he worked on the following treatises: The
Incarnation, The Life of Christ, Sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, The Holy Eucharist,
Penance. Aquinas did not finish writing the Tertia pars. The remaining treatises on the
sacraments, i.e., the continuation of Penance, Extreme Unction, Holy Orders, Matrimony,
including a treatise on The Resurrection, were posthumously added comprising what is now
called as the Supplementum tertiae partis (Supplementary to the Third Part).
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, on the other hand, was written when Aquinas began his
career as a master in theology at the University of Paris from 1256-59. As university masters,
they were expected to conduct disputations (public debates) several times in each university
year in order to academically train their students. It was considered then as an effective way of
pedagogy. Masters presented topics for public debates where positive and negative affirmations
were recorded and subsequently resolved by the masters by way of their disputations. At the
end of each public debate (disputatio), masters write their disputations. During his tenure,
Aquinas wrote several of them including Quaestiones disputatae de veritate where twenty-nine
disputed questions were expounded. To name a few, question 1 deals with Truth, question 2
on God’s Knowledge, question 3 on Ideas, question 4 on The Divine Word, question 10 on The
Mind, question 11 on The Teacher, question 12 on Prophecy, question 13 on Rapture, question
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14 on Faith, question 21 on Good, question 23 on God’s Will, question 27 on Grace, question
28 on The Justification of Sinners, and question 29 on The Grace of Christ.29
Specifically in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Aquinas allocates question 16 to synderesis
and follows this up by his treatment on conscience in question 17. Synderesis, on the other
hand, considered under the broader topic of The Intellectual Powers, is featured in the Prima
pars of the Summa theologiae question 79, under the sub-heading, Treatise on Man, where
article 12 expounds on the question, Whether ‘synderesis’ is a special power of the soul distinct
from others? and where article 13 deals with the question, Whether conscience is a power.30
Regarding Quaestiones disputatae de veritate’s question 16, On Synderesis, which was written
ten years prior to the Summa theologiae,31 Aquinas deals with three sub-questions: (i) “Is
synderesis a power or a habit?”, (ii) “Can synderesis err?”, and (iii) “Are there some in whom
synderesis is extinguished?” In this respect, he explains that synderesis is a “natural habit
[which acts] to warn against evil and to incline to good.”32 Further, being a “natural habit,”
Aquinas asserts that synderesis is immutable and immovable. As a “natural habit,” synderesis
is considered as an agent whose actuation is only realised by an efficient cause.33 When it
comes to the question of error, Aquinas contends that synderesis does not err but only in its
application of general principles to particular cases.34 Moreover, he believes that ignorance,
passion, weak will, evil habits, vices, sin and concupiscence may impede the cognition and
appetition of the universal principles.35

29

See the following commentaries on the works of St. Thomas Aquinas: Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore
Stump, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1214; Aidan Nichols, OP, Discovering Aquinas: An Introduction to his Life, Work and Influence (London: Darton,
Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), 3-18; Thomas Franklin O’Meara, OP, Thomas Aquinas Theologian (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 41-86; Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas: A General
Introduction to the Life and Work of the Angelic Doctor, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (USA: Pantheon
Books, 1961), 75-88; and Torrell, OP, Jean-Pierre, Saint Thomas Aquinas Volume 1: The Person and His Work,
trans. Robert Royal (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America, 1996), 54-74, 142-159.
30
Clarity is enhanced if the Summa theologiae is read in parallel with its Latin translation since it would
precisely indicate the variance between synderesis from conscientia instead of just ‘conscience’ in the English
translation. However, adding to the potential textual confusion is Aquinas’s deliberate nuancing of conscientia
as also referring to synderesis being a habitus: “hic habitus interdum conscientia nominator.” See Aquinas,
Summa theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 13.
31
Smith, Conscience and Catholicism: The Nature and Function of Conscience in Contemporary Roman
Catholic Moral Theology, 6.
32
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 1.
33
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 1.
34
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 17, a. 2.
35
Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

17

Aquinas elaborates the ontology between synderesis and syneidesis in articles 12 and 13 under
question 79 in the Summa theologiae’s Prima pars where he expresses the necessity of utilising
the primary moral principles grasped by synderesis for consideration of particular situations:
“For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge
to something; for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scientia, i.e., knowledge applied
to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by the same act.”36
In article nineteen of the Summa theologiae’s Prima secundae, Aquinas sheds further light on
the contrast between synderesis and syneidesis by expounding on the question: Whether the
will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason? Answering the question of whether an
erroneous conscience is binding, Aquinas replies by stating that: “[A]bsolutely speaking, every
will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.”37 His reply, which is
fundamentally expressive of the nature and function of synderesis, is underlined by his own
assertion that “the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason.”38 Since reason
possesses the habit of the practical intellect, the habit called synderesis, it is practical reason
that guides the will towards the specific performance of an action. In other words, it is practical
reason which guides syneidesis to perform an action that is in consonance with the universal
truths of doing good and avoiding evil.
The notion of the ultimate end in the context of moral agency must be considered principally
in relation to, among other things, the treatment of human virtues. Since virtues perfect the
rational power,39 it is through the habituation of virtues that human volition will cause moral
agents to move towards their ultimate end. Answering the query on the justification of humans
via virtues, Aquinas explains that: “As to those things which are done by us, God causes them
in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.”40
Aquinas’s exitus et reditus principle connotes what Rahner regards as the “historically
becoming…and is essential unfinished” free response of the moral agent to God’s selfcommunication.41 In this respect, moral agents confront and ask themselves not simply the
question, “Who am I?”, but rather, “How do I become what I ought to be?” In this process of
becoming, moral agents would need to draw from various moral sources that would equip them
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with the necessary ethical dispositions in view of properly engaging in moral deliberations
prior to making moral judgments.
Fundamentally, the nature of moral agents as historical intelligent beings who are naturally
capable of self-governance and self-transcendence would need to be further grounded by their
knowledge of universal moral principles, specifically of the most basic of these which are the
first principles of natural law. As they face the contingent realities of this world, including their
own moral fragility, they stand not just as existential intelligent beings, but more profoundly,
as ontological beings who are naturally disposed to discover and to know what is good. This
ontological disposition, however, cannot be presumed to be capable of being demonstrated by
moral agents at all times, most especially when the concrete conditions for human virtues to
foment are impoverished or absent. Moral development is crucial. Imaginative prudence is
vitally and crucially beneficial. Divine grace is perpetual.
After situating moral agents in the midst of their social environment which presents the
challenges for discovering their moral identity and moral agency, the following chapter
discusses the anthropology of moral agency according to Aquinas. Since Aquinas locates
synderesis in the rational part of the human soul, it is imperative that this assertion is grounded
broadly in his understanding of the human person.

The Challenges of Moral Agency Today
Confronted by the challenges posed by this current millennium, moral agents find themselves
being confronted by the unabated rapid movements of human events, either possibly resigning
to complacency due to human limitations and attitudinal dispositions, or perhaps committedly
securing fulfilment of their human ends. Among these challenges, John Paul II identifies a
“crisis of truth”42 where a “radically subjectivistic conception of moral judgment”43 has
become commonplace in modern society. Objective moral standards are being ignored in moral
deliberations. On the other hand, Benedict XVI sees the moral danger when industrialised
nations impose their secularised ideologies on developing countries in the guise of offering
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economic help. He asserts that the practical atheism that richer countries export to developing
countries consequently causes the “moral underdevelopment”44 of these people since they are
being driven away by such idealogues from fully integrating their human development that is
meant to recognise the work of God in their lives. When human life is driven by economic
factors alone, the sanctity of human life is abandoned. Pope Francis himself recognises this
threat of secularisation and observes that the modern age of knowledge and information has
given rise to a “rejection of ethics and a rejection of God.”45 He also raises the concern of the
phenomenon of “rapidification” 46 which sees the unbridled and unabated succession of events
that tends to harm society and the quality of human life by leading human attention away from
God. Yet in the midst of all these challenges, he reminds everyone that: “What we have been
promised is greater than we can imagine. May we never lose heart because of our limitations,
nor ever stop seeking that fullness of love and communion which God holds out before us.”47
The horizon of human concerns and the many other influences situate the moral agents in their
social environment with its “joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties…of this age.”48
The proceeding introductory discussion presents four perspectives in coming to an
understanding of the nature and function of synderesis in moral agency: personal, doctrinal,
communal, and teleological. These perspectives reveal the multi-faceted nature of synderesis
which supersedes any notion that it is merely a passive inclination awaiting actuation. Its
thematic division is not meant to compartmentalise the reality of synderesis, but rather, it aims
to show the richness of this innate reality in bringing about fulfillment and perfection in the
life of moral agents. The consideration of the scientific research of Darcia Narvaez in this thesis
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will demonstrate these riches as exemplified by the phenomena of neuroplasticity, epigenesis
and environmental effectuations.

Personal: Synderesis as ‘Spark of Divine Love’
In the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes, the Second
Vatican Council Fathers explored the universally acknowledged anthropological quandary:
“But what is man?”49 Karl Rahner, SJ concurs: “Man has always been a source of inquiry to
himself.”50 Influenced by a ressourcement theology that sought to recoup neglected and
forgotten themes from traditional resources such as the Holy Scriptures, the Council Fathers
turned to the Book of Genesis to draw up a theological foundation suitable for exploring the
basic question about the essence of humanity.51 The Old Testament concept of imago Dei52
was presented as a starting point in unravelling the meaning of moral agency in the face of
current challenges. It spoke of the imago Dei as an existential condition whereby women and
men are called from the outset “to communion [and]…to converse with God.”53 It understood
this ‘call’ as ‘personal’ since God created women and men in His own image and likeness.
Likewise, it is ‘personal’ because the ‘call’ requires women and men’s free response to enter
into a relationship with the Trinitarian God. The Council Fathers further affirmed that because
of the personal nature of this call, “[t]his likeness reveals that man…is the only creature on
earth God wills for itself.”54
Through divine providence, moral agents have the fundamental capacity for God (capax Dei)
because they have been created in the image of God (imago Dei). This capacity enables moral
agents to confidently journey towards the realm of eschatology. This confidence stems from
the moral agents’ ontological condition that in spite of their ignorance, inordinate passion, weak
will, vices, sin or concupiscence that may possibly steer them away from acquiring human
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ends, the innate existence of synderesis, that “spark of divine love,”55 beckons moral agents to
discover fully this divinely effusing love that perdures in their heart. Such a love-revealing
innate spark invites moral agents to a “primal remembrance of the good and true [that] is
bestowed”56 on every moral agent. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, who later became Pope Benedict
XVI, made use of the Hebrew term, anamnesis, in lieu of synderesis, to describe its role in
fostering the active remembrance of the unconditional love of God despite human
transgression. Notwithstanding, Aquinas still asserts that synderesis is not tainted by sin’s
corruption of human nature. He maintains that synderesis admits no error in the face of the
good and the truth: “error can happen…due to a false deduction, or because of a false
assumption.”57 However, error will come not from synderesis but “from [the] wrong use of
principles.”58 Furthermore, Aquinas acknowledges that synderesis may be impeded from
expressing the first principles of natural law during instances when the moral agent’s faculty
of reason is “engrossed by some passion, or oppressed by some habit.”59 This elucidation
unveils that though cognition may already have been undertaken, volition may not necessarily
be forthcoming unless moral virtues, such as prudence, are personally habituated by moral
agents so that the “good is done and pursued, and evil is avoided” (bonum est faciendum et
prosequendum, et malum vitandum).60

Doctrinal: Synderesis as the ‘Imperatives of the Divine Law’
The Second Vatican Council produced an important theological statement on conscience that
puts emphasis on moral agents rather than their obedience to laws:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not
impose upon himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always
summoning him to love good and avoid evil, the voice of conscience
when necessary speaks to his heart: do this, shun that. For man has in
his heart a law written by God; to obey it is the very dignity of man;
according to it he will be judged. Conscience is the most secret core
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and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, whose voice
echoes in his depths.61
By putting moral agency in the spotlight of its discourse, Gaudium et spes images the
existential reality of moral agents who possess interiorly that comforting voice which serves as
a sanctuary where moral agents can be alone with God. Implicit in this important statement is
the silent acknowledgment of synderesis expressed in the traditional term of the law written by
God in the hearts of women and men summoning them to love good and to avoid evil. The
document recognises that moral agents may still err despite of the law written by God in their
hearts. Synderesis enables moral agents to detect this law which guides human capacity towards
moral consciousness. In addition, the Second Vatican Council’s document, Dignitatis
humanae, recognising the voice which guides human agents to discover the law in their hearts,
declares that: “man perceives and acknowledges the imperatives of the divine law through the
mediation of conscience.”62 The perception of the imperatives of the divine law refers to none
other than the intuitive apprehension of synderesis.
Reflecting on the imperative nature of the divine law, Aquinas points out that: “Synderesis is
said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law,
which are the first principles of human actions.”63 This statement gives some idea on the moral
weight of primary moral principles: natural law expresses the divine law in human terms. The
intrinsic relationship between synderesis and natural law serves as an existential principle of
unity that orients moral agents towards the full discovery of themselves as “intelligent being[s]
in an intelligible universe.”64 The contents of the first principles of natural law are held to be
derived from the operation of the intellectus agens65 and the intellective faculty of the human
mind whose contact with the social environment is essential in human intellection. In and
through this contact, moral agents become aware of their natural inclination as expressed by
the natural law. It is also in and through this contact that they, partly like the angels, seize
61
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divine wisdom through the intellectus agens. Stanciene renders this horizon as akin to
synderesis as “the space where human nature meets angelic nature.”66

Communal: Synderesis as ‘Spark of Conscience’
The ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council presupposes the human agents’ inner dialectic
between the freedom to be involved and the freedom to be formed. The former, which posits
the capacity to consent, initiates human agents to the reality of the community to which they
naturally and socially belong. The latter, on the other hand, underscores the reality of the role
of the community and the Church in providing wholistic and integral human formation.
In the Catholic Church tradition, the moral agent’s freedom to be formed is circumscribed
specifically by the ecclesial mission “to preserve God’s people from deviations and defections
and to guarantee them the objective possibility of professing the true faith without error.”67
This predisposition acknowledges the historicity of moral agents “who are subjected to
negative influences and tempted by sin to prefer their own judgment and to reject authoritative
teachings.”68 It is on this account that moral development via virtue formation is paramount in
realising the moral agents’ freedom to become true expressions of their human essence.
History will confirm the subjugation of human agents to various philosophical extremes such
as relativism and absolutism.69 These extreme tendencies, which are equally operative in
secularised societies and religious communities such as the Catholic Church, pose detrimental
threats to human flourishing. Benedict XVI offers his comment on these polarities that define
the religious experience of today:
Two antithetical conceptions of Catholicism are proposed. On the one
hand, we find a renewed understanding of the essence of Catholicism
that understands Christian faith on the basis of freedom and see this
faith as a principle that sets people free. On the other hand, we find a
superseded “preconciliar” model that subjects Christian experience to
an authority that issues norms to regulate people’s lives even in the
most intimate spheres and attempts in this way to maintain its power
66
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over them. It seems therefore that we have a conflict between two
antithetical models, morality of conscience and morality of authority.70
St. Jerome’s description of synderesis mentioned earlier as that spark of conscience which was
not even extinguished in the breast of Cain after he was turned out of Paradise reveals a
theology that is not just speculative but communally congruent with universal human nature.
This spark profoundly arouses the human heart of the community to seek the moral good. Such
a spark leads moral agents towards an intuitive awareness of the first principles of moral action.
It is an awareness that is founded on the ontological nature and function of synderesis.
Jan Krokos suggests that “the basic question about synderesis is concerned with its mode of
being or its place within the structure of man, or more precisely – the soul.”71 Aquinas locates
synderesis in the rational part of the soul72 and qualifiedly affirms that it is a habit although
“some held that it is a power higher than reason.”73 By contrast, St. Bonaventure places
synderesis in the affective part of the soul since the disposition is understood as a “desire for
the good.”74 The Thomistic notion of habit (habitus) refers “to the determination of a potency,
which so shapes the latter that it perfectly and permanently corresponds to its own nature.”75
Hence, synderesis, as habitus, disposes moral agent towards “the understanding of principles”76
which, in the mind of Aquinas, particularly refers to the apprehension of the first principles of
natural law. Through these principles, synderesis contributes to moral agency by its ontological
intuition to seek and pursue the good and to avoid evil. Synderesis directs human reason to the
goodness of human acts (humanorum actuum) and likewise reveals the contrary evil of the acts
of men and women77 since “synderesis does not regard opposites.”78 Since synderesis naturally
orients the moral agent only to a singular object, that is towards the first principles of natural
law, synderesis is considered as a “power of reason”79 only insofar as it possesses the capacity
to discover and know the practical good. Synderesis, being a disposition, actively seeks the
70
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practical good which aids in the epistemic growth of the moral agents’ knowledge of the
universal moral principles. Aquinas claims that the first principles of natural law are “naturally
known without any investigation on the part of reason.”80 On this basis, he establishes the
infallibility of synderesis: “This is the knowledge of the first general principles, in reference to
which everything else which is known is examined and by reason of which every truth is
approved and every falsehood rejected.”81

Teleological: Synderesis as ‘Habitus naturalis’
In pursuit of that path that will lead to self-authorship and self-fulfilment, moral agents discover
the harsh truth about themselves. Moral agents discover and realise that they “[have]
inclinations toward evil…and [are] engulfed by manifold ills which cannot come from [their]
good Creator.”82 Consequently, moral agents discover themselves in the throes of the dramatic
struggles between good and evil. Reminiscent of humanity’s fall from grace, they bite into their
new discovery and commit to it thereby impeding their own path to self-authorship and selffulfilment. But prior to such deleterious discovery, moral agents would have more than likely
discovered an affective propensity towards the good. Such propensity is at first similar to an
undefined thrust from within (pre-cognitive) moving moral agents to act on those of which will
be true to their human nature (cognitive). This thrust is the natural habit (habitus naturalis)83
of synderesis through which moral agents possess a fundamental awareness of the first
principles of natural law which they are able to use promptly when needed.84
Rahner, SJ identifies how moral agents are threatened from without and from within. He
explains that moral agents find themselves in various situations where outside influences, such
as materials and persons, will always be present. Although the extent of the influence rests
ultimately on the decision of moral agents, the possibility is never absent since there is ‘no
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zone’ within the spatio-temporal dimensions of the moral agent that is inaccessible to the
influence from without.85 On the other hand, moral agents either find themselves degrading
their dignity by going against themselves and the end to which they are called. Or, they
eventually find themselves upholding their dignity through the aid of divine grace and thus
progressively enhancing the maturation of their moral life.86 Rahner speaks of executing a
definitive free act of deciding in favour or against an ethical persuasion since “there cannot be
any existential neutrality in the face of the historical being of man.”87 Thus, moral agents would
have to respond one way or the other. Holy Scriptures provide practical direction in wrestling
with those life-defining moments: “No slave can serve two masters; for a slave will either hate
the one and love the other, or be devoted to the one and despise the other.”88
Moral agency emboldens human agents to confidently traverse the journey from freedom to
self-fulfilment. The instrumentality of human freedom allows human agents to seek realities
that will cause human flourishing or otherwise. Whichever course of action may have been
chosen, freedom ushers in the existential possibility for moral agents to seek fruition of their
human essence. They either stand on holy ground before the infinite God or take the path to
moral decadence. Catholic teaching upholds that through divine grace, that grace which
emanates from the absolute unconditional generosity of God and which completely is
unmerited on the part of created beings,89 freedom is both realised creatively in moral agents
by it and through the exercise of moral agents’ freedom to choose.90 It is only through openness
to divine grace that moral agents, finite though they are, will be brought by grace itself before
the presence of the Infinite Being.91 Considering its contrariety, freedom, however, can not
only betray the fundamental orientation of moral agency, but more catastrophically, can
gradually see the radical disavowing of the personal and free intent towards self-authorship and
self-fulfilment.
The earlier-considered question, “But what is man?”, draws out the following query: “What is
the ultimate end of both woman and man?” Aquinas thematically dedicates questions 1 to 5 in
the Prima secundae of his Summa theologiae to shed light on this anthropological question.
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Aquinas believes that the answer to this question is: happiness (beatitudo or felicitas).92 He
specifies that since moral agents necessarily act for an end93 and are acted upon voluntarily,94
this end is therefore a universal good that brings about human self-fulfilment.95 The perfection
and fulfilment of the human person is achieved by knowing and loving God.96 Aquinas believes
that this end is ultimately “happiness in God.”97

Summary
Aquinas’s principle of exitus et reditus, which alludes to the return of moral agents back to
God (reditus) after a period of self-isolation or separation (exitus), fundamentally asserts the
locus where moral agents become aware of their synderetic disposition and the challenges it
brings to the ends of moral development. In effect, it ultimately points to the acquisition of the
ultimate telos (end). This end (the goal of reditus) to which the moral agent has a natural
inclination, is “naturally apprehended by reason as being good.” 98 Natural inclination disposes
moral agents to pursue the practical good and to avoid evil. As the moral agents’ natural
inclinations are connatural99 with synderesis, both metaphysical entities dispose the moral
agent towards the natural law which fundamentally governs human nature.
Far from being merely construed as a passive disposition awaiting actuation, the reality of
synderesis in moral agents inherently possesses various attributes that define its natural
inclination to do good and avoid evil. The moral agent experiences an interior attraction to the
moral good (personal) which dictates fundamental norms of human conduct (doctrinal) that
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find contextualisation in the human society (communal) and which directs all moral agents to
their ultimate end (teleological) which is happiness in God. These attributions operate
synchronically to guide moral persons achieve self-fulfilment and self-perfection
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Chapter 3
The Concept of the Human Person in Thomistic Anthropology

Introduction
Notwithstanding the human state after Adam and Eve’s fall mentioned in the Book of Genesis,1
Holy Scriptures reveal that “God’s seed remains in them.”2 The initial verses of the third
chapter of the first Letter of Saint John present the reality of lawlessness and sin in the context
of humanity’s relationship with God. The reference to the seed reveals a profoundly sublime
meaning when its Latin etymology is considered. The Latin translation of the word, seed,
which could mean “offspring” or “descendant,”3 expresses the ideas of potentiality and
engendering. Two theological assertions can be drawn from this statement. Firstly, considering
the metaphor of the seed which possesses the capacity for growth, created beings have
potentials invested in them by God. When the seed grows, it unleashes these potentials which
reveal something about the essence of God who created them and the universe ex nihilo.4 And
secondly, as seeds would have come into being by a prior action (ex nihilo), there is an implicit
Creator-creature relationship that stems from the very action of God as the “universal cause of
being.”5 In this respect, created beings are metaphorically considered as ‘God’s offspring’ or
‘God’s descendants’ since every human life originates from God. This underlines the truth
behind the biblical assertion that men and women are created in the “image of God.”6 It is due
to this reason that created beings are able to rationally relate to God: “It is clear, therefore, that
1

Gn 3:1-24.
1 Jn 3:9.
3
Leo F. Stelten, Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Latin: With an appendix of Latin expressions defined and clarified,
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1995), s.v. “semen.”
4
Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 1, ad. 3.
5
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 45, a. 2.
6
Gn 1:27.
2

intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.”7 The discovery of
the practical good that synderesis grasps points human agents to their origin. The Thomistic
doctrine of emanation, i.e., all creatures originate from an uncaused principal cause,8 explains
why it is inherent for women and men to discover their attraction to God. This implicitly
signifies that something of the principal cause is present in the creature since “a thing has being
by participation.”9 The seed of synderesis continues to exist in every rational being because the
primordial good (being as good) which God created since the beginning of time, remains: “God
saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good.”10
Christian anthropology rests on the divine revelation which posits that in created beings, God’s
seeds remain. This seed is understood in this research as the seed of synderesis which God
implants in every human being and remains in them even when human agents succumb to
certain forms of lawlessness and sin. In the following discussion, Aquinas’s teaching on
anthropology will be first analysed. It will focus on the hylomorphic body-soul unicity of
created beings as determinants of human operations particularly ethical actions and moral
development. The ensuing discussion will consider the rational operations which Aquinas gives
priority over other faculties that determine human acts, including the will and passions. Human
acts, though under rational control, are affected, directly or indirectly, by factors that impede
human agents from performing moral acts. In relation to synderesis and its intuitive grasp of
the first principles of natural law, ignorance, weak will, inordinate passions, evil habits,
concupiscence and sin affect the moral growth and development of the knowledge of the moral
good. The difference between the Thomistic characterisation of an incontinent and intemperate
person will be evaluated subsequently in view of presenting possible moral contexts in which
the universal moral principles can either be ignored habitually or momentarily. The study of
Aquinas’s anthropology will serve as a theological foundation for the later reflection on virtues
whose ends synderesis appoints.
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 93, a. 2.
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Thomistic Anthropology
Aquinas dealt with the fundamental theological question of ‘What is man?’ by exploring
humanity’s salvific imperative via the perspective of his Christian philosophy. Writing in his
Summa theologiae, Aquinas advances the theology that human beings possess the indelible
‘imprint’ of the divine Being in their existence: “In the very fact of any creature possessing
being, it represents the Divine being and its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all
things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own
goodness.”11 He also recognises the rational nature of every human being as the defining human
characteristic which sets them apart from the rest of the creation. He sought the validity of
Boethius’s anthropological definition by positing the intellectual capacity of every man and
every woman: “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature” (persona est rationalis
naturae individua substantia).12 On account of this assertion, two important theological
presuppositions relative to this research can be extrapolated: (i) the hylomorphic theory, and
(ii) the ontology of the intellect.
The hylomorphic theory is Aquinas’s foundational principle in defining the body-soul unicity.
In his Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, he poetically articulates, “My soul
is not I” (“Anima mea non est ego”).13 His statement implies his clear rejection of the various
understanding of the body and soul relationship such as dualism and physicalism.14 Aquinas
believes that regarding this soul, “We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of
intellectual operation is the form of the human body…this principle by which we primarily
understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body.”15
In a nutshell, Aquinas believes that: “the soul is not a body.”16
Aquinas maintains the matter-form complex in defining the composition of existing beings,
i.e., matter = body, form = soul.17 In De spiritualibus creaturis, he elucidates this union citing
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 65, a. 2, ad. 1.
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I. q. 29. a. 1, arg. 1.
13
Thomas Aquinas, Super I Epistolam B. Pauli Corinthios lectura, cap. 15, lect. 2, sec. 924,
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 76, a. 1.
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in clearest terms the identification of the substantial form as the rational soul: “Thus, therefore,
we say that in ‘this man’ there is no other substantial form than the rational soul, and that by it
man is not only man, but animal, and living being, and body, and substance, and being.”18
Furthermore, he delineates the meaning of substantial form in relation to its accidents: “the
substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential.
But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or
in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.”19 From this union between form
and matter, Aquinas attributes the origin of the organic operation of a substance: “So the
subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as
it is in act, it produces it.”20 Corollary to the above, Aquinas extends his consideration of the
body-soul unicity to posit the reality of immaterial substances such as the angels.
On the other hand, the ontology of the intellect expresses the closeness of humanity’s
existential being to God. The possession of intellective powers is the rationale by which
Aquinas upholds that human agents reflect the image of God. Quoting Damascene in his
Summa theologiae, Aquinas states that: “man is said to be made to the image of God insofar as
by image is meant intellectual, free in judgment and capable of autonomous action.”21 Through
their intellective powers, human agents are rendered capable of cognising the truth (veritas)
and the good (bonum) which are perfective of human nature. Just what is the full nature of this
truth can only be attributed to God, says Aquinas:
(T)ruth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it
is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an
intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is
not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect;
and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other
being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence
and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in
Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.22
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Truth, in the Thomistic sense, is the realisation of one of the human natural inclinations, i.e.,
“to know the truth about God.”23 (Natural law’s natural inclination will be fully discussed in
chapters 7 and 8.) As a natural inclination, there is an internal ordering in every human agent
that orients them to God. It has an especially intimate relationship with synderesis since both
guide human agency in discovering the perfective good. With respect to the notion of good,
Aquinas qualifies the order of human cognition by stipulating the hierarchy of intellection
based on the nature of human beings:
[T]he intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it
apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it
desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and
the idea of good third, though good is in things.24
All these ‘primal goods’ (bona) point to the ultimate end which is perfective of the moral agent.
Correlative to the consideration of the notions of the truth and good, Aquinas distinguishes two
types of knowledge belonging to the same intellectual power though differing in their ultimate
objectives. The first type of power is called the speculative knowledge or intellect which
apprehends the truth in itself while the second type is referred to as the practical knowledge or
intellect which apprehends the same truth with the further view for operation. Both constitute
a unified organic power of the intellect and each has a specific goal distinct from each other.
Aquinas differentiates them accordingly: “For it is the speculative intellect which directs what
it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is
that which directs what it apprehends to operation.”25
The immanent capacity towards certain perfective ends is considered as a potency until the
intellect and will conjointly cause the corporeal body to actively engage in the actuation of any
given human potential. Aquinas raises an important point regarding the dynamism of this
movement from potency to act: “every movement of the will must be preceded by
apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will.”26 Aquinas’s
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 4, ad. 2.
25
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 11.
26
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 82, a. 4, ad. 3. (The Thomistic doctrine of potency and act generally refers
to the necessity for an external cause or agent to move or actuate created beings or objects towards becoming or
changing according to the capacity of its own essence. This doctrine is clearly evident in acquiring knowledge:
“Because our intellect shared in a defective intellectual light, it is not actuated with regard to all the intelligibles
24

34

doctrine on potency and act serves to underline the moral development of human agents which
can be concretely observed in the process of virtue habituation.

The Intellective and Appetitive Powers of the Soul
Aquinas locates the human intellect in the human soul: “the intellect is a power of the soul.”27
He also maintains that “the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form
of the human body.”28 The intellective, however, is not the sole power of the soul. He also
attributes an appetitive power to it which operates correlatively with the intellective and
sensitive powers.29 Possessing different powers, the soul’s powers find their “natural perfection
only as united to the body.”30 The unity of the soul with the body is a fundamental doctrine in
Thomism. This unity is specified by the soul’s subsistent nature. Aquinas points out that:
Although the act of existing of a soul belongs in some way to the body,
still the body does not succeed in participating in the existence of the
soul according to the soul’s full excellence and power; and
consequently there is an operation of soul in which the body does not
share.31
It was necessary for Aquinas to affirm a subsistent soul in order to posit its immateriality and
immortality. If the soul’s self-subsistence is not affirmed, it would lead to a physicalist
understanding of the human person whereby intellection is had through the instrumentality of
the body. Aquinas categorially opposes a physicalist approach to the body-soul reality: “a soul
is an entity and subsists per se since it operates per se; for the action of understanding does not
take place through a bodily organ.”32 If, on the other hand, the absolute independence of the
soul from the body is stressed, Aquinas could then be accused of espousing a dualist
understanding of the human person. He preserves therefore the unity of the body and soul by
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specifying the inter-related natures of both body and soul as constitutive of the human person
operating as one and existing as an organic rational being. In his Summa contra Gentiles,
Aquinas explains this organic operation:
That which has its being in common with a body, must have its
operation in common with a body, because a thing acts inasmuch as it
is a being: nor can the active power of a thing surpass its essence, since
power results from the essential principles. But if an intellectual
substance be the form of a body, its being must be common to it and
the body: because from form and matter there results one thing simply,
that exists by one being. Consequently an intellectual substance will
have its operation in common with the body, and its power will be a
power in a body: which has been proved to be impossible.33
The doctrine of hylomorphism is a Thomistic foundational teaching that underlines many of
Aquinas’s teachings particularly his doctrine on the virtues. It also serves as a theological
anchor in correlating Thomism with the science of psychology. This will be undertaken
towards the end of this thesis.
Aquinas’s hylomorphism is underscored by his doctrine of the hierarchy of beings. Unlike
angels which intellectively operate without the medium of a physical body,34 human beings
operate rationally through their given body-soul unicity.35 Human cognition is initiated via
sensitive experience, including imagination.36 Without wanting to pre-empt the discussion on
imagination later in this research, imagination partly undertakes a type of ‘angelic intellection’
that is accomplished by the intellectus agens. The human person is capable of imaginatively
opening up to that primordial wisdom emanating from God via the intellectus agens which
angels undertake without the necessity of a corporeal body. This is the epistemic moment when
synderesis partly reaches out to the realm of the divine to grasp the innate first principles of
natural law. The body-soul unicity is the underlying rationale as to why human agents as
knowing subjects are intellectually actuated and realised due principally to their natural mode
of being as embodied creatures:
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[T]o make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper
knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be
joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate
knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus
we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by
sensible examples.37
Rightfully, Aquinas asserts human knowledge is limited by human potentials: “For knowledge
is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower
according to the mode of the knower.”38
Further to the understanding of the origin and nature of created beings in the hierarchy of
beings, the end (telos) of created beings is a necessary Thomistic assumption. Aquinas points
to a purpose and goal that naturally drive created beings to develop and achieve their potentials.
This human development alludes to those human acts that are self-fulfilling and beatific.
Virtues, which will be fully elaborated in the succeeding chapters, practically express these
human acts which, through habituation, may lead human agents either to their human and
beatific ends. Within this operation lies the governance by both the intellective and appetitive
powers of the soul to operate in unison in delivering human agents to their ultimate telos.
Noteworthily, passion (affect) has the potential to either lead or dissuade moral agents in the
exercise of their human acts producing either virtues (good habits) or vice (bad habits).
The doctrine on the hierarchy of beings allows Aquinas to propound that:
[M]an can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can
acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature,
of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul
requires many and various operations and powers.39
This quote specifically reveals the requirement of many and various operations and powers in
the soul in order for it to guide moral agents to their ends. Human beings, according to Aquinas,
are considered least among the rational creatures who would require more operations and
power in climbing, as it were, the hierarchy of beings. Aquinas confirms this: “The intellectual
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soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire
perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect
creatures.”40
Between natural dispositions and virtues are potential human acts which are determinants of
telic ends.41 Human acts are themselves dispositions “whereby that which is disposed is
disposed well or ill.”42 These dispositions, apart from being mitigated by the given constitution
of the human agent as body and soul, are also dependent on the ruling of rational freedom in
either wilfully consenting to the execution of human acts or the contrary. Reason as its basis,
human agents act according to their specific natural capacity and innate disposition. Reason
participates in this exercise by determining which actions promote the habitual good or not,
whether human efforts are self-perfective or not. The desire for perfection is premised on the
human intellect’s proclivity to turn towards the truth and the good, the fullness of both fosters
human flourishing.
The grasp of the truth and the good is an apprehensive exercise that is potentially perfective of
the knower, the moral agent. ‘Knowing’ in the mind of Aquinas is perfective spiritually though
not materially. If the speculative (theoretical) intellect potentially perfects human knowledge,
practical intellect also perfects human willing and acting. The apprehension of the innate first
principle of practical reason, i.e., bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum,
initiates the desiring and knowing of the perfective practical good. Yet a mere formal principle
that necessarily requires time and experience for human agents to inchoately understand its
content and meaning as universal moral principles, the apprehension of these principles as
primal goods is naturally recognised being “the first thing that falls under the apprehension of
the practical reason.”43
In the mind of Aquinas, the roles and objectives of the primary moral principles are to direct
and guide the human intellect and will in making judgments that are ultimately perfective of
human nature.44 These principles and their derivative moral norms, i.e., secondary principles,
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also provide moral guidance for moral development. As distinct powers of the soul, the intellect
and will have embedded evaluative capacity which caters to the mind’s analytical and
evaluative processes. In reason’s judicial processes, the prior reality of apprehension should be
stressed before the will can take full flight.45
Probing the relationship between the intellect and the will, Aquinas explains that a thing or a
moral agent could be moved in two ways: first as an end and second as an agent. Regarding
the former, he contends that as an end, construed as a good (‘end-as-good’), the end moves the
intellect via the will. The will, in return, apprehends the good in the perceived end. The intellect
appreciates the object of the will since the will is naturally inclined to seek that which is good.46
The intellect, in this respect, is construed as a final cause since whatever is apprehended and
perceived by the intellect as end-as-good moves towards it as an end.47
On the other hand, the notion of as an agent points to the will as inherently possessing the
potential to move the intellect as an efficient cause. This causality, however, has a specific
delineation according to Aquinas: “wherever we have order among a number of active powers,
that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends.”48
In this text, he alludes to the capacity of the will to move the intellect to realise rational powers
that are responsible for the realisation of particular ends.
By and large, two matters need to be spelt out firmly on the basis of the above. First, the will
does not incline itself to just any good since what it is inclined to is congruent to the perfection
to which human nature has a natural inclination. Since the intellect is inclined to seek and
discover the good which proceeds from the apprehension of the first moral principles, the will
understands this good as its own formal object. In effect, the intellect moves the will to the
same good as an end. Aquinas asserts the following: “The will does not desire of necessity
whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect
naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end.”49
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And secondly, dealing with the question of which is prior, the intellect or the will, this mental
exercise will end in a vicious circle if left without any deciding determination.50 Aquinas was
fully aware of this possibility which he dutifully addressed by stating: “There is no need to go
on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect preceding all the rest.”51
The discussion above establishes the correlation between the intellect and the will which, for
all intents and purposes, are both powers operating within the one and the same rational faculty.
Aquinas declares the final word in this respect:
[T]hese powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect
understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to
understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it
is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired
good.52

Passiones animae in the Summa theologiae
Having considered above the operational relationship between the intellect and will, Aquinas
acknowledges another reality that motivates both the intellect and will in proffering rational
judgment, i.e., passions of the soul (passiones animae).53 Habits and virtues, which will be
considered in the next chapter, likewise influence the moral appraisal of human actions. Since
rational judgments, taken in their broadest definition, are crucial in determining the morality
of human actions, Aquinas engages to unravel the nature and function of passiones animae in
his Summa theologiae’s Pars secunda. Framed within the soteriological theme of humanity’s
ongoing journey to God, Aquinas wrote the initial five questions exploring the ultimate goal of
life while the next remaining two-hundred eighty questions outlined its relationship with
human acts. In particular, questions 22 to 48 thematically proceed from the treatment of the
50
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location of emotions in the soul developing towards their classification, the consideration of
their mutual relationship with the intellect and their resulting moral implications arising from
this relationship. Overall, the structure is masterfully composed suggesting a logical
development of theological themes in support of the exitus-reditus principle.
Construing passiones animae54 as a reaction to external stimuli, Aquinas conceptualises the
notion of passions as a case of a “patient [being] drawn to that which belongs to the agent.”55
He claims that passions require something exterior to a subject rather than an interior principle
to effect a modal change.56 Aquinas attributes this ordination to the appetitive power rather
than the apprehensive power57 since the human mind is drawn appetitively to the good and evil
outside the soul while apprehension is not.58 Thomas Ryan is of the opinion, however, that
“emotions are not merely reactions to stimuli. An emotion is both passive (“I am affected”)
and active (“I move towards or away from something…agreeable/disagreeable, a value or
disvalue, good or evil.”59 Robert Miner also suggests that Aquinas does not reduce the reality
of passions into “instinctive reactions that are impermeable to rational apprehension.”60
Aquinas should have no concern in affirming the above interpretations as the apprehensive
power is still involved in the process in a way unlike the appetitive power. For Aquinas, the
apprehensive power does not tend towards the external stimuli “but knows it by reason of an
‘intention’ of the thing, which ‘intention’ it has in itself, or receives in its own way.”61
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In view of his teaching on the hierarchy of beings, Aquinas suggests that passions are not
exclusively the property of human beings but rather are shared with non-rational animals.62
This duality ascribes the element of instinct in passions that is almost exclusively alluded to
animals. The corporeal nature of human persons which occasions somatic movement and
alterations account for this reality. Hence, passions have both rational and non-rational
elements.
Further on the nature of passions, Diana Fritz Cates provides an apt description of how Aquinas
understands the passions:
Aquinas holds that emotions are modes of tending in relation to objects
of perception or imagination that we assess to be significant for our
own or another’s well-being. Emotions are interior motions that are
aroused by and oriented with respect to certain objects of ‘cognition.’63
Cognition, as construed in the above, includes imagination as a source of stimuli for passions.
The dynamism of emotions or feelings are best recalled via imagination than memory. When
a man falls in love with a woman, he is drawn towards the woman because he feels love towards
her. Similarly, someone could feel so passionate about the innocent children locked up
indefinitely in detention centres and the anger that one feels stimulates a personal reaction
against the unjust and inhumane treatment of these children. In these examples, the sensory
appetitive power of the soul is understood to have made the move towards the source of the
external stimulus. On this matter, Aquinas specifies the location of the passiones animae in the
soul where the desiring emanates: “the passions (affections) are in the appetitive rather than in
the apprehensive part.”64 Further, passions involve bodily resonance which reveals the
attending presence of certain passions in the human person.65 Neurobiological studies can
confirm the presence of brain activity stimulated by sensible objects impinging on the sensitive
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organs. This relationship between Thomism and neuroscience will be further explored in a later
chapter.
As alluded to above, passiones animae have the potential to influence the moral determination
of human acts. Hence, some passions are considered well-ordered passions while some are
regarded as disordered passions. The teleological determination of passions may be viewed in
reference to whether the passions (or emotions) “foster or impede growth in love for God and
others, facilitate or prohibit happiness and personal integration, cultivate or undermine inner
and outer harmony in the person and in relationships with God and others.”66 Thus, “[e]motions
are “good” (“right”) or “bad” (“wrong”) due to their being ‘fitting’ or not in the judgement of
practical reason. The benchmark is whether or not they protect and promote the values that
facilitate or impede happiness.”67 The teleological determination simply denotes whether
human ends are being met or not.
In addition, Aquinas understands passions as a “kind of movement.”68 This understanding is
based on the object of the two types of the faculty of the sensitive appetite, namely, the
concupiscible power and the irascible power. Movement basically refers to human reactions to
external stimuli. Aquinas conceives of this as “[t]he sensual movement…following sensitive
apprehension.”69 Aquinas claims that the movement which effectuates the point of contact
between an external stimulus and the human agent’s exterior senses is non-rational in nature
and, therefore, not ruled by reason.70 It is only when external stimuli are internalised that the
purview of morality begins to take hold. Aquinas explains the reason behind this assertion:
“Moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a
passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason.”71
In question 81 of the Prima pars in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas differentiates the sentient
powers into the concupiscible and the irascible powers. He explains:
[A]s natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there
must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through
which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to
the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the
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concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that
hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the
irascible.72
In differentiating the two, Aquinas argues that the concupiscible and irascible powers are
subjects to both the intellect and the will. He claims that the cogitative power, an internal sense
(interior sensorium) that is responsible for relating and the grouping of particular experiences
or ‘intentions,’ is guided by universal moral principles or reason in controlling both the
concupiscible and irascible powers. The cogitative power is the human counterpart of the
estimative power in animals.73 Furthermore, “[t]o the will also is the sensitive appetite
[passions] subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power [the will]”74 before
being moved by the concupiscible and irascible powers. External stimuli may, therefore, incite
a positive or a negative reaction in the human person which, upon internalisation and
consideration by the intellect and will, a good or evil act may consequently proceed. Aquinas
adds: “The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us
to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.”75 It can be inferred
from the foregoing that the Angelic Doctor stresses the moral imperative of following reason
in pursuing actions that are moral: “For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, that
good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man.”76
Aptly facilitating the utility of reason, Aquinas upholds the value of passions in the attainment
of the good: “But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are
no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.”77 It is apparent that
Aquinas sees the contribution of the passions to human flourishing in this regard. He
determines that practical reason dictates what is good for human flourishing. Passions, in this
process, are involved somehow indirectly by moving the will to inform reason what is
particularly good, hic et nunc. The movement of the human soul towards the good is therefore
not merely cognitive and volitive, but affective as well.
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In view of the passions as having such an influence on the moral appraisal of human activities,
Aquinas conjures the notions of the continent and the incontinent person. In the Secunda
secundae of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas differentiates these two types of persons: the
“continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of
his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids.”78
Following this definition, one may infer from Aquinas’s thoughts that reason holds the key to
understanding their differences:
[W]hatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason.
Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is
in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with
perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as
good desires are opposed to perverse reason.79
Situating passions in the context of rational considerations of either the continent or incontinent
person, Aquinas is of the belief that “passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient
cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason
remains, man is always able to resist his passions.”80 On this account, Aquinas clearly holds
the primacy of reason in considering the morality of passions relative to the continent and
incontinent persons. Following on the discussion above, acts bear a neutral or indifferent
position until reason proceeds with their moral determination. Moreover, passionate acts could
either be antecedent, i.e., “when the soul yields to the passions before the reason has given its
counsel (impetuosity),”81 or, consequent, i.e., “when a man does not stand to what has been
counselled, through holding weakly to reason's judgment (“weakness”).”82
Focussing on the different ways in which passions influence the act of the will as stipulated
above, Aquinas’s treatise on sin in the Summa theologiae provides an insight into how the will
can contravene the dictates of reason:
Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on
account of some hindrance supervening.… [I]n this way, a man who is
in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in
general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now
it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction. Secondly, by
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way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something
contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily
transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered
so as not to exercise its acts freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on
account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason.
That this takes place in the passion is evident from the fact that
sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of
reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through
excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason
to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.83
Elaborating on the abovementioned three ways in which passions may influence reason and
will, the third rationale refers to physiological causes that affect the proper functioning of
reason, e.g., types of dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease. Apart from physiology, it may also
occur that an impediment may temporarily restrict the use of reason due to an experience of
intense and extreme emotional love or anger, e.g., an over-protective man locks up his lover at
home to prevent her from meeting up with any man, including her own family. Aquinas
reminds his readers that passions, too, have the capacity to deceive reason by causing bodily
organs to transmit misinformation as to what is actually sensibly perceived. He believes that
the powers of imagination and cogitation can be influenced by bodily modifications or
movements caused by the nagging of human emotions.84 These eventualities vitiate ultimately
the proper ordering of reason albeit only indirectly influenced by passions or emotions. It will
be unravelled in the chapters ahead why Aquinas has regrettably shown distrust towards
imagination’s capacity to assist the moral mind discover the moral good.
The second way, i.e., passion influences the judgement of reason and the will, can be better
explained by referring this matter to Aquinas’s elaboration in the Secunda secundae, question
seventy-seven, article one in the Summa theologiae:
[W]e observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily
turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result
being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the
sensitive appetite, and consequently the will’s movement follows it
also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of
reason.85
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The second way basically implies that passions have the capacity to sway not reason but the
will to go against what the universal moral principles prescribe. The universal moral principles
are classified as normative in Thomistic theology and would be therefore the only moral
principles upon which the morality of human acts derives its moral determination. Aquinas
upholds that particular knowledge plays an indispensable role in practical judgment since its
locus is the “realm of the concrete.”86 The import of particular knowledge in moral
deliberations will be fully discussed later in this thesis.
Lastly, regarding the first way in Aquinas’s consideration of how passions influence the
judgment of reason and act of the will, he underlines what he calls the “dispersion of energy”
in the operation of the soul.87 He maintains that if various passions are altering or modifying
human dispositions, the power of the soul suffers division and it is consequently pulled towards
dealing with the mitigating effects of human passions. Such suffering causes reason to be
ignored; passions potentially could result into the disordering of the will. In his own words,
Aquinas spells out the effect of a surplus of emotions being experienced by human agents: “By
this law of distribution, when the sense appetite is fired by emotion the will, which is the
rational appetite, has little or no force for its own activity.”88
On the basis of the three ways mentioned above, it is obvious that passiones animae can
influence the judgment of reason and the will albeit indirectly. The negative import of
passiones animae means that the universal moral principles are not observed and, henceforth,
an act is consequently pursued that is foreign to the primary moral principles. From the
perspective of the universal moral principles, this research raises then the question regarding
how passiones animae may actually, albeit indirectly, assist in contributing to the effective
application of the first moral principles in concrete particular situations in the life of a human
person? The question presupposes the primary principles as given realities in human agents
and at the same time envisages the essential practical value of virtues in moral development
that fosters human flourishing.
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The Incontinent and the Intemperate Person
In question one-hundred and fifty-six, article three of the Secunda secundae in Aquinas’s
Summa theologiae, Aquinas introduces the intemperate person. By comparison and contrast,
the incontinent person is qualifiedly described as being more moral than the intemperate
person: “the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.”89 Robert Pasnau echoes
this in these direct terms: “From a moral perspective, the intemperate person is much worse.”90
Similarly, Aristotle regards the continent person and the intemperate person as “a good state
and…a bad one,”91 respectively.
How is an incontinent person different from an intemperate person? Intimating from its location
in the Summa theologiae where both are discussed following the specific sub-title headings of
Continence and Incontinence and under the general theme of the Cardinal Virtues, Aquinas
distinguishes them both:
(I)n the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own
choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas
in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion.
And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is "a disposition
difficult to remove," the result is that the incontinent man repents at
once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man;
in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become
connatural to him by reason of his habit.92
The realities of both the judgment of reason and the act of will distinguish an incontinent person
from an intemperate person based on the text above. Firstly, in view of the act of the will,
Aquinas considers the will’s inclination in the intemperate man as premised on habit or vice
while in the incontinent man, the will is indirectly influenced by passions. This distinction
undergirds the fundamental difference external influences have on the act of the will. Since in
the intemperate person the influence on the act of the will is caused by habits or vices, the
outcome is shaped by habitual dispositions that are motivated by a disregard for rational
thinking. In addition, passions’ influence on the incontinent person is said to be fleeting as
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compared to the intemperate person’s appetitive disposition to act against the will which is
ingrained.
Secondly, the intemperate person is aware of the judicial ruling of reason but chooses instead
to do the opposite. The intemperate person “has an entrenched disposition to choose things that
satisfy his sensual desires, and so he simply lives his profligate life, unapologetic,” says
Pasnau.93 The incontinent person, on the other hand, due to the influence of passions, is left to
act on them despite an unwillingness to do it. The incontinent person is influenced only at a
specific moment since passions dissipate rather quickly. Aquinas believes that incontinent
persons would have and may have already made a moral resolution about a particular action
but due to concupiscence which weakens the will, they succumb to the temptations of the
passions.94
Alongside this aspect of the judgment of reason, there is also a teleological question pertaining
to what is ignored by the intemperate person and the incontinent person. As disposition is
habitual, the intemperate person ignores ultimately the end or the good. Intemperate persons
are aware of the moral good and choose rather to do exactly what they want. Due to the
imposition of the habit or vice, reason is weakened, but not obliterated, and its operation is
muted. Aquinas conveys this observation in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate:
One who has the habit of some vice does indeed lose the principles of
activity, not as universal principles, but in their application to some
particular case, in so far as through some vicious habit his reason is
stifled in order to keep it from applying the universal judgment to its
particular activity when making its choice. In this way, also, the wicked
man who falls into the depths of sin is said to have contempt.95
On the basis of the above discussion, concerns regarding fostering the primary principles
among intemperate persons are existentially real. Aquinas specifically raises this concern
regarding their moral state: “Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth once who errs
as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the
end.”96 This concern is crucial since the absence of any internal moral compass adversely
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affects moral development. Recognising, however, that it is difficult to remove such error in
reason as it could be habitual, Aquinas is of the belief that finding a ‘cure’ to intemperance and
incontinence is not impossible.97 The nature of this ‘cure’ is a matter for later discussion.
Suffice to state at this stage that, with the possibility for the rehabilitation of the senses,
incontinent persons’ ignorance is and can be dealt with since their judgement of reason
proceeds only from a momentary passion or emotion and at the back of this, they actually know
what is good but simply ignore it.
The characterisation of the intemperate person reveals a human person who is aware of the
moral good but appears to possess a weak will. Something more pleasurable and sensual
alternative would have been more likely the culprit behind the demise of rational thinking. The
degree of pre-occupation with habits or vices is considered of such intensity that the universal
principles expressed by reason are muted by the intemperate person. Given that the disposition
accorded by synderesis is never extinguished, it would appear that no matter how many times
it would be reiterated that all human beings, including of course the intemperate person, have
the primary moral principles in them, it would amount to nothing if the human disposition is
habitually swayed to ignore it.
The incontinent person, on the other hand, is clearly affected volitionally, albeit indirectly by
passions, and can recover quite easily from the tempting grasp of the passions. The incontinent
person would be prone to consider which is most pleasurable at a particular moment without
critically thinking about the consequences of such proclivity. That said, since the recourse to
passion could only be episodic, its cessation is conceivable. Moreover, since passions only
indirectly influence the will, it does not vitiate the knowledge of the primary principles and
should therefore be available for consideration by the incontinent person. As Aquinas rightfully
affirms: “[S]o long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions.”98
The nature of the passions reveals the seeming superior importance of being guided by reason
in performing moral acts. Aquinas could only confirm this observation: “[E]very movement of
the will must be preceded by apprehension.”99 There is a real threat that passions or emotions
may adversely affect the moral ordering of human agents. Due to this threat, the acquisition of
moral virtues is essential. But there is also the positive import of having human passions or
97
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emotions come to the aid of reason in firmly grasping the practical good. To this, Pasnau offers
this salient advice: “What a virtuous person needs…is not a strong will, but the intellectual
capacity to see the passions for what they are, and to resist them calmly and rationally.”100

Summary
The human person is a hylomorphic unicity. Human operations including moral development
are subject to this natural state. As a body-soul unicity, human agents interact with the social
environment in actuating interior dynamisms such as the apprehension of the first principles of
natural law by synderesis. In this specific apprehensive operation where the first principles of
natural law are intuited, Aquinas assigns a primary role to practical reason in view of guiding
human agents seek and fulfil their proper human ends. Practical reason affords human agents
the disposition to act morally on concrete matters. Passions, however, may affect this
disposition so much so that it can indirectly influence practical reason via the will to either
perform good acts or to do otherwise. The influence of passions on human acts stresses the
importance of an operative and fomenting knowledge of the first principles of natural law
which synderesis intuitively apprehends. Requiring time and experience for its moral growth,
this practical knowledge complements virtue habituation which also needs the same degree of
human commitment and care for moral virtues to develop from mere habits. The examples of
the lives of incontinent and intemperate persons shed light on the possible outcomes when
passions influence reason and will. It could either result into the possession of an entrenched
disposition where the first principles of natural law are ignored or the possession of a
momentary disposition where the disavowal of the universal moral principles is short-lived and
moral awareness is regained thereafter. In human moral development, it is essential that the
knowledge of the first principles of natural is afforded time and experience to grow. The lack
of commitment and care to nourish one’s knowledge of the first principles of natural law would
more than likely translate into a disordered moral life and consequently, at a broader scale, a
fragmented community that is bereft of moral understanding and will.
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Chapter 4
Synderesis and the Intelligibility of Moral Goods

Introduction
Fully cognisant of the complex moral persuasions of good and evil in human affairs, Kohelet,
the central figure in the wisdom book of Ecclesiastes, offers the following counsel to human
agents: “In the morning sow your seed, and at evening do not let your hands be idle, for you
do not know which will prosper, this or that, or whether both alike will be good.”1 Consistent
with the previous chapters’ metaphorical allusion to the reality of synderesis, the seed
represents the potential reality of the moral good in human agents. The following discussion
will initially focus on this natural human desire to acquire the completive and perfective good
which synderesis brings intuitively and apprehensively to human awareness. This theme of
moral desire will flow into the consideration of the natural inclination (inclinationis naturalis)
and its co-extensive correlative, the natural law (lex naturalis). In discussing these moral
realities, their telic ends, i.e., natural and supernatural ends, will be analysed as a good to be
pursued. Finally, synderesis, since it draws the human agent to the knowledge of the first
principles of natural law, will be explored in view of its correlativity with natural inclination.
A theological investigation of their natures should reveal their necessity in moral development.
True, one does not know which one will prosper – good or evil, but when human agents
beginning at a young age are given appropriate moral care and are introduced to the life of
virtues, one can share with Kohelet’s expectation that in the morning, all will be good.

1

Eccl 11:6.

Inclinatio naturalis: Desiring the Perfective Good
Aquinas formulates the desire of every human person to achieve the good that is perfective of
human nature: “all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in
which the last end consists.”2 This desire to be and to become, since “every agent, of necessity,
acts for an end,”3 is the existential moral path of the human person where the opportunity to
enter into a “friendship with God” unfolds.4 Aquinas believes that every human person has
such a capacity via natural knowledge:
The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be
known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to
the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace
presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be
perfected.5
Alongside this capacity for natural knowledge, the telos of individual moral pathways is
coupled by a desire towards human flourishing. Eleonore Stump realises this in her reading of
Thomism: “In the will…what is implanted in the rational faculty is not a habit of knowledge
but rather an innate inclination to act.”6 The fact that the pursuit of human goods is not just an
intellective but also an appetitive exercise should not come as surprise if common human
behaviour is considered. Some people are drawn to the memory of their deceased loved ones
upon hearing their favourite songs. Moved not just by the recollection of the past spent with
their loved ones when they were still alive, imagination also allows past emotions (passions)
to emerge while listening to those songs. These emotions play as vehicles of the meaning one
has inscribed in past sense experiences. Germain Grisez confirms this human engagement
towards those goods by indicating that as corporeal beings, we are ‘sensitised’ in some form
prior to intellection:
These inclinations are part of ourselves, and so their objects are human
goods. Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and
learns by sense experience. Thus in experience we have a basis upon
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which reason can form patterns of action that will further or frustrate
the inclinations we feel.7
The medieval concept of inclinationis naturalis spells out Aquinas’s anthropological basis of
the notion of the good, a concept which is correlative to the notion of end (telos).8 Drawn from
Aristotle, Aquinas echoes his idea of what the good is: “good…is that which all things desire”
(bonum est quod omnia appentunt).9 There is a compelling invitation to pause and reflect on
this text, yet it will become apparent, quite immediately, that this good is not really fully
appropriated. Douglas Flippen acknowledges that this definition is problematic since what
people desire is multiplied and manifold.10 He is effectively saying that there is a plethora of
human ends as much as there are many human inclinations. Under this same observation would
Aquinas have probably recoursed to propose the Aristotelian notion of the “happiness”
(beatitudo), the ultimate and final good or end for all human person,11 as the good’s necessary
co-existential correlative. Without such a recourse, the Aristotelian notion of “happiness”
would have likely remained marooned in secularity. When the discussion turns to the acquired
moral virtues, the concept of good will acquire further attributions in the light of human agents’
reasoned will to define themselves by acquiring natural and supernatural ends.
The notions of good and end intrinsically bear a reciprocal relationship where “everything in
seeking its end seeks the good and everything, in so far as it attains its end, is itself good.”12 In
addition, both notions are understood be correlative to the concept of inclinationis naturalis.
Aquinas throws light on the teleology of this correlation: “Everything naturally tends to the
end for which it exists. But all things are ordained to God as their end…. All things, therefore,
naturally tend to God.”13 This statement unambiguously specifies the ultimate end accorded to
each human person by divine will: “If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing
which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man
and of all other things.”14 Henceforth, the good or the end that which human agents seek is
proximately and ultimately God, who is the efficient cause and the final cause of everything:
7
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“Accordingly, because God is the last end, He is sought in every end, just as, because He is the
first efficient cause, He acts in every agent. But this is what tending to God implicitly means.”15
The Thomistic notion of inclinationis naturalis demands further exploration. The realities of
both inclinationis naturalis and legis naturalis will be the initial foci of the discussion in the
immediate section below. This will be followed by a determination of the role of reason,
specifically practical reason, and its relation to the will, both intellectively and appetitively, in
seeking moral goods that are completive and perfective of human nature. And lastly, the
discussion will turn to the consideration of the self-evident nature of the first precepts of natural
law which synderesis apprehends intuitively and immediately.

Inclinatio naturalis vis-à-vis Lex naturalis
The concept of inclinationis naturalis “looms large in any Thomistic account of the natural
law.”16 Though natural law is conceptually much broader, exploring the nature of inclinationis
naturalis via the anthropological perspective will necessarily reveal its connaturality with lege
naturalis.
Inclinatio naturalis refers to those inherent dispositions directing the human agent towards
acquiring proximate and ultimate goods (i.e., natural and supernatural ends respectively). In
discussing the nature of the human will in question eight, article one of the Prima secundae of
the Summa theologiae, Aquinas provides an insight into the essence of inclinationis naturalis:
“the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that
thing.”17 The idea of moving from point a to point b in view of securing the good is suggestive
of the dynamic motion towards perfecting and completing the human self. The intelligibility
of the good is participative in this motion where reason, being a good itself, seeks out the good
and the telic end of its natural inclination.
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On the other hand, lex naturalis, understood as the “participation of the eternal law in the
rational creature,”18 constitutes the ordering of reason in human nature that is expressive of the
eternal law. Being a reality “instilled…into a person’s mind as a matter of natural
knowledge,”19 Frederick Copleston declares that “[e]very man possesses…the light of reason
whereby he can reflect on these fundamental inclinations of his nature and promulgate to
himself the natural moral law.”20 He appears to suggest that by engaging human reasoning, the
human agent is able to acquire an understanding of the natural law. Natural law is known in
this regard by reflecting on those human acts to which the human person has natural
inclinations and that which reason recognises as morally good at the same time. Copleston’s
understanding of the natural law points to the correlativity between natural law and natural
inclination. Natural law is therefore “natural in the sense that they are not humanly enacted but
are objective principles which originate in human nature.”21 “[I]n some way written in his very
substance, so that he has only to observe himself attentively in order to discover it there,” says
Etienne Gilson.22 When it comes to its discovery interiorly within the human person, Martin
Rhonheimer offers his evaluation:
The discovery of this natural law in man – its cognitive objectification,
one might say – occurs only on the level of reflection, where the order
of precepts of the natural law is recognised as an order of right actions
established by the practical reason.23
The declaration by the International Theological Commission gives further reflection on this
theological matter:
Every human being who attains self-awareness and responsibility
experiences an interior call to do good. He discovers that he is
fundamentally a moral being, capable of perceiving and of expressing
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the call that, as we have seen, is found within all cultures: ‘One must
do good and avoid evil’.24
Aquinas upholds that the ordering of reason is something that is active and dynamic and not
merely a passive manner of receiving moral principles effortlessly. Natural law underscores
the ordering of reason in order to give rise to the proper reflection and knowledge of the
corresponding moral good that can be derived from human experiences. Practical reason
accomplishes this by reaching out to the promptings of natural law from within the self since
the human person is constitutive of the natural law. This reaching out engenders awareness to
will the facilitation of the necessary steps that will foster genuine human and moral
development. Reason orders human thinking, feeling and acting in such a way that all these
facets of the human self contribute towards the completion and perfection of the human person.
Aquinas’s main text dedicated to natural law is found in Prima secundae, question 94, article
2. Discussed under the heading of Natural Law, it is preceded by the discussion on Eternal
Law and followed by Human Law.25 Turning to this main text, Aquinas defines here the natural
law as “the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature.”26 This definition lays down
the fundamental Thomistic pre-disposition regarding the presence of divine reason in the
human person: “[I]t is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, insofar as,
namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their
proper acts and ends.”27 The fundamental nature of the divine presence in humanity takes its
root in Holy Scriptures: “So God created mankind in his own image, in the image of God he
created them; male and female he created them.”28
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Humanity’s fundamental divine orientation parallels the presence of the habit of synderesis.
According to Aquinas, “Synderesis is…the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing
the precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.”29 The first
principles apprehended through synderesis express the divine act of sharing heavenly wisdom
by which human agents are able to discern what is good and what is evil:
[T]his is the first precept of law, that ‘good is to be done and pursued,
and evil is avoided.’ All other precepts of the natural law are based
upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as
man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as
something to be done or avoided.30
Further to the insights tendered above on the correlativity between natural inclination and
natural law, Jacques Maritain opines that: “When he (St. Thomas Aquinas) says that human
reason discovers the regulations of natural law through the guidance of the inclinations of
human nature, he means that the very mode or manner of which human reason knows natural
law is not rational knowledge, but knowledge through inclination.”31 In other words, “the
natural law is precisely the ends to which man is naturally inclined insofar as these ends are
present in reason as principles for the rational direction of action,” says Grisez.32
In what arguably is considered a hallmark in Thomistic natural theology, Aquinas presents in
question ninety-four, article two of the Prima secundae in the Summa theologiae, his precise
doctrine on the natural law:
Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of
the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an
inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in
common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the
preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of
this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of
warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is
in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially,
according to that nature which he has in common with other animals:
and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the
natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals”, such as sexual
intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man
an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which
29
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nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the
truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever
pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to
shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live,
and other such things regarding the above inclination.33
Aquinas presents in the above text his practical understanding of inclinationis naturalis by
delineating what constitutes the natural law in real terms, i.e., beyond its formal nature as
conceptual precepts. He does this by stipulating those principles whose contents are derived
only from the primary moral principles. This is premised on the practical assertion that natural
law directs human inclinations to those of which are fundamentally perfective of the human
nature and which are actually in existence in matter and form. Arranged in hierarchical order,
he determines the three orders of natural law as cognised and realised in human affairs.34 These
further specifications “represent [the] proper ordering of human goods of human life”
according to human nature.35 The hierarchical organisation demonstrates the ordering of
created species capable of relating to the divine Creator by means of intentional rationality.
From the human person’s perspective, these natural inclinations “are goods that man shares
with all creatures, other goods that he shares with only some other creatures, and some that are
peculiar to himself.”36 These goods are noticeably universal in form which allows for further
specification. From these natural inclinations arise subsequent precepts relative to each
individual specification. Copleston summarises the first order as the “precept that life is to be
preserved”37; the second order being the “precept that species is to be propagated and
educated”38; and finally the third order being the “precept that he should seek truth and avoid
ignorance, especially about those things knowledge of which is necessary for the right ordering
of his life, and that he should live in society with other men.”39
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Aquinas ascribes to practical reason – reason which is ordered towards action or activity – the
apprehension of the good since it is good that is the first thing that falls under its apprehension.
(The closeness of this assertion to synderesis is evident and will be further explored in the
proceeding chapters particularly on the virtues.) In this light, Grisez undergirds the functional
reality of natural reason as responsible for the universal desire to acquire the good as end in
humans: “ends to which man is naturally inclined insofar as these ends are present in reason as
principles for rational direction of action.”40 This explanation underpins Aquinas’s moral
regard for virtue habituation since natural law itself prescribes virtues as rational directions for
actions which teleologically accords human agents with not just human ends, but beatific
(supernatural) ends more essentially. Aquinas states in this respect that: “all acts of virtues are
prescribed by natural law: since each one’s reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously.”41
He immediately qualifies his statement by setting the parameter against an exceptionless
universal understanding of human inclinations to the good: “many things are done virtuously,
to which nature does not inclined at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been
found by men to be conducive to well-living.”42
Based on the preceding discussion, it is apparent that the hierarchical ordering of natural law
highlights Aquinas’s attempt to formulate the first precepts of natural law based on human
nature’s inclinatio naturalis. According to the International Theological Commission, these
inclinations “are very general, but they form the first substratum that is at the foundation of all
further reflections on the good to be practised and on the evil to be avoided.”43 This
commentary reflects the widely accepted view of inclinationis naturalis as “a set basic practical
principles…a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness…and a set
of general moral standards.”44 Grisez and Seipel both hold the same view explicating that “this
principle is basic in that it is given to us by our most primitive understanding”45 and “the first
principle of practical reason is extremely general”46 respectively. If the International
Theological Commission construes natural law as the first substratum, Maritain views them as
the “preamble and not the law itself.”47 Armstrong, on the other hand, believes that Aquinas
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did not confine natural law “to these general, self-evident principles, which he often referred
to as the primary precepts.”48 All these considerations allude to the basicity of legis naturalis
which finds evidence in the thoughts of Aquinas: “As to those general principles, the natural
law, in the abstract (universal), can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts.”49 Having stated
therefore that the natural law is general and universal in nature, the functions of which would
need to be further explored.
Going by the International Theological Commission’s conviction that “[i]t is impossible to
remain at the level of generality, which is that of the first principles of natural law” [and that]
“moral reflection must descend into the concreteness of action to throw its light on in it,”50 it
is expedient henceforth (a) that a brief determination be elucidated if there is only a solitary
principle or several precepts of the natural law, and, (b) that a terse exploration of the possibility
of any moral attribution to the first principles of moral action be undertaken. To remain at the
level of generality is undoubtedly pointless from the perspective of moral virtues, let alone in
the realm of Christian discipleship. Moreover, “[p]ractical principles – or the lex naturalis –
are discovered in particulars through experience. This is necessarily the case because in the
human world there simply do not exist any universal persons, relationships, things or
actions.”51 Copleston comments that “the precepts that good should be done and evil avoided,
the truth of which is said by Aquinas to be known intuitively, obviously tells us very little about
human conduct: we want to know what ‘good’ and ‘evil’ mean in the concrete.”52 The universal
moral precept, bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum therefore
necessitates further concretisation since as being meant to be a practical principle, it must be
able to concretely direct and guide human actions in human life. Thus, according to Aquinas’s
elaboration:
Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the
natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may
be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm
to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination;
e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but
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that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of
nature.53

Primary and Derived Moral Principles
Aquinas considers the question, “Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only
one?”, in question 94, article 2 of the Prima secundae in the Summa theologiae. After having
stated that the first principles of natural law are founded on the “good…which all things seek,”54
he concluded by stating the primary moral principle: “good is to be done and pursued, and evil
is to be avoided.”55 It should be apparent upon an initial reading of Aquinas’s text that he
maintains only one foundational principle from which all other precepts are derived: “all other
precepts of the natural law are based upon this.”56 Furthermore, in his reply to the first objection
in the question under current consideration, Aquinas reiterates his paradigmatic stance on the
unicity of all precepts under one natural law: “All these precepts of the law of nature have the
character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.”57
Article 6 of question 94 provides the specification regarding the calculus of the precepts of the
natural law. In answering the question, “Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the
heart of man?,” Aquinas explains that:
[T]here belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts,
that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more
detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely
from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in
the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts.58
In the mind of Aquinas, bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum is the
foundational principle upon which other general precepts and secondary and more detailed
precepts are derived. However, the specifications as to what these general precepts and
secondary precepts are fail to be adequately defined by Aquinas. Scholars are generally not in
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agreement on what constitutes the natural law. Daniel Mark Nelson offers his commentary:
“Thomas nowhere provides a complete or detailed enumeration of what one might suppose are
the actual precepts of the natural law.”59 Armstrong, on the other hand, goes further than Nelson
by specifying those which are considered as derivates of the primary principle of the natural
law. He
decided that besides the principle of “good ought to be done and evil
ought to be avoided” (which may also be formulated, “one ought
always act in accordance with reason”), the following also comprised
the principles of natural law: “one ought to respect and preserve not
only human life, but where possible, all life (we here express the
principle in its shortened form), “sexual intercourse ought to be subject
to some restrictions,” “the family group ought to comply with some
fixed patterns,” and “we ought to live together in society in obedience
to certain rules.”60
He concludes that “not even the precepts of the Decalogue were regarded as being primary
precepts of natural law”61 by Aquinas because “he was particularly anxious to limit the class
of primary principles to include only the most general.”62 Armstrong contends likewise that the
precepts of ‘do good and avoid evil’ and ‘ought always to act according to reason’ belong to
the class of self-evident principles and were used by St. Thomas Aquinas “to serve as
examples.”63 There is apparently not a wide observable academic concurrence with
Armstrong’s list of primary precepts of natural law. The general propensity is directed towards
the reading of several general precepts of natural law as being derived from the one principle
of bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. In view of this, McInerny’s
question is worth considering: “Is one precept sufficient to express how we should achieve our
appropriate end?”64 Or, perhaps, the human mind can be assured that the first principles of
natural law have “the status of being enshrined in all other natural law principles, whether they
are the immediate conclusions from the self-evident principles (as for instance, the precepts of
the Decalogue) or conclusions of more remote nature.”65
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Aquinas’s teaching might be viewed as confusing owing to its seeming lack of information
regarding matters relating to synderesis. Since Aquinas teaches that synderesis is the “habit
containing the precepts of the natural law,”66 the inevitable question ensuing from this is
crucially pertinent: if synderesis contains the first principles of natural law, then what exactly
are those principles and how do they end up in the habit of synderesis as self-evident
principles?67 D’Arcy has summed up the frustration of academics in having to deal with scant
information to work on regarding the primary moral principles:
Unless Aquinas tells us, his account of synderesis is incomplete, and
so also, consequently, is his account of conscience. We cannot yet be
quite sure which are the principles all men share, and so we cannot be
quite sure what are the limits to which judgments of conscience may
extend in all good faith.68

The Moral Intent of the Primary Principles
Under consideration in this section is the fundamental question of whether the precept, bonum
est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum, is merely a statement of fact or a moral
directive. This investigation has affinity with the is-ought debate, i.e., if a moral imperative
could be inferred from a descriptive statement.69 If the principles are considered as isstatements, then the precepts convey directives as to ‘how to be good’ and ‘how to avoid evil.’
Considered as directives, its apparent objective then is to serve as pre-determined guides for
the actualisation of human conduct befitting of the human person as a rational being. Directives
do not necessarily convey the notion of a commandment that is demanded of a human person.
The Corporal Works of Mercy could be used as examples of moral directives under this
66
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specification. ‘To feed the hungry’ or ‘to provide shelter to the homeless’ are moral directives
which promote the values of sacrifice and charity towards others but it is not offered as a
command. On the other hand, if the principles are to be viewed as ought-statements, then there
is the moral imperative ‘to do good’ and ‘to avoid evil.’ The Decalogue falls under this
classification. ‘To worship only one God’ and ‘to observe the Lord’s Day’ are considered
therefore as moral imperatives. Contrary to a directive, moral imperatives do have the notion
of a command or order that this or that action needs to be followed.
Grisez advocates along the same line as above stipulating that the first principles of practical
reason are “really prescriptive…[and] does not have primarily [an] imperative force.”70 He
maintains that as self-evident principles, “reason prescribes the first condition of its own
practical office.”71 Practical intellect therefore cognises what is good for the human person and
directs human action to its realisation. This understanding underscores the natural-ness of the
law of nature which only states what is essential for the perfection of human nature.
Furthermore, Rhonheimer declares that “the natural law is not primarily and per se a collection
of normative statements that the practical reason simply finds ‘already there’ to ‘follow’:
instead, it is the first, immediate, result of the preceptive acts.”
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At the back of this, he claims

that:
Even the fact that we know we are ‘rational mammals’ only comes
from experience that we have of our own rationality. And that we are
mammals who are always seeking what we understand as good on the
basis of reason. Again, we only know because we have our own
experience of our acts of practical reasoning. And we know these acts
because we know their content (their object). And this object is, in
general the good.73
Slightly echoing Grisez’s commentary, Rhonheimer stresses that the “natural law…could be
called the ‘perceptive subject matter’ of the human reason [since it becomes a] ‘descriptive
subject matter’ to the extent that the reason reflects upon its own acts.”74 What both Grisez and
Rhonheimer are saying is that the practical intellect only seeks what is practically good for
practical reason to apprehend as necessarily completive and perfective of the human person.
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Since the apprehension of the practical good is performed by the practical intellect, it does
present what it apprehends as constitutive of human nature, hence, of the law of nature. This
thought has found its way in the mind of the International Theological Commission:
The moral obligation that the subject recognizes does not come,
therefore, from a law that would be exterior to him (pure heteronomy),
but arises from within the subject himself. In fact, as indicated by the
maxim… – “One must do good and avoid evil” – the moral good that
reason determines “imposes itself” on the subject. It “ought” to be
accomplished.75
The International Theological Commission’s statement appears to stress reason as a force of
nature that directs human persons to their end. Grisez spells out this force of nature by implying
that: “If natural law imposes obligations that good acts are to be done, it is only because it
primarily imposes with rational necessity that an end must be pursued.”76 The possibility for
any human persons to be pulled away from what their natural inclination dictates can only be
construed as a deviation from the natural ordering of things. Human limitations do vitiate the
human desire towards flourishing as Nelson suggests:
But because humans were created for supernatural end, the
achievement of which exceeds the abilities of human nature unaided by
grace, and because human reason itself is deficient in many ways as a
result of sin, even perfect knowledge of the natural is insufficient.77
In summary, D’Arcy’s query attempts to probe further into the nature of the first principles:
“What, then is its role? It seems to be a purely formal principle, providing the rule that governs
all our moral reasoning, rather than its universal premis[e].”78 Rhonheimer reminds everyone
that any reflection on the primary principles must bear in mind that it “already presupposes the
experience of this principle as being practical [and that it] has its origin as a principle of action
already in the practical reason, in the reason embedded in striving.”79 Gilson appears to agree:
“To say that we must do good and avoid evil is not arbitrarily to decree a moral law; it is merely
to read a natural law which is written in the very substance of beings and to bring to light the
hidden spring of all their operations. We have to do it, because it is our nature to do it.”80 Lex
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naturalis therefore being constitutive of the human person, contemplates on the moral
development of the human person by providing moral guidance to human agents who are
already naturally inclined to the moral good.
Exactly what it means for the first principles of natural law to be natural or self-evident is the
task of the following section.

Inclinatio naturalis vis-à-vis the Ratio of Human Goods
Aquinas ascertains that “all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally
apprehended by reason as being good.”81 Two elements in this statement require a brief
explanation: (1) the dynamism of the appetitive movement which causally effects the
apprehension of the good, and (2) the role of reason (ratio) in instigating the appetitive
movement. These two elements will be elaborated in the ensuing sub-sections.

The Dynamism of the Appetitive Movement
In the mind of the Angelic Doctor, the abovementioned quote presupposes that human agents
are ontologically imperfect. Consequently, humanity’s metaphysical state necessitates
appetitively moving from the state of moral imperfection to the state of moral perfection under
the driving force of human desires (passions). In this respect, Aquinas declares that: “(E)very
appetite exists because of a need, for an appetite is a desire for what is not possessed.”82 The
appetitive movement is therefore understood as necessary since the human person’s
fundamental ordination is towards achieving perfection which is expressive of the telic end.
Owing to the faculty of reason which naturally inclines human agents to the moral good,
Aquinas universally claims that perfection is desired by every rational being. In other words,
if reason is allowed to guide human willing, there is no reason whatsoever why it would not
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direct human agents to their perfection. Since to be morally good perfects every human agent,
why then would the human will and passion not subscribe to the dictate of reason?
Since in ideal situations when the appetitive movement promotes the acquisition of the
universal good, reason specifies those particular realities which are determinants of human
perfection. In his own words, Aquinas explains the role of reason in the movement towards
perfection and its relation to the apprehension of the first moral principles:
[M]an arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from
one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational…. And since
movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in
something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry
and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by
analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has
found.83
In light of the above, the movement from unknowing to knowing something takes on a similar
dynamism that gradually achieves cognition. A person needs time and experience to learn how
to swim initially perhaps by simply learning how to stay afloat in the water and then moving
to learning the different swimming strokes. In considering this processional movement,
Aquinas realises, too, the mutual interdependence of the intellect and will in the procurement
of the telic end. He states:
Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according
to nature: for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are
known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is
derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end.
Accordingly, the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be
in virtue of the natural law.84
It is clear from the foregoing therefore that for Aquinas, “natural inclinations provide the
foundation and the direction for our knowledge of self-evident principles of natural law.”85
(Aquinas’s understanding of the primary moral principles as self-evident truths is discussed
below.) There is certainly a dynamic operation that takes place between these givens in co-
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operatively delivering to human agents what they necessarily require to advance from their
present state towards moral perfection.
Having initiated the discussion above regarding the complementarity between reason and will,
the relational functionary elements of intellection and appetition in respect to natural law will
now be further explored below.

‘Reason’ Behind Human Appetition
Aquinas theorises that inclinationem naturalem is the apprehensive movement which tends
reason towards the (moral) good. Since reason apprehends the moral good as end, it does so
only on the basis that it brings about the desired perfection in human persons. Reason is
naturally disposed to the good not because the good is good per se, but because reason
apprehends the perceived good as good for sake of the end of the human agent. Reason,
however, does not completely work in isolation since in tending towards the good, the
appetitive faculty contributes indirectly to the appraisal of the good that is being apprehended.
The good which is desired by the appetitive power reaches reason and consequently is informed
of the nature of such good as sensed. The appetitive power tends towards the desired object
only after reason has evaluated the good as good for the human person. Aquinas’s teaching that
“for every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every
apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will”86 adequately explains the mutual
relationship between reason and will. Specifying that the outcome of this relationship is
something practical, Grisez opines that the will’s function is bound by the dictates of reason
since it is only in relation to volition that knowledge is construed as practical. He intimates
that:
[T]he first acts of practical knowing are prior to the first acts of the will.
These acts of knowing are practical only by reference to the will, whose
acts they specify, but not through the subordination to the will
characteristic of those acts of practical reason which pre-suppose a
prior act of the will.87
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Hence, inclinatio naturalis serves “as mute pointer in the right direction and reason is the sight
which apprehends such a pointer knows why the direction is the right one, and directs the
person with sight to the way to go.”88
A necessary cognate of the relationship between the intellect and the will in relation to legi
naturali and inclinationi naturali is the determination of the moral good. To elaborate on this
consideration, the discussion regarding the following subject matters provides clarifications:
(i) human inclination may or may not necessarily involve the moral consideration of things,
and (ii) moral good necessarily involves the teleological considerations of human acts.
Regarding (i), it should be acknowledged that not all human inclinations flow from the
intellect-will relationship. Some human activities involve certain natural inclinations which are
non-rational. Physiological functions such as the pumping out of blood from the left atrium to
the left ventricle through the aorta to the different organs and tissues of the body carrying
oxygen and nutrients is achieved ‘naturally’ or involuntary since the heart muscles are naturally
inclined to operate in such a physiological manner. This example obviously does not attract
any moral evaluation since the consideration of natural inclination in this regard does not
involve the operations of the intellect and the will.
Regarding (ii), natural inclinations may invite moral evaluations in view of whether the good
that is being acted upon by the will corresponds to what the reason dictates as perfective of
human nature and whether it adheres to natural law. Flippen states that the “order which reason,
by considering, puts into operations of the will is the business of morality.”89 Since a law is
defined as the “ordinance of reason for the common good”90 by Aquinas himself, it logically
follows that a law is meant to provide specific ethical standards and guidance in society.
Natural inclination itself may be viewed as a moral ordering directing the human agents to their
human (natural) and beatific (supernatural) ends. This moral ordering is on account of the
service of both the intellect and will and the delimitation imposed by human passions. In
reference to the latter factors, Aquinas insists that though these powers may affect the
apprehension of the good, they are subordinated to reason. He says then:
All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g., of
the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by
reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept,
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as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are many in
themselves, but are based on one common foundation.91
Fundamentally, concupiscible and irascible passions are indeterminate realities when it comes
to moral considerations: they are neither good nor evil and indirectly affect the will and not
reason. Aquinas does not disregard the reality of the passions albeit they only indirectly affect
reason. The occasion that passions present to human reason is potent enough to blur the
difference between what is rational and not rational.

Inclinatio naturalis vis-à-vis Synderesis
Inclinatio naturalis directly points human agents to the first principles of natural law since
disposing them towards the moral good is its essence. Natural inclinations though are not the
natural law but are natural dispositions that draw every human person to where they should be
directed to in order to actuate the potentialities of their human nature. Grisez provides an
explanation to this assertion:
Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops
and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct
strata. These tendencies are not natural law; the tendencies indicate
possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point of
departure it requires in order to propose ends.92
Natural inclinations are therefore dispositions which are operative in all human agents who are
considered hylomorphic beings. This dynamism accounts for the organic movement of the
human agent within the exitus-reditus paradigm by Aquinas. It views the sojourn of the human
person as a movement towards full human and moral development whereby every step forward
is a step closer to the ultimate telos. The path of moral development is serviced by reason which
directs the will to the end under the influence of natural inclination. Aquinas holds this same
position as Seipel who offers this remark: “[W]e can come to know the proper ends of human
life by carefully determining the inclinations we truly possess by way of our God-given human
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nature.”93 Rightfully establishing the normative place of natural inclination in the scheme of
human intellection, apprehension thus precedes every other volition as mentioned above.94
With natural inclination’s correlativity with reason already well-established in the preceding
discussion, the investigation of its relationship with synderesis is now proffered. If the will’s
natural inclinations - this will being a rational appetite95 - direct the practical intellect to the
first principles of natural law, synderesis is the habit of certainty that disposes every person to
apprehend the moral good. Aquinas regards synderesis in this fashion based on two accounts:
first, because it is permanently placed in the human soul and cannot be extinguished; and
second, because it only conveys the truth of the first principles of natural law. Aquinas
elucidates that “‘synderesis’ is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as
through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered.”96
Considered as defined, it is one thing to posit that the practical intellect arrives at the knowledge
of the first principles of natural law via synderesis and it would be another thing to demonstrate
how synderesis actually realises its own apprehensive act, i.e., to “judge of those things which
have been discovered by reasoning.”97
A salient feature of Aquinas’s conceptualisation of synderesis is the apprehension of what are
believed to be self-evident truths (per se nota). In Thomistic linguistics concerning the primary
principles, self-evident is defined as the immediate and non-discursive grasp of the first
principles of natural law. Aquinas utilises a self-evident theory in his analysis of whether
knowledge is innate or acquired. Via self-evident theory, Aquinas maintains that the knowledge
of the primary principles is not innate in the sense that knowledge is brought about by some
form of divine illumination. Apparently, the primary moral principles are essentially underived
truths that are yet to be actuated via synderetic action. John Finnis offers his explanation of this
phenomenon:
The first principles of practical reason are ‘indemonstrable’ and ‘selfevident’…. Aquinas firmly holds that they are understood by what he
calls ‘induction’ of principles, by which he means insight into data of
experience (data preserved, after the direct experience, in the memory).
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‘To reach a knowledge of them [first principles, whether speculative or
of practical reason] we need sensory experience and memory.’98
One crucial element pertinent to this research is the determination on how the truths of the first
principles of natural law are considered self-evident. The Thomistic use of the term self-evident
is not in consonance with the contemporary usage of the word itself. Self-evident is commonly
understood as something that is known without the need for proofs to ascertain its authenticity
or veracity. It is important to note that for Aquinas, self-evident truths are reached, as Finnis
mentions above, via sensory experience and memory. These two intellectual operations are
both mutually exclusive and dependent of each other in facilitating human intellection.
Regarding the sensory experience, Grisez, concurring with Finnis, explains that: “Using the
primary principle, reason reflects on experience in which the natural inclinations are found
pointing to good appropriate to themselves.”99 Nelson accurately identifies the corporeal state
and the human condition as the necessary givens in human intellection: “Because of the way
in which we are created, it is natural for us to use our powers in characteristic ways to come to
know things, which is not to say we are born with that knowledge.”100 Further, he states that
human limitations contribute towards how knowledge is acquired by the human intellect:
One cannot reason to conclusions in the speculative or practical
sciences without supplying experientially known information that is
not found in naturally known general first principles, which themselves
have an experiential component. Moreover, given the limitations of
human reason, there is a great potential for error in reaching
conclusions. The mode of our participation in God’s reason is not full,
Thomas says, but imperfect.101
Rhonheimer adds depth to the discussion by highlighting that the intellect is not a mere passive
receiver of sensitive information in formulating the primary moral principles. He stresses,
indicating unity with Aquinas, the con-joint act of the intellect to draw data from the
extramental world and the action of the intellect itself to tap into the intellectus agens in
discovering the light of synderesis.
Even though Thomas holds firmly to the position that all knowledge
arises through senses – that, indeed, nothing at all could be known
without its first having been made present to the intellect by way of the
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senses, and that in every act of knowing there occurs a “turning toward
phantasms” (conversio as phantasmata) – nevertheless, he never in any
way reduces the action of the intellect to a mere rational “reworking”
of sense data in the manner of an empiricist or sensualist…. From the
formal point of view, the cause is the intellect itself, and that means
that its relation to sense experience is not merely that of a “receiver,”
nor does it “contribute something” and certainly not in a “creative
manner”; it is rather, as a “light” that “makes visible” what is already
there but “hidden” because not yet presented to sense perception.102
Rhonheimer’s explanation above substantially sums up what self-evident refers to concerning
the knowledge of the primary moral principles. Grisez follows this thought through with
parallel semantic articulation: “Our minds use the data of experience as a bridge to cross into
reality in order to grasp the more-than-given truth of things.”103
The initial sensory experience earlier alluded to by both Rhonheimer and Grisez may not,
however, be enough to form a firm and definitive knowledge. From the perspective of sensitive
cognition, previous knowledge from memory may necessarily be required. Finnis, asserting the
process called ‘induction of principles’ whereby primary moral principles are produced, he
maintains that induction, as opposed to syllogism, paves the way for the first principles of
natural law to be immediately intellected in the human mind as self-evident truth. He believes
that memory serves as a pool of knowledge or a storage of information whereby previous
knowledge are integrated, composed, or combined to arrive as a newly inducted knowledge.
Foreshadowing a later discussion point, imagination’s instrumentality in cognition is posited
by this research as having an epistemic value not only in the initial apprehension of the primary
principles but also with the expansion of knowledge via amalgamation of previously cognised
truths.
The above discussion presented the Thomistic understanding that sensory experience and
memory maintain crucial contributory roles in the formation of the first principles of natural
law. They provide, as it were, epistemic raw materials and the cognitive mechanism which
allow for sensible data to be processed and conceptualised respectively as self-evident. By their
very nature, they are not exclusively and essentially responsible for the consideration of
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acquired sensible data as self-evident. They provide the same contributory role even to nonself-evident truths.
While the question on how first principles of natural law are apprehended will be considered
in the next chapter, it needs to be pointed out that beyond the natural apprehension of the
intelligible goods, “a discursive, inventive process of the natural reason [takes place whereby]
what is potentially contained in these principles is cognitively unfolded and made explicit.”104
Explaining this quote, Rhonheimer maintains that through the discursive and inventive process,
the human agent embarks on the path of experience where personal discoveries through one’s
initiative or by receipt of instruction or revelation are achieved.
It is overwhelmingly clear at this point that sensory experience is vital in the discernment of
the first principles of natural law. Aquinas further construes a more expansive manner of
intellection beyond sensitive intellection. He believes that “[s]ensitive knowledge is not the
entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual
knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.”105 Following Aristotle, the
Angelic Doctor acknowledges the hylomorphic condition of the human person which allows
for sensitive knowledge and for the intuitive intellectual knowledge to take place.106 In this
respect, Aquinas acknowledges two operations in the sensitive part of the soul: “One, in regard
of impression only, and this operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed
by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image
of an absent thing, or even of something never seen.”107 The intuitive intellectual knowledge
relative to the self-evident truths contained in the first principles of natural law is accorded to
the intellectus agens which is directly responsible for causing “the phantasms received from
the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.”108 Aquinas claims that the
intellectus agens is the “means of which we can know the truth of changing things in an
unchanging way.”109 It is through the intellectus agens that the sensible good, which is naturally
sought by the practical intellect, becomes impressed on the soul as the practical good that
guides human agents to fulfill the precept, bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum
vitandum. Lest human reason is “perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of
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nature,”110 there is a real expectation that human agents would flourish under the moral
foundation and ethical guidance of the first principles of natural law. Being contingent human
agents, there will always be the likelihood that though the first principles of natural law are
intuitively apprehended by synderesis, it may fail to serve any practical purpose when moral
reasoning is perverted by passions and inordinate vices.
Aquinas intelligently asserts that “there is in every man a natural inclination to act according
to reason: and this is to act according to virtue.”111 The study of virtues in the following chapters
provides the pertinent forum for reflecting on how human agents may gain practical guidelines
in view of the growth of the knowledge of the primary moral precepts. It is presupposed in this
research that the knowledge of the first principles of natural law is an ongoing inquiry and
discovery simultaneously taking place within the gambit of human moral development since
(i) the moral precepts contained in the first principles of natural law are extensively generic in
nature, and (ii) the contingent nature of the human person being a body-soul unicity is
characterised by both dispositional (interiorly) and situational (exteriorly) fluctuating
influences. Since through the first moral principles human agents proceed to discover and
judge what have been intuitively discovered via synderesis,112 the path towards a virtuous life
and experience should enable the moral precept, bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et
malum vitandum, come to its full realisation and perfection in the human person.

Summary
Synderesis is the innate disposition (habitus) that intuitively grasps the universal principles of
natural law. As a habit understood in the Thomistic sense, it contains the precepts of the first
principles of moral action. Through it, the human mind is illumined by the knowledge of the
primary moral principles which state that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be
avoided. The disposition, however, is only actualised when the human mind engages with the
physical world from where the material content of morality is sourced. This epistemological
contact is necessary and pivotal in guaranteeing that the moral good that synderesis apprehends
is inchoatively actuated. Moreover, synderesis does not only point to moral good but also
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desires that this moral good grows to its full potential. It is through the habituation of moral
virtues that the moral good transforms human agents into moral agents who are naturally
capable of acquiring not just the natural ends but the supernatural ends as well.
This rationale behind the pursuit of the moral good’s specificity is consistent with Thomistic
anthropology which conceptually views the human person as a composite of body and soul. In
this view, the hylomorphic unicity of the human person is determinant of the process of
cognising sensible materials. As Aquinas himself asserts, everything resided first in the
extramental world before eventually making its way in the human mind to end up as an idea or
a concept. Aquinas believes that human cognition is brought about by mainly two processes:
sensitive cognition and imagination, both of which can operate mutually or separately in
knowing the truth. However, without human agents personally immersing and engaging in an
intelligible and moral universe, the first principles of natural law will never have any
intelligibility.
Aquinas conceives of the apprehension of the first principles of natural law as an appetitive
movement that is premised on the human agents’ natural disposition to seek the universal moral
good. Reason is naturally disposed to the moral good since, as a good itself, it recognises and
responds to the good present in other realities that are inherently good. In this dynamism of
apprehension, Aquinas presents the notion of natural inclination and the concept of the ratio of
the perceived moral good. He contemplates the ontological dynamism between reason and will
in moral development as the process that gives rise for human agents to actively seek and
pursue the moral good and avoid evil.
Aquinas contends that the intellectus agens is responsible for illuminating the human mind of
the divinely presaged and sensitively cognised a priori universal moral good. It is through both
of these factors that the first principles of natural law attain their intelligibility and
enforceability which is expressed via its principal derivates (e.g., secondary principles), viz.,
the inclinatio naturalis to preserve life, the inclinatio naturalis to reproduce and to educate
offspring, and the inclinatio naturalis to know the truth about God. These three represent the
immediately derived primary moral principles expressed in a hierarchical order where the
natural inclination to know the truth about God signifies the disposition that is closest to that
which engenders the acquisition of the supernatural ends. In this mutual regard, the ordering
of the natural law discloses the ordering of human natural inclinations.
77

In the overall scheme of things, synderesis appoints the moral ends which have been
appropriately considered by practical reason as morally good in themselves to be either
acquired as natural or supernatural end. As human nature inclines human agents to these moral
ends, it is synderesis which paves the way for these moral ends to be intuitively and
apprehensively known. This primordial knowledge is critical for moral development. Without
the necessary accordance of moral nourishment, the first principles of natural law remain
inoperative and ineffective in directing human agents to their telic ends.
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Chapter 5
The Materia causae in the Cognition of the Practical Good

Introduction
The previous chapter dealt with fundamental truths about the nature of synderesis as an innate
habit which enables the human person to intuitively apprehend the first principles of natural
law. The theological inquiry on synderesis in this chapter presupposes a few matters. Firstly,
synderesis, according to Catholic theology, is implanted by God in every human person and is
uniformly given to all. Secondly, since its formal object is the first principles of the natural law
whose roles are to serve as moral foundation and to provide moral guidance to human agents,
synderesis will still require the necessary stimuli from the social environment for its epistemic
growth and maturation. And thirdly, every human agent possesses the capacity for moral
growth and this is realised by way of virtue habituation. The first presupposition has already
been dealt with in the previous chapters. The third presupposition will be covered in later
chapters. The task of this present chapter relates to the second presupposition which focusses
on investigating the various material causes (materia causae) which influence the actuation
and the apprehension of the first principles of natural law. These epistemic materials influence,
directly or indirectly, pre-cognitively and cognitively, the act of synderesis in human agents.

The Notion of Apprehending the Practical Good
The disciple in the Gospel of Matthew 19:16 raises a valid question pertinent to this present
study: “Teacher, what good deed must I do to have eternal life?”1 Catholic eschatology teaches
that the good (supernatural end) is synonymous to eternal life even if it is upheld that: “No one
is good but God alone.”2 But God’s goodness overflows out to his creation for no reason but
for the sake of good alone. The gift of synderesis manifests God’s overflowing goodness.
Within the human self, there is an inner sanctum where this good is known and experienced.
The Second Vatican Council Fathers identify this inner sanctum in the following terms: “In the
depths of his conscience, man detects a law…summoning him to love good and avoid evil.”3
In the spiritual interiority of human agents, the discovery of the primary moral principles takes
place in the human soul. Aquinas’s foray into the field of ontological realism or metaphysical
realism4 decidedly led him to the soul’s inner sanctum and away from the polar spectrums of
physicalism and illuminism.5 These polar specturms have been theorised to be causes of moral
knowledge in the human person. Proposing the middle ground (via media) as the locus where
divine wisdom and human wisdom meet, Aquinas adopted Aristotle’s intellectus agens and
determined it as the principle which illumines the soul in knowing the first principles of natural
law. He explains: “We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make
things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is
the necessity for an active intellect (intellectus agens).”6 The other component of the middle
ground is sensitive experience which Aquinas delegates as responsible for actuating the innate
habit of synderesis. It also provides the necessarily epistemic materials serving as precursors
to human intellection. Anthony Lisska refers to these as “the epistemological materials
propaedeutic to concept formation.”7 The ontology of the agent (active) intellect underlines the
apprehension of the practical good that inheres in the first principles of natural law.
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Relating the epistemological notion of apprehension to synderesis is basically drawn from
Aquinas’s own theological reflection on natural law in his Summa theologiae: “good is the first
thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason.”8 To apprehend seems to connote
a power which synderesis does not actually possess. Synderesis, however, is a habitual
disposition which moves moral agents to the knowledge of the practical good. Aquinas explains
this fully in this text:
Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do
not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we
call “synderesis.” Whence “synderesis” is said to incite to good, and to
murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to
discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear
that “synderesis” is not a power, but a natural habit.9
Implied in the above text is the process of discovery and judgment of things discovered through
the first principles. Rhonheimer offers his understanding behind this implication:
Nothing can be “deduced” from the first principle. Instead, it “shows
itself” in the various specific principles and develops in them its
foundational-practical effectiveness, not only as a principle of thinking,
but as a principle of movement.10
Since the primary moral principles require specific epistemological movements, this assumes
the process which Aquinas envisages: it begins with the simple apprehension of the essences
or quiddities of sensed objects and develops into the more complex cognition involving the
process of composition and division.11 Synderesis operates in the simple apprehension of
quiddities upon being actuated via sensitive experience. As mentioned previously, synderesis
is certainly not passive but an active and dynamic participant in the epistemic growth of the
primary moral principles. There is meaning in why Aquinas equivocates synderesis to reason
in the following text: “Natural reason known by the name of synderesis appoints the end to
moral virtues.”12 This implies effectively then that when synderesis moves human agents, it
follows this movement.
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The understanding of the notion of apprehension in Aquinas’s epistemology is crucial in fully
grasping the different metaphysical moments that occur during this process. These moments
will be fully articulated later in this thesis. That said, the intuitive process of apprehension
points beyond mere cognition of the perfective good. Human agents are not ‘all brain’; they
also possess a will and emotions. Both faculties of volition and appetition are involved, too, in
bringing about the apprehension of moral knowledge. Furthermore, Stump suggests that the
term ‘apprehension’ in Aquinas’s writings may either refer to “cognitive and non-cognitive
acts of grasping.”13 She believes that non-cognitive reception (intuition, pre-cognition) occurs
when the intellect receives epistemic materials without apprehending it. On the other hand, the
cognitive act refers to the growth of the knowledge of the universal principles through sensitive
experience (apprehension).
The following section will now shed light on Aquinas’s epistemology which should provide
the necessary fundamental insights into his doctrine on synderesis.

The Thomistic Theory of Cognition: An Overview
Aquinas’s hylomorphic theory underscores his epistemology. It fundamentally presents the
human person as constitutive of a body and soul. His hylomorphism-grounded epistemology is
the key to his insights in the disciplines of psychology and metaphysics. As will be
demonstrated below, his understanding of the specific phases in the intellective cognition such
as the act of the corporeal organ and turn to phantasm is undergirded by the body-soul
composite. His celebrated statement in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate sums up Aquinas’s
cognitive theory: “Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in sense” (“Nihil est in
intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu”).”14
The discussion in the previous chapter lucidly posited that the Thomistic intellective process
necessarily starts via sensory experience. As these extramental elements make contact with the
human person, specifically through the human sensory organs, it leaves an impression that
images the actual existing object outside the human mind. These sensory images are raw
images of material objects in the extramental world that would have to be internally processed
13
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before the human mind can fully grasp what it is. Since extramental objects are material in
nature, there is obviously no way that what is perceived externally would be present internally
in the mind exactly as how it exists as perceived. Aquinas refers to the impressions made by
these extramental elements on the mind as likeness of what is perceived. This “empirical
constraint,”15 as Pasnau puts it, points necessarily to how Aquinas qualifies the limits of the
knower to know: “whatever is received into something is received according to the condition
of the recipient.”16 Since the human person as the potential knower “can have knowledge of all
corporeal things”17 due to the intellect, Aquinas asserts that the intellective process is initially
a process of abstracting the universal from sensible images that have been perceived and have
been impressed on the rational soul. This is premised on the Thomistic assertion that the
rational soul is immaterial and therefore can only cognise spiritual images, i.e., the universal
quality of a material object, or philosophically, the essence of an existential substance. The
intellectus agens (active or agent intellect) is responsible for the operation of abstraction after
which it passes the intelligible species on to the intellectus possibilis (possible intellect) to turn
it into a formal concept or word.
Regarding the phenomenon of perceiving, i.e., perception as involving and including other
human senses such a feeling, tasting, smelling, hearing, the human person does not only sense
the distinctive and manifold accidental attributes of existing objects in reality, such as the red
colour of an apple, but rather, it grasps ultimately its perceived essential specification or
universal quality.
There appears to be an inseparable intellective process which involves the cognition of the
external world achieved by the external senses and processed by the internal senses which
produce the cognition of perceived realities. This inseparable metaphysical process involves
the simultaneous apprehension of the universal and particular elements of the perceptible
world. This metaphysical sequence or order of the procession may be likened to the proverbial
dilemma: which comes first, the chicken or the egg. Aquinas would argue that the universal is
what is cognised prior to the particular since the “intellect has the universal for its object.”18
Since anything physical (particular) is incapable of penetrating the human mind, the universal
is what is abstracted out of perceived objects. This is the question that has preoccupied
15
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medieval thinkers, including obviously Aquinas: how does a physical object leave a nonphysical (immaterial, spiritual) impression of itself on the mind?19 Aquinas attributes to the
intellectus agens the metaphysical task of stripping off perceived sensed objects of all their
accidental attributes to effectively grasp its essence or its universal quality. What is abstracted
out of a perceived red apple is the apple-ness that defines all existing red apples. The cognitive
process does not conclude with the mere grasp of the quiddity. Aquinas affirms that ensuing
from the abstraction of the essence or the universal quality of sensible objects, the human mind
turns to the phantasm (conversio ad phantasmata) to confirm and affirm that what is perceived
is really and actually ‘this red apple’ and not any other red apple or other apples for that matter.
This determination underlines the real experience that a human person actually perceives as a
hylomorphic being. The understanding of the specificity of the cognitive process is an
important element in Thomism. Empiricism is indispensable in the study of synderesis and its
process of sustaining the practical knowledge of doing and pursuing the good.

Sensitive Knowledge and Experience of the Material World
As earlier elucidated, human agents cognise the world around them once extramental elements
leave their impressions on the external senses. The quality of the impression is dependent upon
the cognitive boundaries of human agents since “the thing known is in the knower according
to the mode of the knower.”20 This qualification provides the metaphysical foundation for
whatever human agents seek to apprehend, including the appropriation of the practical good
that results from its cognition. As the universal capacity of every contingent rational being to
seek the synderetic good is affirmed, the circumstantial aspect of its moral development
depends on the individuality and experience of moral agents.
Though evidence favours the rational stress in Thomistic literature, there is an underlying
content within it that upholds the value of human experience. Knowing is an experience of and
by the whole person. More than a rational intellection, sensitive cognition is also a learning
experience. The intuitive apprehension of the first principles of natural law confirms not just a
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disposition but an ensuing experience that contributes towards the fuller understanding of those
innate moral precepts.
Possessing a given nature which is a body-soul composite, human agents interact with the
outside world through the intermediary of their physical bodies whose external senses serve as
immediate points of contact for sensory interactions. Material stimuli are recognised as
immediately acting upon the sensory organs in order to catalyse the production of sensitive
knowledge. The causal relationship between potency and act undergirds this intellective
process. It also highlights the intrinsic relationship between sense organ and sense faculty. In
this process, Aquinas affirms the existence of the five interior senses that receive these
extramental stimuli.21 Short of explicating any underlying rationale for the attribution of five
human senses, Aquinas simply ascribes their distinction and number to nature: “nature
provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of
the powers.”22
Aquinas confirms that nature is responsible for equipping human agents with the necessary
faculties and spiritual powers to be able to realise their own perfection. Since the sensitive
faculties operate under the intellective faculties, sensory human experiences are harnessed by
the intellect in order that human potentialities are actualised by virtue of their natural
ordination. The actualisation of human potentials practically begins by the initiatory
intellective process of sense perception23 whereby the reception of sensible species by the
sensory organs is instantiated. Aquinas asserts the existence of various internal organs which
serve as receptors of sensory inputs or stimuli which bring about various physiological
responses on the different sense organs such as the experiences of smell, touch, feel, taste and
vision. All of these are classically referred to as the ‘objects of sense perception.’ Though
merely initiatory, these physiological experiences are crucial in the cognitive process since they
provide the foundational raw materials for the eventual apprehension of knowledge and
subsequent synthesis of such.
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The human body serves as the conduit, as it were, between the exterior environment and the
interior environment, between the exterior senses and the interior senses, in internalising the
epistemic process of cognition. During the initial phase of contact, the external senses relate to
the internal senses by reducing the sensed extramental objects into sensible species. The
immaterial sensible species, according to Stump, are “received by the senses although not
cognised by them.”24 The process of reduction that is initially involved in this cognitive process
is pre-analytical, i.e., this phase is prior to any actual cognition that is yet to take place.
Cognition realises when a sensible species is eventually produced in the form of a concept or
a word. Analytically, the reception of the sensible species by the internal senses does not
involve any cognitive act although it may appear so after carefully studying the specific natures
of the internal senses, specifically the vis cogitativa which will be demonstrated below.
Further to the above-mentioned reductive process whereby extramental objects are received as
sensible species by the internal senses, sensitive cognition requires certain stimulus or input
without which the required sensory act on sense organs cannot take place. The inherent nature
of the sense organs makes it possible for it to be necessarily acted upon by extramental
materials. Aquinas underscores the passive nature of the sense organs: “the passivity of
sensation was an instance of like being acted upon by like.”25 It is simply not the essential
property of the sense organs to come out and engage with the social environment on their own
accord. In affirming the sense organs’ passivity, Aquinas also affirms the co-natural
instantaneous effect of such relative to the in-coming stimuli: “sense is a passive power, and is
naturally immuted by the exterior sensible.”26 As bearing a passive configuration, sense organs
are necessarily disposed to be immuted in deference to its specific role in the process of
intellection. H. D. Gardeil sums up the cognitive process in this manner:
We have but to remember that in the process of sensation there are two
phases: the passive phase, in which the sense is informed and
determined by the external object; and the active phase, which properly
constitutes the act of knowledge, and in which the informed faculty
determines itself.27
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The instantaneity that the process of stimulated interaction by extramental objects on the sense
organs involves the sub-powers of the cognitive (apprehensive) and the appetitive (sensitive)
faculties located in the soul’s intellective or apprehending power. Aquinas claims that the
cognitive and appetitive powers (both extensions of the intellective power) are responsible for
the appropriate reaction to extramental stimuli.28 In effect, both of these powers are responsible
for directly dealing with the internal senses in processing impressed extramental data. Aquinas
differentiates the role of reason in this respect which excludes the external senses that rely upon
the stimulation by extramental objects for its operation. Aquinas explains this differentiation:
The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby
they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But
the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require
exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason,
which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive
power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.29
The movement of sensitive power, in particular, is enabled by the natural disposition towards
the fundamental ordering of the good and the avoidance of evil. Aquinas characterises this
sensual movement as “an appetite following sensitive apprehension.”30 By this he meant that
the causal movement of the appetitive faculty is ordered by reason.

The Thomistic Intellective Operations
In the Prologue of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Aquinas succinctly
describes his teaching on the intellective operations:
Now there are three acts of the reason, the first two of which belong to
reason regarded as an intellect. One action of the intellect is the
understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this
action it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some
the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the
intellect…. The second operation of the intellect is its act of combining
or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present….
But the third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar
to reason, namely, to advance from one thing to another in such a way
28
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that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the
unknown.31
It should be clear by now that the Thomistic intellective operations are generally premised on
sensitive cognition. Most knowledge begins from sensory experience while some are cognitive
products of this initial interaction with the extramental world, i.e., knowledge formulated via
imagination. With regard to the intellectual operation of composition and division, Aquinas
claims that when previously sensed intelligibles are synthesised new concepts or ideas are
formed. Experience reveals that human knowledge inchoately develops when recently-formed
concepts or ideas are combined, in its entirety or elements of it, with other recently-formed
concepts or ideas or with previously-sensed concepts or ideas. The human agent may initially
understand via audition the sound of a piano (or any other musical instrument) and this
understanding of sounds may develop and grow upon hearing other types of sound such as
musical instruments played in a musical duet, quarter, quintet or the full-scale orchestra. New
ideas or concepts may be products of the progression of understanding of earlier grasped
sensible knowledge. Considering the principle of non-contradiction as an example: a child who
has learnt that her parents cannot be with her at school discovers consequently that her parents
cannot be with her and be at home at the same time. By and large, Aquinas believes that the
intellect has the innate capacity to form new concepts by joining or synthesising previously
cognised intelligible species, including sensible species for that matter:
The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and
division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a
likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection
all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect
does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but
it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and
this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties,
accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily
compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from
one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the
process of reasoning.32
Further, Aquinas explains that what is involved in the intellectual process of composition and
division is differentiating and comparing: “Composition and division of the intellect are made
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by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and
division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things.”33 During this process when
the human intellect compares and differentiates one thing from another by composition and
division, Aquinas also points to the process of reasoning that is set in motion. These constitute
the second and third operations of the intellect according to the mind of Aquinas respectively.
The first act of the intellect is simple apprehension which entails the intellective apprehension
of the quiddity of a sensed material object. Through abstraction, quiddity is extracted from
sensible species which is understood to have earlier left an impression on the sensory organs.
The process of abstraction will be dealt with in length below.
Specifically pertinent to this current study, the intuitive apprehension by synderesis of the first
principles of natural law is considered as occurring within the purview of the first action of the
human intellect. The notion of good is considered at the pre-reasoning level (pre-cognition)
and as such necessitates the second and third process of intellection for such good to be truly
intelligible and therefore formed and conceptualised. It should be clearly pointed out, however,
that: “In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first:
for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible
causes.”34 This statement both points to the acquisition of derived knowledge from previously
cognised knowledge and the knowledge which emanates from the intuition and apprehension
of the first principles of natural law by synderesis.
Aquinas’s proposition above extends the consideration of synderesis when it comes to the
consideration of its ontological nature. While synderesis is an innate disposition towards the
good, this good necessarily requires fomenting by way of time and experience. Analogically,
this good is potentially a primary knowledge in the human intellect and necessarily requires
inchoative stimulation for its germ of truth, as it were, to come out from its shell. This is a
logical consequence of that fact that as contingent and corporeal beings, knowledge is mediated
by the physical body and its senses. This is the logical proof as to why synderesis, or human
intellection for that matter, achieves its formal object via media, i.e., it is halfway between
divine illumination and physical or sensory intellection. Owing to this, synderesis draws its
epistemic materials from the social environment and nowhere else. If knowledge is divinely
infused into the soul, this would defy the role of the human body in its natural constitution as
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a body-soul composite. Inversely, to give preponderance on knowledge being acquired solely
by sensory cognition and thereby disregarding the inherent disposition of the human person
towards the synderetic good is effectively negating the hylomorphic unicity of created beings.
The discussion so far has proposed that the dynamism of intellection is a process in a continuum
passing from potentiality to actuality. Intellectual knowledge is always a potentiality
anticipating actualisation by sensory stimuli. Being in a passive state, epistemic stimulation is
necessary in order to facilitate human intellection, which for intent and purposes, may require
series of repeated experiences for such intellection to be fully realised. Human intellection does
not reach its perfection in an instant and may necessarily acquire it by degrees.
Interiorly governing the transition from potentiality to actuality is the necessity of time in the
apprehension and formation of human knowledge. Aquinas firmly states that “composition and
division of the intellect involve time.”35 In this light, it is apt herein to raise an important query:
Does the human intellect instantly grasp the essence of a material object at the first instance
of sensitive contact? It would be difficult to understand that the human intellect would have
such an innate capacity to grasp the quiddity of material object without considering factors such
as time and experience. A child would not be able to immediately comprehend that the first
person he or she sees at birth is a human being, let alone his or her biological father or mother.
A child’s understanding of the human beings around him or her would require a growing
experience that is punctuated by time and repeated experiences. Similarly, any human person
would require time and experience in getting to know the person he or she wishes to marry.

The External and Internal Sensoria: Materia causae
The Sensory Intellective Process: General Overview
Aquinas, following the philosophy of the fourth century Stagirite, believes that nature itself has
accorded every human person the necessary powers to cognise extramentally. This is,
according to Thomism, a defining attribution which differentiates human agents from higher
beings such as angels and lower beings such as non-rational animals. This cognitive power,
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apart from other inherent human powers considered within the order of created beings, holds a
supreme value in the free and passionate pursuit of human fulfilment and perfection. Aquinas
asserts the primacy of intellection which appears to govern the hierarchical ordering of created
beings in their appetitive inclinations. His assertion of this primacy of being is well-established
and widely known. He expresses this in terms of the moral agent’s natural desire for
knowledge: “[T]he proper operation of man as man is to understand…. Hence the desire of
man is naturally inclined to understand.”36 Aquinas maintains that this natural desire for
knowledge ultimately leads towards a desire for God which is expressive of the natural desire
to understand the causes of things: “Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever
he sees…. [M]an naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is the first
cause of all. Therefore man's last end is to know God.”37
In the Thomistic hierarchy of being, the human person is a body-soul unicity who demonstrates
a specific degree of intellection attributable to lower forms of spiritual beings and higher form
of animals. Such noble placement in the cognitive zeitgeist38 admits inherent limitations while
simultaneously proffering the moral agent’s potential viability for growth and development be
it intellectively, volitionally or affectively. Nature’s endowment assures the existence of the
necessary resources which are meant to set the moral agent on the moral path towards human
fulfilment and perfection. This path is complex and fluid, but the moral agent is preconditioned, as it were, to face the realities ahead. One of his spiritual endowments is the habit
of synderesis. This is a most fundamental endowment since it is innate and immediately
accessed, not to mention that it is available in perpetuum. But the grasp of the first principles
is not like waking up in the morning knowing the Catholic Doctrine of Transubstantiation of
the bread and wine into the real Body and Blood of Christ without prior recourse to some form
of study or research. Gilson concisely describes this metaphysical process using the analogy of
the light that is the intellectus agens:
The human intellect possesses therefore a light just sufficient in order
to acquire the knowledge of intelligible to which it can raise itself by
means of sensible things. In a certain sense, indeed, we possess in us
the germ of all knowledge: praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum
36
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semina. These pre-formed seeds, of which we have natural knowledge,
are first principles: prima intelligibilium principia. What characterises
these principles is that they are the first conceptions which our intellect
forms when we enter into contact with the sensible. To say that they
pre-exist in the intellect is not to say that the intellect possesses them
actually in itself, independently of the action which bodies exercise on
our soul. It is simply to say that they are the first intelligibles which our
intellect conceives starting immediately from sensible experience.39
Gilson’s observation is consistent with the assumption of this thesis that the synderetic good is
a formal principle that does not have material content until the human mind comes into contact
with the extramental environment. His attribution to this as first intelligibles signifies the
necessity of an external catalyst to bring about cognition. In this cognitive process that is
defined by the body-soul unicity, the order involved in the apprehension of the first moral
principles is mediated and initially processed by the external and internal sensoria. Though
both of these sensoria are involved in the over-all cognitive process, perception, i.e., the
processing of the acquired sense data, is the domain of the internal sensoria (internal senses).
The reality of phantasm, which contains the sensible species arising from the ‘epistemic
contact’40 between the extramental object and the external-internal sensoria, denotes the
intelligible species subsequently resulting after abstraction. As previously articulated, it is
through the agency of the intellectus agens that the abstraction of the sensible species takes
place by stripping off the accidental attributes attached to it in order to extract the universal
factor, or quiddity, contained in the perceived extramental object. The resulting intelligible
species is stored in the intellectus possibilis where it remains for further intellective processing.
At this stage, what is abstracted is the universal essence or quiddity of the extramental object.
Since human knowing is specific or particular, Aquinas theorises what he calls conversio ad
phastasmata (turn to phantasm) where the intellective process ‘returns’ to the sensible
materials earlier received by the external senses for the purpose of intelligibly identifying
particularly and singularly that which was cognised earlier. The turn to phantasm fulfills the
specification of the object perceived which the possible agent is unable to do so since it can
only directly grasp the universal. Aquinas reminds us of this:
Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and
primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in
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material
things
is
individual
matter,
whereas
our
intellect…understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such
matter.41
In effect, if what is perceived initially is an orange fruit, ‘this orange fruit’ and not any other
orange fruit is apprehended via conversio ad phastasmata. Underlying this example is the
psychological fact that only the accidentals (materials attributes such as colour, size, shape,
etc.), and not the quiddities of material objects, are perceived and cognised. The apprehension
of the universal is a metaphysical reality beyond perceptual knowing. This is evinced by
Aquinas in the following teaching:
Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a
body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter…. Now it
belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be
apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a
stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in
an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or
any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as
much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend
the individual through the senses and the imagination.42
The above discussion suffices for the delineation of what is called sensory cognition or
sensitive intellection. What is crucially pertinent now is the study of the four internal sensoria:
sensus communis, vis cogitativa, vis memorativa, and vis imaginativa. Among the four
sensoria, the discussion below will specifically explore the faculties of memory and
imagination in view of their role in the possible stimulation and ensuing formation of the
practical good. The outcome of this exploration will serve as a foundation to the discussion on
the beneficence of moral imagination in moral development.

The Four Internal Sensoria
Textual considerations regarding the external and internal sensoria are sourced from the Prima
pars of the Summa theologiae and the Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul (Quaestiones
disputatae de anima). Although Aquinas deals with the internal sensoria in various places in
41
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many of his obra maestra, these two treatises provide more substantial and targeted discussions
compared to the rest. It should be added that Aquinas appears not be heavily interested in
treating this matter at length. The status of the internal sensoria as being only a pre-analytical
phase in the intellective process, hence pre-cognitive, may have been the underlying rationale
why it did not receive any emphasis. The discussion below, however, will shed light on the
importance of its role not only in cognition but in the broader spectrum of moral development.
Aquinas regards the four internal sensoria as organic senses. As organic senses, the brain is
identified as the source of every sensorium’s operations. Aquinas claims that their individual
operations are performed as an organic whole geared towards producing consequently a
phantasm (phantasmata) out of the extramental objects initially sensed by the external sensoria.
Their operations are meant to serve the ultimate purpose of the human agent’s desire for selffulfilment and self-realisation. Gilson points out how nature itself supplies human life with the
necessary structures to achieve these ends: “Nature neither makes beings in vain nor multiplies
them needlessly. Yet she never refuses them anything they need. Therefore the sensitive soul
must exercise as many operations as are required for the life of a perfect animal.”43 Thus,
nature’s generosity provides the basic ingredients for human agents to seek their perfection and
fulfilment in life.
An important attribute of phantasms that is pertinent to and relative to the intellective process
is its potential nature. Since it bears the sensible species, phantasm is considered as potentially
intelligible. This attribution underscores its essential status in the cognitive process whereby
phantasms “are in potency with respect to the intelligible or intentional mode of existence
which the essence must assume to be actually known by the intellect.”44 This statement
effectively relativises phantasm as an intermediary between sensitive cognition and intellective
condition. Through the action of the intellectus agens, the sensible species is passed on to the
intellectus possibilis after extracting the universal out of the sensible species. The intelligible
species, which bears now the universal quality of the extramental object sensed earlier,
possesses the intellected intention or the conceptualised image of the sensed object. The
epistemic role of the intellectus possibilis appears over now since the sensible species has
reached the terminus of the cognitive process. However, what remains to be determined is how
does the intellect know the specificity of the cognised extramental object? In other words, how
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does the moral agent know particularly that ‘this orange’ is the actual orange that was perceived
and not some other orange. The discussion below will explain the significance of the four
internal sensoria in relation to the phenomenon of the turn to phantasm which accounts for the
knowledge of particulars.

Common Sense (Sensus communis)
Among the four internal sensoria, it is the role of common or proper sense (sensus communis)
to bring together and coordinate all the external stimuli that have left their impressions on the
external sensoria. It is on this basis that Aquinas aptly describes common sense as the “common
root and principle of the exterior senses.”45 Tasked to undertake the over-all coordination of
the four internal sensoria, common sense exercises discernment and judgment. It discerns, for
example, whether the object being perceived is red or blue in colour. Likewise, it judges, for
example, whether what is being tasted is sweet or salty. Due to these functions, Aquinas
confirms that “all apprehensions of the senses must be referred”46 to the common sense.
Moreover, common sense coordinates all external stimuli by serving as a ‘hub’ to all traffic
within the internal sensoria processes. For example, it coordinates with vis cogitativa in
determining whether what is being perceived is beneficial or harmful to the human agent. It
would also relate with vis memorativa and vis imaginativa in drawing from their stored wealth
of knowledge in identifying objects being sensed. On account of the above, Robert Edward
Brennan, OP describes common sense as “the foundation and meeting ground of all the external
senses.”47
Contrary to the popular understanding of common sense as something like a knack for seeing
things as they are, and, doing things as they ought to be done, common sense in Thomism
represents some type of a ‘central processing unit’ where the apprehension of impressions
acquired by the different senses are synthesized and discriminated. An interesting function of
the common sense is its ability to sense that it is sensing. This reflexive ability enables common
sense to be dynamically aware of its processes in relation to the social environment. In this
respect, Brennan pinpoints that “in the very act of perceiving an objective world, we also
45
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perceive a subjective world.”48 This statement discloses the nature of common sense as being
dynamic and active, not passive, since it incites an internal movement determining a reactive
response to perceived external stimuli. The dynamics of the impact of external stimuli upon
internal receptors will be elaborated from the perspective of psychology in the ensuing
chapters.

Memory (Vis memorativa)
When primary school-aged children return home, they will probably tell their parents their
experiences at school. They will use their memory (vis memorativa) to remember and reminisce
about what they had seen and had done at school. Aquinas ascribes to human memory the
capacity to “apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is
absent.”49 The inner sense of memory is an image-forming power than enables human agents
to remember (reproductive) or to reminisce a past event in a rather syllogistic manner
(recollective). Since it requires walking down the memory lane, memory requires the aid of the
intellect but only incidentally since it is largely the activity of the re-presentative sense to
produce memory of past events.50 In contrast to memory, which is a recalling of a past event,
to reminisce, according to Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, is “not remembering a fact that
has been learned, but rather like reliving in memory a past experience.”51
A note needs to be stated regarding the difference between sensitive memory and intellective
memory. Sensitive memory is peculiar to the internal sensoria while the intellective memory
pertains to the realm of the intellectus possibilis. Stump makes the commentary that intellective
memory is similar to sensitive memory although without the imagery. The presence of imagery
is not accorded to the intellectus possibilis since it maintains only universals or quiddities.
Imagery is relative to phantasms which are mental representations of sensed extramental
objects. On the nature of the sensitive memory, she makes the further remark that “memory at
this level would consist of something like replaying the internal movie of previous sensory
experience, though with some phenomenological indication that the sensory experience being
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reviewed is a past experience.”52 As will be referred to below, cogitative sense is co-extensive
with memory in the sense that its evaluation of perceived sensibles is recalled or reminisced by
memory.

Imagination (Vis imaginativa)
The discussion on vis memorativa introduces the topic on imagination (vis imaginativa) since
both are co-extensive. Such would be helpful since Aquinas’s “account of the imagination is
somewhat frustrating in its austerity. If one combs through his works looking for the term
imagination or its synonym phantasia, one finds little or no reference to [it].”53 Be that as it
may, Aquinas makes the determination to consider imagination as one of the interior senses:
As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other
animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also
"reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection
of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna,
however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth
power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from
the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we
compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never
seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man,
in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto.54
Insinuating a later discussion, this thesis characterises Aquinas’s treatment of imagination as
seminal in respect to his specific teaching on prudence. The arguments supporting this position
will be articulated in the proceeding chapters. Moreover, scientific research in psychology will
prove to be pivotal in re-shaping the human understanding of the beneficence of moral
imagination in the ethical assessments of human conditions and situations.
There is certainly potential in Aquinas’s teaching on imagination most specifically when
considered as a necessary faculty in prudential moral inquiry. There is no shortage of
commentators who have highlighted, directly or indirectly, this potential. On account of his
reflection on the work of Aquinas, Brennan identifies two imaginal operations:
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the first a function of purely sensitive imagination, where original
experiences are reproduced just as they occurred; the second a function
of logistic or dianoetic imagination, sometimes referred to as
deliberative imagination, wherein insight and control are exercised to
produce images of things that never really occurred, or never happened
in the manner that they are picture.55
In view of the above text, Pasnau explicates that vis imaginativa is one imaginal power where
the mind exercises control over the sensory appetites principally owing to its freedom to
produce what it intends to imagine. Although the epistemic materials are obtained
extramentally, “the mind controls this avenue of stimulation.”56 Later in this thesis, it will be
demonstrated how the mind can be adversely influenced by passions in producing irrational
thoughts.
Imagination’s operation of receiving and conserving sense impressions transmitted by common
sense broadly manifests its relation to memory. Reproductive imagination appears static just
like memory where its phantasms are like ‘stored items’ available to be drawn from its
storehouses when required. Creative imagination, on the other hand, presents a more dynamic
operation of creating a mental image in the absence of sensed extramental objects. Two things
need to be pointed out on account of the latter: firstly, because it is impossible to imagine things
that have not been imagined before, imagination presupposes an “[accumulation] of certain
original impressions from the exercise of our external senses.”57 Imagination in this respect
employs the second operation of the intellect called compositio et divisio in forming phantasms
by combining different elements of previous impressions never before executed to produce a
new imagined image or phantasm. Fiction stories and sci-fi alien creatures would be good
examples of putting together realistic elements from various sensory-base experiences to
produce images that are actually non-existent. One might expect that the image of God of an
avid Bible-reader would be different from someone who has hardly read the Holy Scriptures.
Secondly, since what was put before a human agent’s consciousness is no longer present to the
exterior senses, the phantasm is less distinct than the previously sensed original matter. Thus,
“imagination suffers from certain inexactitudes and failures of details”58 as compared to the
original sensed matter. Both forms of imagination endure this limitation since phantasms are
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“more or less exact copies of original experience.”59 The recourse to the original experience is
undertaken to verify its details accurately. The uncertainty that is experienced due to
imagination’s inexactitudes is complemented by data drawn from memory.
Alongside its task of forming perceptual images of previously sensed impressions, imagination
also acts as a storehouse of images accrued from perceptual experiences:
Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the ‘proper sense’
and the ‘common sense’ are appointed…. But for the retention and
preservation of these forms, the ‘phantasy’ or ‘imagination’ is
appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were
a storehouse of forms received through the senses.60
The conservation function of imagination is apparently for future use.61 The notion of
imagination is intimately liked to virtue in the sense that human agents can imagine themselves
doing virtuous acts done by other people. Although this link was intimated by Aquinas, it will,
however, be demonstrated in the ensuing chapters that moral imagination has a particularly
significant function in the moral assessment undertaken by the virtue of prudence. This is one
consideration that has escaped the consideration of Aquinas in his teaching on the various
properties of prudence. The moral formation of the younger generation will benefit from
imaginatively reflecting on the role-modelling by adult members of the community. The Epistle
to the Hebrews attests to this significance: “Remember your leaders, those who spoke the word
of God to you; consider the outcome of their way of life, and imitate their faith.”62

Cogitative Sense (Vis cogitativa)
Aquinas drew up his concept of vis cogitativa by understanding rational and instinctual
recognition of harm or danger, pleasure or displeasure between humans and animals. He
observes that animals operate instinctively in determining the presence of danger and pleasant
stimuli. He cites the example of a sheep who sees danger upon the sight of a wolf and the bird
who gathers straw to make a nest. This instinctive capacity in animals is governed by the
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estimative power. Being instinctual in nature, the sheep, for example, does not have the
capacity to rationalise or think about what danger or pleasurable is present at hand. Birds, on
the other hand, when gathering straws for making a nest, perceive the usefulness of straws since
it protects their brood from prey. Animals react to random situations via the determination of
incidental sensibles which are not sensed per se (or cognised) but rather derived from other
perceived qualities of sensed objects. A sheep perceives a wolf as wolf and not a wolf that
poses a danger to its life. Birds would not have a clue how straws exactly protect its brood. By
virtue of their gathered instinctual experiences which Aquinas refers to as ‘collation of ideas,’
animals are able to put together bits of experiential data to determine their reaction. Animals
therefore compose and divide elements of past experiences to generate an instinctive nonevaluative understanding of a situation.
In humans, the estimative sense is the cogitative sense (vis cogitativa). The examples cited
above descriptively apply to human experiences particularly in conjunction with memory.
Gerrity Benignus confirms this co-relationship:
[T]he cogitative power and memory connect our repeated experiences
together, and so give rise to ‘experience’ in the broader meaning of the
term, namely, the knowledge or skill which arises from repeated
contacts with a certain kind of object – as when we speak of an
‘experienced man.’63
The main difference between the cogitative and estimative senses is the evident fact that
rational creatures are able to rationally analyse sensory inputs and not depend solely on instinct.
The cogitative sense creates phantasms of what danger or pleasure look like. At the back of all
these is the reality of experience impinging on the human senses informing it of certain sensory
knowledge available extramentally for immediate use or for proper storehousing.
Studying the cogitative sense from the perspective of the passions, Pasnau elucidates the power
of this sense to enable human agents to perceive individual objects.64 He cites the example of
the fear of spiders. Passions incite fear when one sees a spider crawling on the wall which
cogitative sense recognises as a particular experience. However, the (universal) mind directs
the cogitative sense by making it realise that the perceived spider is merely one among many
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spiders, in fact, one among larger and more venomous ones. This explanation echoes Lisska’s
delineation of the functions of the cogitative sense: “to be aware of an individual as an
individual; to recognise an individual as a member of a kind.”65
Vis cogitativa is also credited for preparing the phantasm for the act of abstraction owing to its
relationship with the intellect.66 The content of this process is beyond the limits of this thesis
but it is important to remember that the cogitative sense “performs these functions…under the
direction of the intellect.”67 Important maybe the operational role of vis cogitativa in sensitive
cognition and in the transition from it towards intellective cognition, Flaherty is correct in
asserting that “St. Thomas has insisted with us on the necessity of the vis cogitativa to prepare
a suitable phantasm [but] he has not said how this preparation is accomplished.”68 That said,
the relevance and the necessity of vis cogitativa is unequivocally confirmed by Aquinas. It is
clearly evident that the cogitative sense poses as an important internal sense when it comes to
the determination of the specificity and particularity of the cognised matters due fundamentally
to its capacity for compositio et divisio. There is no real epistemology without actually arriving
at the specific cognition of singular matters. The knowledge of singular is the practical
expression of hylomorphism of which rational beings have the innate capacity to acquire.

Phantasm as Materia causae
This sub-section succinctly explores the nature of phantasms (sensible knowledge) as the
material cause (materia causae) of intellectual knowledge. As asserted earlier, the knowledge
of the first principles of natural law is partly dependent on the material world for its content.
Through epistemic contact with the extramental world, data are introduced to the human
intellect for intellective processing. While Aquinas asserts that “to be cognizant of the natures
of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect,”69 he likewise concurs
that:
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[I]ntellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the
phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require
to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said
that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual
knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause (materia
causae).70
What Aquinas is saying is that sensible knowledge is untenable without the service of material
causes by which phantasms largely depend for their contents. Aquinas metaphorically alludes
to the external organs as being “awakened by them (sensible objects) to the consideration of
things”71 to commence the process of intellection. Since knowledge mainly originates from the
sensitive world72 (with imagination accounting for the other source),73 phantasms are nonexistent if the extramental world is devoid of any materiality. Aquinas makes this important
philosophical determination: “[W]e actually feel or know a thing…because our intellect or
sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species.”74
Cognitively, sensitive knowledge is a precursor to intellective knowledge since “sensitive
knowledge is necessary to the soul.”75 Conceptualisation, which is the point when the
intellective process apprehends extramental objects, will fail to occur without the initial senseperception whereby the sensible species emanating from the epistemic contact between the
internal senses and the impinging effect of an extramental objects on the sensory organs is
consummated. Aquinas summarises this process in these words: “For one cognitive power,
namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ.”76
Phantasms can be described as epistemic instruments in the intellective process. As likeness
(similitudo)77 of perceived sensible objects, phantasms bear the accidental qualities of sensed
objects, albeit undefined and yet-to-be-cognised. Aquinas explains that “[t]he thing understood
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is in the intellect by its own likeness.”78 Evidently, sensed objects could only be present in the
intellect as a likeness and not as the actual object that is sensed. Gilson provides his
commentary on the Thomistic assertion that the role of phantasms is merely instrumental in the
cognitive process: “It is important to emphasize that a sensible species is not itself what is
sensed. Instead it is the means by which the senses sense extramental things.”79
The instrumentality of phantasms in the intellective cognition is specifically important because
it carries the material specifications of sensed objects. In Scholastic theology, these are
considered as the accidentals of material substances. In the intellective procession where the
turn to phantasms is metaphysically undertaken, phantasms provide the material determination
to the universal quiddities abstracted from the intelligible species. The turn to phantasms is
Aquinas’s solution to the question on the particularity of sensed objects considering that the
“intellect has the universal for its object.”80 The phantasms produced by memory, imagination
and cogitative sense all contribute to the intellective process of concretely defining a specific
concept or idea.81

Conversio ad phantasmata (Turn to Phantasm)
From sensing an extramental object impressing on the external senses to the resulting
production of sensible species, to its ensuing abstraction by the intellectus agens, and reaching
towards its passage towards the intellectus possibilis, Aquinas presents the goal and purpose
of human intellection: the understanding of sensible objects by way of producing their
corresponding concepts or ideas in the human mind. But what really brings about the cognition
of such material objects as they exist and not merely in their universal quiddity? What makes
a human person cognise this mango, and not that mango? Aquinas answers these quandaries
by propounding the principle of conversio ad phantasmata (turn to phantasm).
Aquinas is unambiguous in stating that owing to the doctrine of hylomorphism, the turn to
phantasm is an essential process in intellective cognition. He clearly states: “In the present state
78
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of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to
understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.”82 If what is in the
intellect is universal quiddities, the turn to phantasms realises the full process of cognition
where the identification of the actual sensed object is specified, not in its universal state, but
rather, in its particularity.
Aquinas recognises the epistemic limit that is expressed by his anthropology (hylomorphism),
notably on the impossibility of the intellect to directly cognise particulars:
Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and
primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in
material
things
is
individual
matter,
whereas
our
intellect…understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such
matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal.
Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only.83
The empirical constraints mentioned above shed light on the importance of the intellect to turn
to phantasm. Unlike angels who are spiritual in nature,84 human creatures as corporeal beings
necessarily have to avail of phantasms in order to cognise perceived objects. The turn to
phantasm is considered an essential step in the cognitive act for without it, the human agent
will never really know anything. Knowledge is gained though not just by the intellect alone but
by the whole rational person. Body and soul work as a tandem in constituting an understanding
of human agency and the social environment. Stump aptly describes this cooperative act: “An
intellect is not identical with a human person, and the knower is the human person, not the
intellect alone.”85
In concert with the Angelic Doctor, this thesis has been underlining the importance of
Aquinas’s doctrine of hylomorphism as the underlying principle in his epistemology. It is really
on this basis that human intellection is not possible outside the body-soul concept. Aquinas
aptly describes this human limitation in intellective cognition in the following words: “[T]he
object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge.”86

The principle of
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human cognition as being governed by the spiritual nature of the rational soul and the
corporeality of the human body.
In his study of Thomistic epistemology, James South elucidates the given human condition that
necessitates the cognition of particulars beyond the universals. Firstly, he affirms the empirical
propensity of Thomistic theology: “The mediating role of sensation is central to Thomas’s
account of cognition.”88 Secondly, reflecting on the relationship between the intellect and
sensible powers, Aquinas introduces the concept of ‘participation’ in explaining the necessity
of the metaphysical phenomenon of turn to phantasm. Citing the Aquinian text in Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate, South presents his argument which he labels as “the rule of Dionysius”
or the “axiom of continuity”:
The cogitative power is that which is highest in the sensitive part of
man, and, thus, sense in some way comes in contact with the
intellective part so that it participates in something of that which is
lowest in the intellective part, namely, discursive reason. This is in
accord with the rule of Dionysius…that contact is established where
the lower begins and the higher leaves off.89
The rule of Dionysius or the axiom of continuity is grounded on the Thomistic hierarchy of
beings. In each of the different levels of being, its top end touches the lower end of a higher
entity while its lower end touches the top end of a lower entity. South makes his case using this
order of continuity to explain the relationship and association between the immaterial intellect
and sensory organs:
The immaterial intellect is continuous with the sensitive soul which in
turn is continuous with the external physical world. It is this continuity
that can account both for the general relationship between sense and
intellect as well as the more specific issue of the intellectual knowledge
of the material singular.”90
The general relationship between sense power and intellectual power is best exemplified by
the joint causality exercised by the agent intellect and phantasm in the production of the
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intelligible species. It is the hierarchy of powers in which the lower power is in continuity with
the higher power through participation that accounts for this relationship.
In addition, he concludes with the following insight:
The continuity between phantasms and the intelligible species
produced by the agent intellect allows the potential intellect to “reflect”
back on the phantasm. This reflection provides us with our knowledge
of the singular. It is the phantasm, the product of internal sensory
processes, that provides the likeness of the material object. This
phantasm, in turn, provides the causal connection between the material
object and the intellect. This connection allows the intellect to make
judgments about and have knowledge of material singulars.91
Evident from the discussion above is the fact that knowledge that is obtained by human agents
is knowledge secured not by reason alone. Human knowledge is mediated since the human
person is body and soul and the unicity with which the human person operates is dictated and
guided by it. Understanding of this sort is necessarily underlined by the principle of
individuation. The human person, as a rational being, responds personally and more than just
intellectually to various stimuli present in the environment. The capacity of human agents to
respond to stimuli, both internally (neurobiologically) and externally (socially), will be
discussed in the ensuing chapters. Human responses indicate human potentials since potency
and act are correlative terms in Thomistic moral philosophy.

Summary
According to Thomistic epistemology, the apprehension of the practical good by synderesis is
inchoately undertaken through an intellective process involving the cognitive and appetitive
faculties. Underscored by the body-soul reality (hylomorphic), this process is both intuitive
and apprehensive in nature. The intuitive process is governed by the intellectus agens which is
responsible for awakening the natural disposition towards discovering the good that is morally
completive and perfective of human agents. The apprehensive process, on the other hand,
involves sensory experience which instantaneously activates the innate moral disposition that
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is synderesis. The intuitive apprehension of the first principles of natural law by synderesis,
however, requires time and experience for these principles to be made fully intelligible by the
human mind and imagination. The time and experience involved in this intellective process are
responsible for the material contents of phantasms which Aquinas construes as the likeness of
sensed objects. If phantasms are rich in moral contents, there is greater likelihood for the moral
good to develop and to guide moral conduct.
Moral content that is invested with time and experience contributes to the ongoing formation
of the human understanding of the perfective good and the inchoative development of the same
moral good that is potentially transformative of the human moral condition. In the intellective
process, these material contents are received, processed and stored by the interior senses notably by memory, imagination and cogitative sense - as phantasms. Imagination’s phantasms
particularly allow for moral growth to maturate through composition and division of priorly
sensed concepts or ideas. Cognition is mediated by the internal senses which participate in
various critical ways, most especially the acquisition of material causes for intellective
knowledge to materialise. Further, the metaphysical phenomenon of the conversio ad
phastasmata specifies the importance of enriching the contents of phantasms since when the
intellect turns to phantasms, the contents are present to be singularly identified as determinants
to human flourishing. In this respect, phantasms serve as materia causae for the intellection of
the practical good. When this occurs, it guarantees that, at least intellectually, the human agent
is exposed to the basic rational experience of the moral good. Beyond this fundamental
exposure, the human agent must acquire moral virtues to actually engage in moral flourishing.
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Chapter 6
Synderesis and the ‘Perfecting’ Virtue of Prudence

Introduction
Moral agents, having lost their full integrity due to original sin, experience the pervasive
interior assault on a now weakened will (akrasia).1 What saves moral agents from further moral
harm, at least in principle, is the given reality of synderesis which guarantees the persisting
spiritual link between God and them. Synderesis guarantees a moral foundation upon which
moral agency can evolve from merely performing acts of men and women to virtuously
demonstrating human acts befitting of an imago Dei. When human agents are allowed to grow
in an optimal virtuous environment, such condition facilitates synderesis to fulfill its task of
naturally seeking the perfective good. Aquinas points out the telos of human acts: “Happiness
is man’s true good” (“Beatitudo est verum hominis bonum”).2
As a moral foundation, synderesis must be practically and materially assisted for it to mature
and to reach its potential. It must be provided with all the necessary avenues within the grasp
of the human power in order for the good which it intuits and apprehends undergoes the process
of continual actualisation and maturation. It is materially incoherent to assert that the human
person is in possession of synderesis when the moral good that it inclines to could not be
sustained by a realistic prospect of inchoation. Human perfection is in a causal motion when a

1

St. Thomas Aquinas asserts that due to sin, humanity’s first parents have lost a firm grasp of their free-will
thereby rendering their actions capable of opposing what reasons dictate. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q.
83, a. 2. “Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from
coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness.”
2
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 2, a. 3.

personal commitment to perfection is undertaken: “one is said to be in the state of perfection,
not through having the act of perfect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and with
a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to perfection.”3 Alongside, the human project
must necessarily flee from a mere abstractive and presumptive conception of the good and
commit rather towards an adherence to a moral lifestyle befitting genuine human nature.
This chapter specifically discusses the nature and significance of acquired moral virtues in
moral development. It presupposes that authentic human acts engender the actualisation of
human potentials in acquiring the perfective telic ends. Aquinas’s conceptualisation of virtue
as “a power of the soul…which implies perfection of power”4 explicitly implies the human
capacity for moral development (self-movement). Virtue habituation expresses the human
commitment to act out human potentials to bring about the desired natural and supernatural
ends. Both of these ends are understood as modes of perfection in varying degrees and are
construed as a participation in the life of God. Supernatural ends though require the benefit of
infused grace while natural ends may be realised even without a personal articulated faith in
God. As previously stressed, the latter perspective is thematically accommodated in this thesis
in order to broadly highlight the potentials of every and any human agent to achieve their
natural perfection.
Human nature possesses certain limits which impact on the human propensities to acquire the
moral virtues. External factors may adversely affect the human intent to seek self-fulfilment
and self-perfection, hence, the need to cultivate human virtues. The acquisition of moral virtues
assists human agents in their formation and in their information about the moral path that will
truly lead them to their perfection and fulfilment. Prudence is the virtue that integrally assists
human agents in making moral inquiries on the basis of their knowledge of the first principles
of natural law. It will be argued that Aquinas’s teaching on prudential counsel or inquiry could
be further developed by including imagination as one of its quasi-integral parts. When human
agents employ their imagination, moral judgments are given more latitude in securing the moral
truth since due consideration of both universal moral principles and the contingent human
conditions are undertaken prior to moral judgment.

3
4

Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 184, a. 4.
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 56, a. 1.
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Moral Development as ‘Self-Movement’
The late French philosopher Étienne Henri Gilson contends that: “Man is placed on a frontier
where the world of spirits and the world of bodies meet. The powers of both must necessarily
belong to him.”5 The inherent juxtaposition of these human powers accords all human agents
the potency to act as moral agents who are capable of operating within human limited powers
to achieve self-transcendence. What is profoundly propitious in the hylomorphic unicity of the
body and soul is the natural capacity of the soul to act as the principle of operation that enables
human transformation. Gilson points this out by reflecting on Aquinas’s anthropology: “The
notion of the soul is much wider than that of the human soul. In its wide sense soul is defined
as the first act of an organised body capable of performing functions of life.”6 For human agents
to achieve both natural (proximate) and supernatural (remote) ends as fruits of their natural
ordination, they must necessarily embody the moral virtues.
The Thomistic human person, in view of the connaturality and co-operation of both
inclinationis naturalis and synderesis, is capable of potentially developing and maturing into
an agent of morality. Moral agency pertains to the dynamic human capacity to engage and be
transformed by human efforts under the grace of God. These human activities define moral
agents as people who are reasonable, willful and passionate about acting in view of perfecting
that which they are potentially capable. Aquinas, quoting Damascene in the Prologue of his
Treatise on the Last End, promotes the inherent qualities of the moral agent as an intelligent
rational being “endowed with free-will and self-movement.”7 This Damascenian definition of
the human person duly notes the specific connaturality between reason and will in promoting
authentic self-movement. As previously noted of Aquinas’s theological persuasion, it is
primarily upon the influence of reason that human efforts are transposed to something more
than just being an act of man to becoming a human act.8
The abovementioned inclinatio naturalis of the human person particularly bespeaks of the predetermination of human initiatives whereby its formal object points to the beatific vision as its

5

Gilson, The Christian Philosphy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 200.
Gilson, The Christian Philosphy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 187.
7
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, pr.
8
Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
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ultimate goal. Synderesis grounds the procession from acts of men and women to human acts
by supplying the primordial habitual disposition that infallibly gravitates the human person
towards the first principles of natural law. While the human person’s telos is pre-determined,
the progression towards its realisation, however, is not. The habituation of moral virtues as
indicative of self-movement presents itself as a necessary stage in moral development. Virtues
are considered as conditio sine qua non in the human passage towards perfecting basic human
nature. While self-movement is categorically an inherent quality that defines the moral agent,
it is more so a crucially promising phenomenon, i.e., it is the potentially perfective human
project that foreshadows-only the attainment of the yet-to-be-realised-happiness (beatific
vision). The post-lapsarian human limitation did not stop Aquinas from persistently affirming
the pertinence of synderesis despite of the original sin’s mystifying transmission of its effects
from generation to generation: “Sin blots out the law of nature…in particular cases, not
universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law.”9 The selfmovement relating to the application of the synderetic first principles to particular situations
remains in effect, however, it does preclude this persistence when it comes to the application
of secondary principles, i.e., principles derived from the first principles.10 On the basis of the
development of human morality as self-movement where an impediment concurrently exists
and whereby this privation is understood as such rather an inherent human quality, the natural
disposition towards the perfective good subsists:
As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can
nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case
of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the
general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of
concupiscence or some other passion.11
Aquinas further qualifies this privation that impedes the secondary principles from realising
perfective human acts: “[when it comes to] the secondary precepts, the natural law can be
blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions…or by vicious customs and corrupt
habits…and even unnatural vices.”12

9

Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 6.
The exclusion of the secondary moral principles, those principles derived from first moral principles, is
premised on the Thomistic claim that the first moral principles are infallible while secondary moral principles
are not. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 6.
11
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 6.
12
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 6.
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In possession of the natural capacity for self-movement, the human agent’s commitment
towards moral self-development is vitally guided by certain “principles of action”13 called
virtues that potentially catalyse and help actuate the full maturation and development of moral
potentials. As inclinatio naturalis orders the human agents’ moral development according to
their nature,14 synderesis, on the other hand, provides cognitive apprehension of these first
principles of natural law through which it apprehends the good via its nature as a “habit that
contains the precepts of the natural law.”15 While in principle the human pursuit of the good
end and the end’s good is well-stated by Aquinas, it should be clear by now that in all of these
articulations, self-movement must specifically be understood as a potential rather than a
determinate reality. If evil persuasions, vicious customs, corrupt habits and unnatural vices
vitiate the moral self-movement of human agents, it would be perfective embodiment of virtues
itself that would stymie the corrupting influence of vices that impede moral growth. Properly
speaking then, in view of its correlation with natural inclination and synderesis, acts of virtues,
which determine and express the active meaning of self-movement, adhere to natural law in
ordering human activities towards the perfective good. Henceforth, since “natural law belongs
everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature,”16 Aquinas unequivocally
professes that:
there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason:
and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all
acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason
naturally dictates to him to act virtuously.17
Since natural law prescribes acts of virtue in self-movements that are perfective of the nature
of the human agent, virtues then are considered essential pathways through which moral selfmovement is advanced. In order for human nature to be perfected, virtues must be regarded as
indispensable dispositions in seeking the good end and the end’s good. Thereto, if human
agents desire to be happy and to be in eternal union with God, they need to live a virtuous life.

13

Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 1.
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 3.
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 1.
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 3.
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 94, a. 3.
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As Holy Scriptures attest in proclaiming the Beatitudes: “Happy are the pure in heart, for they
will see God.”18

Constitutive Elements of the Thomistic Moral Development
Virtues are providential and necessary since they orient humanity’s “feigned ignorance and
hardness of heart”19 towards authentic moral development. When the formation of human
morality is accorded with diligence and perseverance, such feigned ignorance will be
enlightened by the infallibility of the synderesis. Eventually, the hardness of heart is supplanted
by habitual virtues that consequently conform human dispositions to the existential order with
which nature and reason call forth. When human agents invest in moral development, “nature
provides things not merely with the end that they are ordered to, but with the very principles
that allow them to arrive at those ends.”20 Notwithstanding, synderesis, limited by its own
nature as a universal principle, needs the facility of rational inquiry for its principles to be
applied in concrete situations: “For we arrive by the inquiry of reason from universal principles
to particular applications.”21
Throughout a moral agent’s moral development, the human self undergoes a lifespan of
dispositional transformations that anticipates the formation of an aptitude for moral
understanding and moral reasoning. Considering the Thomistic pre-eminence of rational
operation in the human pursuit for self-transcendence, the ensuing discussion on moral
development theorises upon the various realities which influence the cognition of the practical
good, viz., the generation of habits and virtues, the ethical formation effected by moral
stakeholders, and the central synthetic function of prudence. To premise the discussion below,
it would be beneficial to cite the following quote explicating how Aquinas understands the
relationship between reason and will in the determination of human acts:
Of actions done by man those alone are properly called “human,”
which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational
animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions
18

Mt 5:8.
Cf. CCC, no. 1859.
20
Angela McKay, “Synderesis, Law, and Virtue,” in The Normativity of the Natural (Springer, 2009), 33.
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Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi. trans. John Patrick Reid OP, The
Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Providence, RI: The Providence College Press, 1951), InteLex Past
Masters, a. 8. See also McKay, “Synderesis, Law, and Virtue,” 40.
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alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is
master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the freewill is defined as “the faculty and will of reason.” Therefore those
actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate
will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called “of
a man,” but not properly “human” actions, since they are not proper to
man as man.22

The Generation of Habits and Virtues23
It is evidently clear that Aquinas gave much thought to the rightful placement of virtues (virtus)
within the corpus of his Summa theologiae. Alongside his much-treated exposition in the
Summa theologiae, his doctrine on morality appears nearly identical with another publication
of his called Quaestiones disputatae virtutibus a communi. It may be recalled that the basic
structure of the Summa theologiae presents the sojourn of human agents who, conscious of
their origin from God (Prima pars) and who through the guidance of the laws (Prima secundae)
and the embodiment of these laws via good habits or virtues (Secunda secundae), discover the
gratuitous reality of these laws and virtues in Jesus Christ who is the only way to God (Tertia
pars). The unfolding of truths confronting the human person inclines towards not a circular
movement starting from God and ending back to God but rather a spiral upward movement
demonstrating an intensification of one’s knowledge and personal relationship with God which
incipiently began via divine invitation. God being the beginning and the same God being the
end represents the Alpha and Omega of the divine presence in human salvific history.24
As evidenced by the placement of the treatise on morality in between God and Jesus Christ,
this reveals not just the probable Thomistic conception of the role of Spirit in human
discipleship, but more importantly, it projects the rightful appropriation of the cognition of

22

Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.
Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, qq. 55-70. Aquinas distinguishes the different types of virtues according
(i) to their cause, (ii) to their last end, and (iii) to their formal object. As to their cause, virtues could either be
distinguished as naturally acquired or divinely infused. As to their last end, virtues could either be directed
towards their natural or supernatural end. This ‘end’ is correlative to ‘happiness.’ The theological and infused
moral virtues fall under divinely infused whereas the acquired moral virtues are considered naturally acquired.
As to their formal object, the formal object of theological virtues is God; while truth and good are the formal
objects of intellectual and moral virtues respectively. Intellectual virtues are “virtues…for the consideration of
the truth” (Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 57, a. 2.). Traditionally, prudence, wisdom, science and
understanding are considered intellectual virtues.
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revealed truths embodied in laws which guide the formation of human acts towards becoming
acts of virtues. Through this synoptical delineation of the textual plan of the Summa theologiae,
it is already apparent that the cognitive, volitive and appetitive faculties have important and
specific roles in bringing about the realisation of telic ends.
On account of the above, the following question arises relevant to the present study: How do
moral virtues assist in the development of moral imagination which forms part of moral
understanding and moral reasoning that are principally instantiated by the habit of synderesis?
The role of prudence is pivotal in the scholarly discovery of how the interior sense of
imagination (together with memory as a material foundation) can foster a ‘habit of imagination’
that assists in virtue embodiment (moral development). Defined by Aquinas as “right reason
applied to action,”25 prudence’s intrinsic relationship with the internal senses of vis memorativa
and vis imaginativa will be the major focus of the discussion below.

The Emergence of Habitus
Aquinas’s treatise on habits covers questions 49 to 89 of the Prima secundae in the Summa
theologiae. Questions 49 to 54 deal with the general aspects of habits while questions 55 to 89
deal with specific habits which include virtues, vices and sins.
The specific consideration of habits as one of the intrinsic principles of human acts is basically
founded on the Thomistic principle that “happiness is to be gained by means of certain
acts…[and] in order to know by what acts we may obtain happiness, and by what acts we are
prevented from obtaining it.”26 In his treatment of the virtues, Aquinas elucidates the distinction
between virtues’ natural and supernatural ends: the teleological realities which result
axiomatically from the authentic ordering of human acts according to the dictates of nature and
the infusion of divine grace. From the perspective of Catholic doctrine, the notion of synderesis
appears to be inconceivable without the full consideration of the supernatural ends. However,
the apprehension of the synderetic good does not automatically transpose human acts into
meritorious acts deserving of supernatural ends. Within the limits of human nature, natural
ends (or goods) may be the ‘next best thing’ for some others who may have yet to profess faith
25
26

Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 47, a. 2, s.c.
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in God or may have no opportunity at all to be made aware of anything transcendental. This
perspective is employed in the discussion below allowing for a more general appropriation and
affirmation of moral virtues.
The limits of human nature present the inescapable reality of confronting practical issues that
relate to virtue embodiment. This fits perfectly well within the synderetic operation of
apprehending the practical good that requires practical engagement with extramental realities
necessary for the emergence of the possibility of sense knowing. In the midst of this
engagement is the centrality of the human person, a hylomorphic unicity, who operates in the
natural world while envisaging, consciously or unconsciously, the natural ends in the face of
occurring existential hindrances.27 The reality of these potential blockages raises the
importance of the emergence and development of habits. This stance has always been promoted
by scholastic theologians who “understood the important function that habitus has in shaping
human conduct.”28 Aquinas’s definition of habits strongly underlines this necessity:
“Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently,
to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end.”29 This definition
qualifies habits as implying “a certain determination according to a certain measure”30 whereby
the human agent’s nature and actions either demonstrate an ordering towards the good or evil.
Habits, being one of the principles of human acts, are not pre-determined in this respect.31
Furthermore, in contrast to natural habits such as synderesis itself, habits can be lost if not
practised or lived.32
The emergence of habits in the human agent is understood as the actuation of potential qualities
brought about by extrinsic factors such as the obligation exacted by human laws and the
infusion of divine grace. Aquinas explains this incipient process of habit formation: “Habit is
caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some
quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the
passive.”33 These qualities, which are expressive of habit (habitus), refer “to a real modification
27

Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, lib. 2, cap. 129. (Aquinas asserts that there are human acts that are proper to
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28
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 49, a. 3.
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Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 49, a. 2.
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of a person’s moral character. Vicious habitus produce a vicious individual; virtuous habitus,
a virtuous person.”34 When human agents act on these extrinsic factors, there emerges the onset
of what would be potential habits. Depending on the degree of commitment human agents
allocate for their moral development, in due course of time, “[v]irtue makes a real saint, but
vicious habitus leaves the person in a state of disordered potential.”35
Being a movement from potency to act, the emergence of habits initially indicates an activity
of human volition. However, the will is not entirely isolated from the influence of reason in its
principled operations. Aquinas confirms this:
The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the
reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to
be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in
order that action may follow more promptly.36
On this basis, habits emerge when sensitive powers responsively act “at the command of
reason”37 and consequently, when potencies are moved to action, “it is clear that the active
principle…is reason.”38
Aquinas could not have been more emphatic in positing the role of reason and will in the
development of moral reasoning. He certainly views this development as an ongoing
commitment whereby “repeated acts cause a habit to grow”39 and where “habit is engendered
little by little.”40 Aquinas is aware as well that when “acquired over time, habits grow to be
‘second nature.’”41 That said, “[h]abits are not only qualities and accidents, but they are the
qualities and accidents which lie closest to the nature of a thing, and which comes closest to
entering into its essence and integrating themselves into its definition.”42 Since habits have
effectively penetrated human nature so intimately but not essentially, “a habit is like a second
nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so, it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any
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away be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.”43 The depth with
which habits (and vices) are ingrained expresses the hard work of moral agents: “Thus
repetition of acts which pierces matter more and more completely with its form (or enters
deeply into a power of the soul with some new disposition) progressively builds up a habit. So
too, does cessation of these acts of the performing of contrary acts destroy and corrupt it,”44 so
adds Gilson who also believes that “a single act is enough to conquer the passivity of the power
in which the habit develops.”45 On this basis, it could potentially happen that an act (or an
already existing habit) acts “not in proportion to the intensity of the habit”46 resulting to a
decrease of that habit. A decrease of a habit means “a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be
corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue,
whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.”47
The reading of Aquinas’s treatise on the habits prompts a conscious paralleling of
understanding between habits and virtues. Virtue (Virtus), being a species of habitus,
encompasses everything about the nature of habitus and more. The full nature of virtues will
be rendered more clearly when the ends of virtues, particularly the ends of moral virtues, are
discussed. This is, in fact, where Thomism departs from Aristotelianism. The introduction of
the infused virtues which promote the supernatural ends distances Aquinas from Aristotle on
the doctrine on virtues.

Habitus in Virtus
Servais Pinckaers’s published article titled, Virtue Is Not A Habit,48 stimulates thinking on how
the Scholastic understanding of habitus differs considerably with the common usage of the
term, ‘habit.’ While one can understand the conflation of the two terminologies due to the usual
assertion of a habit as being the repetition of human acts, Aquinas delineates a more deeply
psychological and rational understanding of habitus. Aquinas conceives of virtus as habitus
whereby the occurrence of repeated human behaviour is profoundly ordered by reason in
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harmony with human nature. Hence, the reality of habitus is far more than the observable
human activity which is exhibited repeatedly without any conscious deliberation and cognitive
awareness.
Aquinas defines virtus49 as “a good quality of the mind”50 whose “end…since it is an operative
habit, is operation”51 “by which we live righteously [and] “which no one makes bad use.”52 In
the order of causation, the content of this definition is evidently reflexive of the nature of good
habitus since virtus is simply good habitus repeatedly done: “Therefore a habit of virtue cannot
be caused by one act, but only by many.”53 Beautifully phrased by Aquinas is his Aristotelian
quote expressive of the same: “As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither
does one day not a short time make a man blessed and happy.”54
In two separate places in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas affirms that “[v]irtue denotes a certain
perfection of power”55 and a “[h]abit is indeed a perfection.”56 As evidenced by these two
citations, both the formal objects of habitus and virtus point to the general notion of completion,
fulfilment or perfection of human actions that are consistent with nature and reason. Both
presume that if reason truly discerns the essence of human nature, actions emanating from it
would be nothing short of that good that completes, fulfils and perfects the human person.
Aquinas and Aristotle find unison in asserting the empirical nature of habitus and virtus. There
is the material dimension that is purported when habitus and virtus are alluded to as actual and
real behavioural modifications. Beyond this point, however, Aquinas takes a ‘solo flight’ by
extending the nature of virtus to include his theological understanding of virtues expressive of
the Catholic moral tradition. John Inglis explicitly acknowledges this Thomistic extended
scholarship by stating that: “Aquinas’s conception of the highest good and its relation to the
functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of
the acquired moral virtues on an infused level.”57
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Aquinas’s doctrine on the infused virtues accommodates original philosophical and theological
bents which place his thoughts far beyond the realm of secular thinking. On this, Bonnie Kent
is in agreement: “When Thomas proceeds to argue that certain habits are infused in us by God,
it becomes all the more evident that ancient philosophy has been left behind.”58 Although the
topic regarding the relationship between acquired and infused virtues is outside the scope of
this research, it is important to point out that the consideration of the supernatural ends is a
necessary part of any theological inquiry in Catholic morality. That said, it is also equally
important to impress the rationale behind the infusion of virtues (or grace) in the life of the
human person. As the Catechism of the Catholic Church spells out: “It is not easy for man,
wounded by sin, to maintain moral balance. Christ’s gift of salvation offers us the grace
necessary to persevere in the pursuit of the virtues.”59
The infusion of grace to aid human efforts habituate the virtues is premised by the Thomistic
principle that: “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it” (“gratia non tollat naturam, sed
perficiat”).60 This principle has officially been endorsed by Catholic Church teaching: “Human
virtues acquired by education, by deliberate acts and by perseverance in repeated efforts are
purified and elevated by divine grace.”61 Aquinas insists that the “[i]nfused virtue is caused in
us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent.”62 The infused grace is
unmerited yet freely given out of pure generosity by God. It is understood to have a
transformative effect on acquired natural ends in so far as rendering them meritorious for
beatific ends. Aquinas is adamant in stating that: “We need a habit…that our natural powers
may be elevated by an infused habit to what is above their nature.”63 In the end, seeking natural
ends via the acquired moral virtues has a pressing significant value in moral development, and
not just in faith development.
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Acquiring Moral Ends
One important aspect of Thomistic theology is its teleology. Aquinas speaks of telos in relation
to both (i) the metaphysical pre-determination and (ii) the existential contingency of the human
person. The metaphysical pre-determination alludes to those intrinsic human operations that
process all data received from the external environment. The ontological realities determinant
of created beings such as synderesis, inclinatio naturalis, operations of the interior sensoria,
cognition and intellection, all fall under this classification. On the other hand, the existential
contingencies of the human agents relate to their human experiences which have been internally
processed initially and which now have proceeded to be demonstrated externally through their
human acts. Under this classification includes habitus and virtus. The former in the above
largely rests on the intellective (cognitive) operation of the human soul while the latter rests on
the appetitive (volitive) operation of the human soul. The sensitive or emotive operation
(passion) affects both the cognitive and volitive operations.
Regarding (i), revealed by the metaphysical pre-determination is the ontology of being as
created in the ‘image and likeness of God.’ Since this relates particularly to the ontology of
being, the metaphysical fact is sustained regardless of any rational (or irrational) disapproval
of the Christian faith.64 In experiential terms, this may come to human awareness as an ethical
proposition to commit to a lifestyle expressive of the commandments of God. It is an awareness
that is founded on the natural ordering of reason whose operation provides the human person
with the knowledge and the desire “for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect
and crowning good.”65 Such telos is of a grand moral scale that “it is necessary for the last
end…to fulfil man’s appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire.”66
It is observable from the analysis above that the reality of “the end is the foundation and
principle of the means to the end.”67 Probing further, Aquinas maintains that “[t]he human
intellect does not determine its ends, but is determined by them. It is not free to set whatever
end it likes. Rather these are set before the human intellect by nature.”68 As previously
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mentioned, inclinatio naturalis conjointly operates with lege naturalis in determining the
human telos that is in accord with the principles of practical reason. Since practical reason sets
the rational parameters relating to human actions, it provides at least the formal knowledge of
the practical good necessary for moral virtues to achieve their ends. Without the knowledge of
the practical good and the innate guidance by inclinationi naturalis, it would be impossible for
the will to acquire moral virtues, something that the will can achieve not out of necessity but
by virtue of its innate determination.69
Naturally immersed in such a desire for the telos is natural reason which naturally fulfills the
active role of being the principle of human acts.70 Aquinas confirms that among created beings,
this human act “can only be done by reason and intellect…whose province is to know the
proportion between the end and the means to that end.”71 This natural reason is referred to by
Aquinas as synderesis which “appoints the end to moral virtues.”72 In respect to moral
development, the significance of this end is critically paramount since its determination is
without any specificity not until the universality of practical reason is applied concretely by
considering the context of human agents. From this context arises the means in and through
which the human agent may act towards achieving the appropriate moral ends. Later in this
discussion, this role of context-considering will be attributed to the virtue of prudence. On this
basis, synderesis does not just appoint the telos of the moral virtues, but it also “provides the
foundation out of which the virtues arise.”73 After all, virtues are good habits qualitatively
making moral agents good and their operations good.74 The historicity of this operation is
implied. In respect to the acquisition of moral ends which Aquinas speaks of as contingent
upon the habituation of moral virtues, he maintains that nature is not responsible for the
perfection of human acts but by “reason wherein the seeds of all virtue reside.”75
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The perfection of virtues being gradually developed runs parallel with the degrees of perfection
that are achieved. The discussion now turns to those perfective human operations that are
externally demonstrated by the will.
Apropos of (ii), telos can be rightfully understood in relation to the good as lived. It is important
that virtues are spoken of in this manner since they are qualities and operations that are
materially exemplifiable and perceptible. Moreover, the dynamism of moral development does
not unfold in a vacuum, but rather, it unravels in human agents’ consciousness and the
consciousness of the community. Aquinas’s discussion regarding the cause of virtue in
“Whether virtue is in us by nature?” delineates specifically the essential placement of virtues
in the life of a human agent:
[V]irtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the
specific nature, in so far as in man’s reason are to be found instilled by
nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and
action, which are the nurseries of intellection and moral virtues, and in
so far as these is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance
with reason.76
The above quote speaks of the moral aptitude of all human agents that is naturally given. This
points to the practical possibility for human moral development that engenders self-fulfilment
and self-transcendence. Psychology would refer to these realities as self-authorship and selfgovernance in moral development. Aquinas recognises that human agency may be ill-disposed
due to physiological or psychological reasons which effectively impede rational deliberations
on moral issues. A person who suffers from schizophrenia with psychotic symptoms would be
physiologically unable to cognitively process what is really good and what is really bad. In the
face of moral conflicts though, the human agent stands not without the possibility of moral
triumph. Since virtues develop inchoatively, the moral person can occasion human acts that
rationally, wilfully and passionately generate natural good-ness that promotes moral well-being
over a period of time. Morally upright persons are products of years of habituating in virtues
who, as will be adequately pointed out later, hold a special and unique responsibility to be
virtue-enablers to others.
This same thought above convinces Angela MacKay to assert that:
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Man is ordered towards virtue in so far as he possesses natural habitual
knowledge of the first principles of thought and action and insofar as
he naturally desires the good of reason, but he naturally desires the
good reason because, thanks to his possession of these first principles,
he has inchoate knowledge of that good.77
With virtues creating a virtuous person demonstrating virtuous acts, the moral agent must be
seriously considering the proper ends of human acts since they, according to Aquinas, bring
happiness to people. To consider the end is nothing more than grasping the truth about one’s
nature since “[e]very agent, of necessity, acts for an end.”78 According to Klaus Demmer, it is
in the experience of virtue where the moral agent reaches the height of perfection: “In the
virtues, moral commitment reaches its peak…. Virtues bring forth the best in a person, and to
this end, all the moral strength available to her or him is required.”79 Perfection that awaits is
something that Aquinas truly desires for every person due to the human capacity for moral
virtue that “is actuated by acting in accord with the analogous naturally known principles of
practical reason.”80

Natural ‘Perfection’ via Habituation of Virtues
In the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, question sixty-three, article two, Aquinas
deals with the question, “Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation.” Having mentioned
in the previous article that “virtue is natural to man inchoatively,”81 Aquinas stresses this
proposition further: “It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to
aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which
are entirely from without.”82 This Thomistic assertion that virtue is in every human person
naturally yet aptitudinally and inchoatively is tantamount to saying that the human person is
both capable of perfection and capable of being perfected. The latter points to the ends of moral
virtues while the former relates to the ongoing habituation of virtues. The definition of virtue
alluded to earlier, i.e., that virtue makes human agents good and their acts good, is equivalent
to this statement. To speak of the human person as capable of perfection and capable of being
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perfected is theologically and pragmatically important in the analysis of virtue. Since it is
maintained that there is the naturally apprehended good that is accessed by the first principles
of practical reason from “man’s most secret core and his sanctuary,”83 there proceeds from this
affirmation the logical theological evidence of the primordial perfection that the human person
possesses ontologically. There is no wonder then why Aquinas aptly refers to synderesis as the
“nurseries of virtues.”84 Synderesis certainly is indispensable if the human capacity to draw
from within one’s moral reservoir the potency to be perfected according to the moral dictates
of natural reason itself is maintained and asserted. But this requires further facilitation in view
of setting the moral agents on their way to moral perfection. Since moral virtues possess the
“perfections of appetency,”85 its activation is exigent in order for it to inaugurate the inchoative
moral development of moral agents. This role is given to reason as Aquinas states so: “[H]uman
reason directed to the good is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by
human acts: inasmuch as acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid
good is established.”86 Farrell translates this in practical terms: “[T]he first thing that the previrtuous agent needs in order to form a virtue is some idea what is actually virtuous.”87
It could not be better stressed how Aquinas affirms that “certain seeds or principles of acquired
virtue pre-exist in us by nature.”88 This is another of his statements confirming the potency of
moral agents towards attaining perfection. Since these certain seeds or principles are qualifiedly
and inchoatively present in the human person, human acts proceeding from these can actually
form acquired human virtues. Aquinas considers these principles as being “more excellent than
the virtues acquired through them.”89
The analysis just rendered above is a key understanding in the later discussion regarding moral
development that is initiated by synderesis. In this regard, moral virtues uniquely contribute
and facilitate the moral formation of human agents. It materially supplies the habitual
experience of the good through the lives of virtue-enablers in the community. Once virtues
impinge upon the conscious awareness of human agents, most specially upon children during
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their early sensitive years, they commence their life-long moral training and education. The
intuitive formation of the moral sense takes shape during this process. In this process, the
natural capacity for moral perfection begins to unfold gradually transforming human agents
into moral agents by perfecting their human dispositions.

The Two ‘Perfect’ Ends
Aquinas distinguishes acquired moral virtues from infused moral virtues by qualifying that
“[i]nfused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation
to their proper objects.”90 The matter relating to the relationship between moral virtues and the
perfect ends is brought to light in view of the given teleological inclination with which Aquinas
has particularly ordained his Summa theologiae. We can recall here the notion of the exitusreditus principle which underlines his thematic approach. More than merely a preferred
thematic orientation, Aquinas’s approach provides the doctrinal foundation to the Catholic
Church’s view on the vocation of all people and the future of those who follow Christ:
The Church, to which we are all called in Christ Jesus, and in which
we acquire sanctity through the grace of God, will attain its full
protection only in the glory of heaven, when there will come the time
of the restoration of things. At that time the human race as well as the
entire world, which is intimately related to man and attains him, will
be perfectly reestablished in Christ.91
Aquinas is aware that though the image of God is naturally found in men and women (hence,
it is universal in nature), it is not found by everyone. The assumption of the divine presence in
humanity is asserted without exception, however, its habitual manifestation and expression, let
alone the epistemic persuasion of the intellect, is subject to human disposition. Aquinas
qualifies this delineation:
Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual
nature, he is most perfectly like God according to that which he can
best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature
90
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imitates God chiefly in this, that God understand and loves Himself.
Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First,
inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and
loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind,
which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and
habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image
consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows
and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of
glory…. The first is found in all men, second only in the just, and third
only in the blessed.92
The above quote highlights the different states of perfection according to the mind of the
Angelic Doctor. Reiterating it here, what is fundamentally evident is the fact that the human
person is capable of perfection and is capable of being perfected via acquired (human acts)
moral virtues and infused grace. Further, Aquinas has a realistic positive approach towards the
capacity of all human persons to achieve perfection since he believes that all human agents
desire to be fulfilled or be perfected despite of the fact that “all men are not agreed as to their
last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some pleasure; others something
else.”93
Aquinas speaks of the possibility of achieving perfection through the means of the infused and
acquired virtues. It is premised on the two ways in which he sees its realistic possibility:
[T]he perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in
the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is
paramount and greatest comparison with other things, it follows that
the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that
regards the other virtues.”94
The just cited text points to an understanding of what perfection means relative to either the
infused or acquired virtues. Thus, acquired moral virtues pertain to natural affairs while infused
virtues relate to supernatural affairs.
The realisation of natural and supernatural ends is incumbent upon the capacity of moral agents
to produce certain effects. Since acquired virtues are produced by human efforts, it can only be
expected to produce effects that matter to the natural order. In contrast, infused virtues are
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received from God since moral agents on their own are not capable of achieving supernatural
ends. However, perfection is still attributable relative to each order of habitual operation and
telic effect. In this regard, the Angelic Doctor distinguishes infused from acquired virtues:
It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues
are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct
man to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those namely, that are
acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct
man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action,
but not in respect of the last end simply.95
The above Thomistic text unambiguously declares that the supernatural ends are (and should
be) the primary and ultimate objective of the human person since “man’s last end is
happiness.”96 This does not, however, (and should not) negate the significance of acquired
moral virtues in moral development since they practically and ethically contribute to the moral
well-being of human agents and societies globally. Renée Mirkes, OSF certainly agrees with
the just-stated assertion: “Aquinas presents acquired moral virtue as disposed toward infused
moral virtue.”97
It is apparent that the subject of virtues is the human person. As body and soul, the human
person is a free and contingent being who is subject to change. Such is Mirke’s perspective
who emphasises the human person as a historically conscious and materially perfectible being.
She strongly argues that:
[G]race could never detract from nature. Rather witnessing to the
dignity of the human person as an imago Dei who is open to and fit for
grace, the supernatural life of God confers on human nature the very
completion toward which it tends.98
The understanding of the nature of the human person necessitates the serious consideration that
apart from human nature being hylomorphic, human nature is one indivisible existential reality
which is and can be moved from potency to act by a necessary external agent.99 The
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hylomorphic unicity of human persons is the basis of the possibility of perfection which every
human being is naturally oriented to by divine origin:
God, who is perfect unity and perfect activity, not only shows human
persons who they are, but also unifies and activates them in ways that
are not able to be or do on their own. The greater the unity and actuation
in human nature itself, the more is it capax Dei, open to divinisation;
the greater the divinisation, the surer the union between God and the
Christian.100
Concludingly, the concept of the Thomistic hierarchy of being is useful in understanding the
ordering of perfection of the created beings. The human person possesses both the potency for
perfection and imperfection. In terms of virtue, it is evident that two parallel forms of virtue
operate in human agents which are not opposed to each other. These virtues, both acquired and
infused, complement each other simply because the human person is an existential being who
is naturally one and indivisible. The habituation of virtues expresses the free will of human
agents to neither replace the angels nor downgrade themselves to sentient created beings but to
desire to be necessarily true and good in accordance with their nature. Aquinas’s placement of
human beings in the hierarchy of beings is underlined by their potentials to become better
individuals expressive of the religious truth that: “God can make better the things He has
made.”101 Indeed, by the infused virtues, “the mode of being of humans is increased by virtues,
which give humans a greater potency to act, God can direct them to perform more perfect
actions.”102 Though acquired and infused virtues have ultimate and proximate ends
respectively, these do not mean that the infused virtues cancel out the acquired virtues on the
basis of their superiority in the hierarchy of beings. The infused virtues are modes of divine
grace infused in the soul of human persons in view of elevating or transforming human efforts
into the supernatural order. This evidently takes place without destroying or supplanting
whatever is already good and present in the human person.
Proceeding from the elaboration above, it must be unequivocally stated that: “Everything
imperfect is a participation of what is perfect.”103 Aquinas, speaking about the perfection of
God, declares that human imperfections possess certain degrees of the perfection from God
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who is essentially the Absolute Perfection. Human persons manifest their desire, albeit
imperfectly and sometimes implicitly, to participate in the perfection of God through the
habituation of virtues. And with an openness to a life of faith in God, the infusion of grace
(e.g., infused virtues) is entreated whereby the human person commits freely to life’s
stewardship for the attainment of supernatural life. The acquired virtues are not futile human
acts which bear no significance at all and not least to the moral development of the human
person. Since virtues do not operate in a vacuum, the acquired virtues being ordered to the
‘civil society’ preponderate on the importance of the community in fomenting opportunities
for people to be nursed in virtues. Perfect or imperfect, acquired or infused, the community
benefits from the ordering of the will towards anything and everything that develops and
promotes the cause of the imago Dei. Furthermore, the Christian family and faith-communities
cannot ignore the essential importance of acquiring moral virtues since “the Christian moral
life (is) the gradual perfection of the image of God in the human person.”104 On this matter of
embodying gradual perfection, Aquinas unequivocally counsels everyone that:
[V]irtue is more lasting than learning, this must be understood in
respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of
virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning
does not.105
There are known external factors which may potentially foment or impede human moral
development. This discussion will now turn to these factors for consideration, keeping in mind
that the human person only has the natural aptitude towards virtus and effective catalysts need
to be introduced to actuate those perfective human potencies.

External Factors Actuating Habit and Virtue Acquisition
After delving into Aquinas’s assertions on the reality of intrinsic human operations, this
research now thematically leads into a discursive discussion of those extrinsic elements which
are responsible for the potential development of acquired moral virtues. The Thomistic claim
that acquired virtues make human agents good persons and their actions good as well is the
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very practical thrust upon which the ensuing discussion is anchored. The practical good that is
incipiently intuited and developed throughout a lifespan renders personal and integral value to
the human person intending on becoming a moral person whose transformation can only be
practically achieved via virtue habituation. It is upon this basis that this thesis contends that the
inchoation of virtues personally assists in the moral agent’s discernment of the meaning and
content of the first principles of natural law.

The Necessity of Virtue Cultivation
In question 63 of the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas focuses on
“The Cause of Virtues.” In article one, he lays down the foundation:
[V]irtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the
specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by
nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and
action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in
so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance
with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so
far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either
well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers
are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of
which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts,
and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid
sensitive powers assist.106
The above text is dense in formulation and meaning yet it fully appropriates that virtue is
natural to the human person. It suggests that the reality of the inherent disposition or aptitude
is potentially operative in the human person (hence, inchoatively). This is foreshadowed by an
earlier Aquinian proposition which implies that virtues are potential operations requiring
actuation.107 Aquinas alludes to this by using the metaphor of the seed: “certain seeds or
principles of acquired virtues pre-exist in us by nature.”108 This statement lucidly delineates
that owing to that seed of the first moral principles, human agents are considered
metaphorically as nurseries of virtues in view of their potential volition to habituate the virtues.
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The metaphor also intimates that being nurseries, it is necessarily inchoative, which means
these virtues will require time to develop. Aquinas rightfully envisages the flourishing of these
nurseries in the exercise of prudence specifically among those who are chronologically
advanced: “Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the
environment of the sensitive passion, but also because of their long experience.”109 The notion
of being ‘old’ seems for the Angelic Doctor an indication of “experience (which) is the result
of many memories”110 necessary to make prudential (virtuous) decisions. Asserting a claim
appearing to be within the province of psychology or the philosophy of the mind, Aquinas
pinpoints the interior sensoria as constituting the bodily organ, i.e., the brain, that is “perfected
by memory and experience.”111 This assertion pertinently imbues the consideration of the
intimate relationship between the acquired virtues and the interior sensoria, a relationship
which engenders the formation and information of the intuited good. Lest the human person be
influenced by laziness and pride112 and “corrupted by the passions,”113 the human person
should be able to commit towards being formed and being informed. This matter on the virtues’
role in the formation and information of the human person secures the thematic direction of the
discussion in the succeeding section.

The Nurturers of the ‘Seed of Virtues’
Similar to synderesis on the basis of their potential practical operation in the soul of the human
person, virtues also require external stimulation to commence their developmental maturation.
Specifically, prudence requires these inputs from the extramental world for its material
contents. Considering that habit and virtue development formally begins at the onset of reason,
this contingently impresses the fact that virtue habituation is a life-long process and moral
enablers are needed for the moral formation of all human agents, particularly of juveniles.
Aquinas explains this further:
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Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore "its
acquisition demands experience and time," hence it cannot be in the
young, neither in habit nor in act…. Wherefore, in children who have
been baptised but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence
as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who
have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things
necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it
becomes perfect, even as the other virtues.114
It is evident from the above that Aquinas prefigures the role of older people in the training of
children of early years to a life of virtues: “Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very
great need of being taught by others, especially by ‘old folks’ who have acquired a sane
understanding of the ends in practical matters.”115 The matter to be taught is clearly the
province of the first principles of natural law which Aquinas believes are already grasped by
‘old folks’ due to their experience and abundance of memories.116 Their syllabus, as it were,
would be no less than the Gospel which teaches about the evangelical perfection: “The teaching
of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all
matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means.”117 It can be inferred from this
statement that derived practical truths from the first moral principles, which are “the secondary
universal principles…are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through
experience, or through teaching.”118 In this respect, the Decalogue and the Beatitudes are
expressive of the first principles of moral law. Moreover, Aquinas stresses that “the common
principles of prudence are more connatural to man”119 thereby punctuating the influence of
experienced people crucial in the habituation of human agents in the human virtues, and more
specifically, in the virtue of prudence. All these assertions on the virtue-enabling capacity of
‘old folks’ may appear incongruently presumptuous and piously arrogant. However, Aquinas’s
attempt to elucidate the efficacy of virtue-enablers is based on the probable ideal rather than
on the impossible absolute.
It would be arcane to posit the sufficiency of the above without further querying the
qualifications of the so-called ‘old folks,’ apart from the presumption that they possess
experience and abundant memories. Aquinas explains in his answer to question 117, article 1,
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in the Prima pars of the Summa theologiae – Whether One Man Can Teach Another, As Being
the Cause of His Knowledge? – that it all depends on the commitment of ‘old folks’ to “lead
the disciple from things known (to him as the teacher), to the knowledge of the things
previously unknown to (the disciple.)”120 This involves proposing “to the disciple the order of
principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to
draw the conclusions from the principles.”121 Aquinas’s preponderance on acquiring the first
moral principles is comprehensively evident and his emphasis elevates these principles as
indispensable criteria in determining the legitimacy of ‘old folks’ who are prudently cognisant
of these principles. Those who embody the first moral principles are therefore considered as
“wiser”122 people from whom disciples seek counsel and “holy persons”123 for seeking counsel
themselves from God. These two qualifications or criteria express the practical indispensable
role of ‘old folks’ whose role as teachers of virtues is vital in the nurseries of virtues.
These nurseries are exactly those schools of virtues where wise and holy people give practical
witness to the first principles of the moral law. Since these virtue-enablers have already grasped
the synderetic good, Aquinas presumes that they have genuinely established intimacy with the
first principles of moral law. This affinity with the natural law presumes the capacity to
prudentially deal with contingent matters of action124 which characterise these schools of
virtues. By facing up to the indeterminacy of their social environment armed with their acquired
moral virtues, these wise and holy people concurrently uphold not just their own personal good,
but also, the common good. This duality is anticipated since, as a social being, the moral agent
operates within the confines of a given social environment: “since man is a part of the home
and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the
many.”125
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The Central Synthetic Function of Prudence
Prudence in General
In Thomistic moral philosophy, it would be logical to assert that a prudent person is a person
of virtues. This statement describes the multi-faceted and all-embracing nature of prudence in
respect to the acquired moral virtues. In this regard, Aquinas declares: “Prudence is the
principal of all the virtues simply.”126 This statement points out Aquinas’s examination of the
virtue of prudence in the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae, question 47, that
prudence is a “special virtue”127 because, as it is both an intellectual and a moral virtue, it “helps
all the virtues, and works in all of them.”128 This section explores the virtue of prudence
(prudentia) as possessing a central synthetic function, a function that involves comprehensively
incorporating and conjointly processing information from the universal moral principles and
the contextual life conditions of human agents.
Aquinas contends that as an intellectual virtue, prudence’s formal object is the truth and as a
moral virtue, the good. Prudence is in a unique position to engage with the best of both worlds,
i.e., the world of the speculative or theoretical and the world of the practical. It should be
recalled that prudence is “right reason applied to action.”129 Being an intellectual virtue, it
draws upon knowledge from practical reason. Classical Thomistic interpretation unequivocally
asserts this seeming preponderance on natural law in its examination of synderesis. As will be
delineated below, there is verity in considering a paradigm shift from natural law to virtues in
respect to a broader insight into, as far as this research is concerned, the contents of the first
principles of natural law. The virtue of prudence inherently possesses an intimate relationship
with the first principles of natural law from where the ends or moral virtues are ordered. In fact,
since synderesis moves prudence, this makes prudence “more excellent than the moral
virtues.”130 On the other hand, as a moral virtue, prudence’s operative role is to “regulate the
means”131 to be utilised for realising the ends appointed by practical reason. In article 3 of
question 47, Aquinas explicates these dual operative functions of prudence:
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To prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also
the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But
no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows
both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied.
Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the
prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the
singulars about which actions are concerned.132
Further to the analysis of prudence as right reason applied to action, the moral virtue component
in this definition specifies that the matter of prudence is the “contingent singulars.”133 In order
for prudence to be able to apply right reason, prudence must investigate the particular condition
within which right reason is to be applied. Such operation entails the proper consideration of
which specific moral principle is to be applied since the notion of ‘one moral principle fits all’
does not carry any weight in practical moral theology. The emphasis demonstrated by the
Pharisees in the Bible on strictly keeping the Mosaic laws at all costs to the exclusion of any
regard to the contextual capacity of human person to actually carry out specific precepts is
atypical of prudence.134
The case of the Pharisaic ethical view mentioned above should attract “the ruling of prudence
to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his
deeds.”135 This determination is essentially pivotal in the consideration of prudence’s virtueoperation as consisting of “the right estimate about matters of action.”136 On account of this,
two sub-topics are currently in order: (i) prudential mean, and (ii) how prudence makes a ruling.
These two are mutually inclusive: the mean that is set by prudence is the cause of its ruling,
and, prudence rules (or command) by enforcing the mean of virtues.
The Prudential ‘Mean.’ In view of (i), prudential mean is analysed in reference to prudence’s
relationship with the other moral virtues. According to Aquinas, moral virtues are only
inclinations without prudence ordering them as to their specific means:
Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An
imperfect moral virtue…is nothing but an inclination in us to do some
kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by
habituation. If we take the moral virtues, they are not connected: since
132
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we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are
prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds
of chastity.137
James Keenan, SJ offers his interpretation of this text: “[W]ithout prudence the moral virtues
are nothing more than inclinations. They are only inclinations because they cannot perfect; and
they can cannot perfect because they cannot attain the right act.”138 It needs to be stated on
account of Keenan’s observation that “neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues:
and from this follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.”139 Though
there is the priority of prudence in the hierarchy of acquired virtues, the infused virtues, most
specifically the virtue of charity, limit the operations and effects of prudence. Aquinas confirms
this: “Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as
stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.”140 This limitation is based on the
Thomistic assertion that acquired virtues are virtues only in a restricted sense. This simply
means that the moral virtues, including acquired prudence, do not direct the human person to
the ultimate end.141 Be that as it may, this research has argued that acquired virtues are not in
any away inefficacious since the attainment of proximate ends prepare, as it were, the natural
elements of virtues to be transformed by infused virtues towards the ultimate end. This is
simply akin to stating that the human person achieves a lifetime of proximate ends which,
firstly, serves the fundamental ordering of natural moral development, and secondly, it
anticipates the supernatural end by naturally pointing the human person, explicitly or
implicitly, to the ultimate end (beatitudo).
Aquinas boldly claims that the “ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the
reason.”142 Since prudence regulates the ends of moral virtues, it follows that its basis for
determining the mean in the moral virtues are those ends which are pre-existing already in the
human person. Since “moral virtue is said to observe the mean through conformity with right
reason,”143 Aquinas distinguishes between a rational mean from a real mean. This
differentiation is owed to the dual nature of prudence being both an intellectual and moral
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virtue. This duality suggests that the prudential mean is not pre-determined as if all human
experiences are the same. The uniqueness of being both an intellectual and moral virtue paves
the way for a contextual analysis (counsel) of the moral situation prior to prudence’s judgment
and command. If prudence is to make a right estimate of the right action to be done, it then
must necessarily consider those particular and contingent matters that relate to the moral
situation. The bioethical principle of ordinary-extraordinary means is underlined by prudence
in considering the moral calculus whether a medical treatment will provide reasonable benefit
or undue burden in the real consideration of the present condition of patients (as moral agents).
The Prudential ‘Ruling.’ After establishing what prudential mean signifies, the discussion now
turns to (ii) how prudence makes a ruling. Alongside determining the mean of all the moral
virtues, prudence also appropriates the mean “between excess and deficiency”144 which
acquired moral virtues must contextually consider. As mentioned previously, Aquinas claims
that prudence does not determine the end but only regulates them through the mean whose
specificity is determined by analysing the moral situation and the moral agent. In addition, he
explains that although there is such a thing as natural inclination, the universal mean is not able
to realistically address the specificity of given moral situations. Hence, considering this given
scenario observable in human situations, “the ruling of prudence is required.”145 The ensuing
question now points to how prudence undertakes the rational process of determining the mean.
The how in prudence’s operation of applying to action whatever is according to right reason is
referred to by Aquinas as the ‘chief act of prudence’:
Now there are three such acts. The first is “to take counsel,” which
belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry. The second act is
“to judge of what one has discovered,” and this is an act of the
speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action,
goes further, and its third act is “to command,” which act consists in
applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act
approaches nearer to end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the
chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.146
It is lucidly expressed in the above quote that there is the juxtaposition of the speculative and
practical reasons in the operation of prudence. This is reflective of the objective of this thesis
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to bridge the reality between the first principles of practical reason apprehended by synderesis
and the efficacy of acquired moral virtues. Prudence is that bridge which fuses the world of the
universal and particular,147 the intellectual and moral virtues,148 in guiding moral agents to
make a decision that is in accord with nature and their given circumstances. This thesis
proposes the ongoing embodiment and contextualisation of the primordial good, i.e., bonum
est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum, via the acquired moral virtues. Virtues
ensue formative and informative effects on the moral agents’ knowledge and understanding of
the good since it forms moral agents to be good people embodying human acts rather than acts
of men and women. It also informs moral agents via habituation of virtues of those human acts
which facilitate the knowing and understanding of the good. This good is evidently the
principle apprehended by synderesis and innately proposed as the first principles of practical
reason. The virtue of prudence, in particular, seeks this good which synderesis appoints as its
end. By natural necessity, it can be acknowledged that these first moral principles evolve into
secondary principles and into extended derivatives as the human mind of moral agents seeks
knowledge and understanding of the world around them.

Praecipuus actus rationis agibilium (Chief Act of Prudence)
In article 8 of question 47 in the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas asks the
question: Whether command is the chief act of prudence. The command element in the text
alludes to the extended function of prudence which is “the ensuing of good and…the avoidance
of evil.”149 It is apparent at the outset that prudence functionally relates to the first principles
of natural law. Such closeness verifies the intimate relationship between synderesis and
prudence: “that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act
of prudence.”150 The correlation between prudence and synderesis is even further specified in
the praecipuus actus rationis agibilium which is premised on the prior act of “to take counsel”
that involves discovery via inquiry. This specification is unequivocally pertinent since “(g)ood
counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action.”151 The
foundational knowledge that synderesis provides to prudence is paramount if prudence is able
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to assist in the process of discovering and inquiring into the appropriate action that needs to be
undertaken in light of the moral agent’s situational context. In relation to this discovery and
inquiry, Aquinas admits that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man
due to the acquisition of secondary universal principles by way of discovery through
experience, or through teaching. This explanation further delineates what has already been
stated earlier as regards prudence being the right reason applied to action. Secondary universal
principles are derivatives of the first principles which are known habitually in contrast to
primary universal principles which are known non-discursively, i.e., innate.152
In view of the above consideration of the requisites of discovery and inquiry, Aquinas saw fit
to assert that: “Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts wherefore ‘its acquisition
demands experience and time.’”153 In addition, he stresses that “practice merits increase, until
it becomes perfect.”154 Taking counsel, therefore, involves a lifetime of discovery and inquiry
due to the dynamism and variety of human situations with which the human mind can only
limitedly appraise and encounter. Aquinas refers to this phenomenon as the “infinity of the
singulars.”155 With the faculty of reason at the disposal of the human person, the initial acts of
discovery and inquiry advance the practical consideration of the human conditions prior to the
rational act of judging. It would be imprudent then to act in the absence of the necessary
discovery of the first principles of moral action and the proper inquiry into the complexities of
contingent situations. Judging hastily produces acts which are not exhaustive of moral
complexities that are commonly descriptive of human situations.
The thematic discussion hereafter will now focus on the determination of the relationship
between synderesis and prudence which the prudential act of ‘to take counsel’ (eboulia =
deliberate well) intimately demonstrates. The two remaining acts of prudence are left for
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external research, viz., ‘to judge’ (synesis) and ‘to command’ (gnome). The thematic
segregation, however, is for analytical purpose only and does not ignore the fact that these three
acts operate as a unit in its natural environment.

Quasi-Integral Parts of Prudence
Aquinas breaks into parts the various elements that make up prudence stipulating them as the
quasi-integral parts of prudence.156 The Latin term, ‘quasi,’ indicates that these parts
individually partake in the nature of prudence but not in its totality. He enumerates the
following parts: (1) Memory,157 (2) Understanding or Intelligence,158 (3) Docility,159 (4)
Shrewdness,160 (5) Reason,161 (6) Foresight,162 (7) Circumspection,163 and (8) Caution.164
Regarding Aquinas’s classification, he considers the first five as cognitive virtues and the last
three as commanding and applying knowledge to action.165 Expressive of prudence’s aspect to
inquire into contingent matters of action, the latter group pursues appropriate knowledge from
both the first moral principles and particular singular conditions supplied by the cognitive
virtues. The cognitive virtues, on the other hand, seek counsel, i.e., obtain knowledge or data,
from various sources such as past events (memory), innate first moral principles and particular
singular conditions (understanding or intelligence, reasoning, shrewdness), and from prudent
people (docility). Notwithstanding the fact that all the quasi-integral parts contribute
individually to the attainment of the objective of prudence to seek counsel, only those parts
mentioned above which have a direct relationship with the synderetic apprehension of the first
principles of moral action will be relatively considered in depth in the ensuing discussion.
Aquinas contends that prudence requires “the memory of many things”166 borne out of past
experiences. Its importance presumes that they provide insights into the first principles of moral
action. A similar presumption is made by the Angelic Doctor when he posited the importance
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of docility by which the human person seeks knowledge from the experiences of older people
than we are whose experiences point to the first principles.167 Past experiences, whether
personally executed or witnessed, are stored in the internal senses leaving its spiritual
footprints, aptly called sensible species, in the vis memorativa. As previously noted, the
cognition of an extramental reality may take a sequence of external sensations, hence several
sensible species, in order for the human mind to reach ideation or ideogenesis, i.e., the process
of cognition or intellection where the human mind forms concepts or ideas. This process
appears to be static, stable and mechanical. The habit of prudential understanding or
intelligence helps the human mind seeks counsel from all these sources of the first moral
principles, and concretely, of the secondary principles, while seeking counsel, too, by
investigating the contingent matters of actions.
Of utmost interest in this research is the observation that imagination (vis imaginativa) did not
make it to Aquinas’s list of quasi-integral parts of prudence. Even considering the different
sources from which Aquinas based his examination of prudence, viz., Tully, Plotinus,
Macrobius, Aristotle and Andronicus, none of these directly or indirectly alluded to vis
imaginativa as a possible source of knowledge.168 Thomistic ideation does not merely and
exclusively involve the extraction of sensible species from the vis memorativa. It involves, too,
the action of vis imaginativa coalescing forms or ideas to create new knowledges (ideation,
ideogenesis) even those types which have no bearing in reality itself. Citing Avicenna, Aquinas
presents the possibility of a created reality via the powers of imagination: “as when from the
imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a
golden mountain.”169 Vis imaginativa’s function is an established faculty in Thomistic
epistemology yet it is quite perplexing that Aquinas decided not to explicitly establish the link
between prudence and imagination. A close investigation would unsurprisingly suggest that
the Angelic Doctor is merely being consistent with his conceptual source and the intellectual
climate during his time.
A probable intimation of this omission is found in question 51, article 3 in the Secunda
secundae of the Summa theologiae:
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in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason
being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be
due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility
in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good
judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from
a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge
aright).170
The above quote reflects Aquinas’s straightforward assessment of imagination as being not
duly constituted of stable knowledge. He conceives of any reasoning by imagination as being
noncommittal since imagination presents a variety of perspectives that can or may impede the
determination of rational certainty. In his Commentary of Aristotle’s De anima, he
unequivocally states his indifference towards the nature of imagination which can lead the mind
from the real good: “Appetition and imagination may be either right or wrong.”171 Aquinas’s
thinking is clearly an echo of the mind of the Philosopher who previously expressed the same
thought: “All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not
right.”172
The insistence on the inclusion of vis imaginativa in prudential moral inquiry is focused on
accessing a much broader epistemic perspective in acquiring knowledge that facilitates
prudential judgment and command. As articulated above, there is an obvious probable risk in
pursuing this issue due to the tentative temperament of imagination to provide a firm
knowledge of things perceived. Experience suggests that the mind has the power of its own to
meander away from the truth instead of contemplating on the practical good that is so essential
for prudence to organically dispose the human mind to proceed to judge and to command.
Notwithstanding, theology cannot and should not ignore recent developments in the human
sciences, notably in psychology (neuroscience, neurobiology) and applied psychology
(philosophy of education), which have already posited the importance of imagination in the
moral development of the human person. As will be detailed below, these findings offer
pioneering insights and cutting-edge outcomes that should open vistas never perceived before.
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The Synthetic Function of Prudence
Responding to Benedict M. Ashley, OP’s article, The Anthropological Foundations of the
Natural Law: A Thomistic Engagement with Modern Science, Janet E. Smith claims that “the
principles and precepts of natural law are not innate but they are easily known to the human
person raised well, for we are designed to grasp them.”173 Her statement springs from Ashley’s
commentary on Aquinas’s epistemology that: “From what we can observe about…sensed
objects and their behaviours little by little we can come to understand something about our
inner life in its obscure mystery.”174
The Thomistic basis upon which Ashley stated his epistemological assertion is thematically
well-established. We may recall here the Thomistic doctrine that states that nothing is in the
intellect that was not previously in the sensible world. Through the ages, this doctrine has
attracted a plethora of theological inquiries which has paved the way for a re-interpretation of
the Aquinas’s doctrine on the natural law. Such is being attempt by the ensuing discussion.
Having already reflected on the classical notion of natural law in the previous chapter, this
section will now explore a contemporary speculative perspective regarding the Thomistic
natural law. In this regard, Peter Spiel asserts that human agents can come to know natural
law’s primal goods through the speculative and practical reason:
[P]ractical reason does not function independently of speculative
reason. Although it provides us with material for ethical inquiry,
Aquinas maintains that practical experience of the ends to which we
are oriented should be guided by the operation of the speculative reason
in determining the truth about human nature as well.175
Seipel’s statement was primarily expressed to counter-argue Daniel Mark Nelson’s nontraditional position who posits in his book, The Priority of Prudence, the following:
The first principle of practical reason, or the first principle of natural
law, does not tell us which goods in particular to pursue or how to
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pursue them, and our natural inclinations are only toward the general
kinds of goods with which our various powers are concerned. In order
to pursue appropriate goods, and in order to act reasonably with respect
to our inclinations, we are dependent on the virtues under the direction
of prudence, which is right reason about how to act.176
Deviating from the classical reason-centred tradition, Nelson evidently stresses the role of
prudence in providing the content of the practical good. He articulates Aquinas’s teaching by
explaining that it is due to prudence’s acquired knowledge which gives rise to what is really
practical in practical reason (synderesis):
The real issue between my interpretation and the usual reading of
Thomas’s ethics has to do with the scope of prudence’s deliberations
and the function of first principles. I readily acknowledge that Thomas
assigns an important role to the insights of synderesis or to natural
knowledge of first principles. I have tried to suggest, however, that
such knowledge serves the explanatory function of accounting for
how it happens that we come to reason practically and for the origin of
the virtues. Thomas’s general point is that we have a created, natural
ability to act for the good appropriate to our nature and to develop the
habits that perfect that capacity. Concrete knowledge of how to act,
knowledge of right means to attain the good, depends on prudence, an
acquired ability which is right reason about human action.177
Nelson’s assertion that the first principles of natural law serve merely an explanatory function
is bold and controversial178 yet not without substantial proof from the teachings of Aquinas.
Using article 16 of question 47 in the Secunda secundae in the Summa theologiae as his basis,
he highlights the view of the Angelic Doctor himself on the insufficiency of the first principles
of natural law in guiding concrete and practical moral actions. The Thomistic text cited
exemplifies this assertion: “Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but
in applying them to action. Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy
the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.”179 This view echoes
the description of the first moral principles in the previous chapter as being mere formal
principles devoid of any practical content.
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It is apparent from Nelson’s perspective that the argument from the human context holds the
key to understanding the role of prudence in assisting the human mind form a judgement and
command on the basis of a sound and appropriate counsel. Seipel, however, is opposed to such
preponderance on virtues over natural inclination. He counters Nelson’s claim by asserting the
bigger picture which classical traditional interpretation generally upholds:
[P]ractical experience of our natural inclination towards certain goods
provides us with the starting point for theoretical reflection. But that
does not mean that we can apprehend the genuine good of human life
in such a way that eliminates the needs for a speculative theory of
human nature.180
The two theological positions rendered above represent two distinct approaches which have
merits of their own. Seipel himself acknowledges this: “Nelson nevertheless articulates a
careful and nuanced interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of human nature that poses a
serious challenge to the account of natural law derivationism.”181
Nelson’s advocacy zeroes in on the metaphysical limitation of the universal first principles of
natural law to grasp the particulars of contingent matters of action. His view logically asserts
that “(h)uman laws are necessary because of the impossibility of applying the general and
abstract principles of natural law to the great diversity and contingency of human affairs.”182
He specifically asserts the function of prudence which promotes the crucial nature of prudential
counsel. It does so by delving into the infinity of singulars in order to properly and adequately
informed the appropriate prudential command that needs to be undertaken. Here is where
prudence functions as the synthesiser of the first principles of natural law and the infinity of
singulars. Nelson’s virtue-perspective interpretation does have theological validity most
especially when considered from the perspective of virtue ethics. The consideration of the
particular is essential and vital in the act of prudence. This research has been emphasising that
while the innateness of the first principles of natural law is acknowledged, it stresses, too, that
its apprehended goods of the natural law need discovery and inquiry for the human mind to
inchoatively grasp the content of those goods. This necessarily requires, as previously
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expressed, experience and time in order for the full import of the good to take root in the human
person. If the virtues need time to grow, the first moral principles also need the same time to
grow. Smith makes a parallel observation: “[A]lthough we are naturally able to delight in what
is good, we need experience of nature to teach us what is good.”183
To emphasise what can be practically known and habituated, as this research thematically
purports, demonstrates no less a distinct mode of perfection depicting the hylomorphic unicity
of the moral person. To exclusively rest on the innate first moral principles without considering
the given rudimentary elements characteristic of the extramental world is, apart from being
frivolous and impossible, a betrayal and ignorance of the Thomistic doctrine on epistemology.
Prudence operates similar to a bridge which connects two ends: the rational end and the
practical end. This means, prudence actively connects natural reason with acquired virtues
habitually and not just intellectually. Prudence provides the synthesis of the divine in the human
person and the human in the moral person, the harmony being achieved through the proper use
of the undeserved freedom inherently designed to actuate human flourishing.

Summary
Underlying the innate reality of synderesis is its habitual capacity to move prudence to facilitate
moral development. Prudence accomplishes this by specifying the means through which the
corresponding perfective ends of human acts as determined by either the imperfect moral
virtues or the perfect infused virtues are achieved. Though acquired moral virtues only point to
natural ends, infused virtues are able to elevate or transform these to merit supernatural ends.
Natural ends appeal to all while supernatural ends are conditioned by an act of faith in God.
Specifically, the acquired moral virtue of prudence regulates the means of acquiring natural
ends by inquiring about the first principles of natural law and the contingent matters of action
(moral context). While the former is acquired via inquiry from virtue-enablers who would have
already acquired an understanding of the first moral principles through experience and time,
the latter is gained by analysing the different specificities relative to the moral agent’s
contextual conditions. This thesis proposes the consideration of moral imagination in
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prudential moral inquiry owing to its inherent ability to form new ideas or concepts outside the
province of sensitive knowledge. These new ideas are crucial in conceptualising different
options, moral or not, prior to confirming a moral judgment and command. The next chapter
will investigate further the beneficence of this proposition.
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Chapter 7
The Beneficence of Moral Imagination in the Act of Synderesis

Introduction
The previous chapter elucidated the imperative of virtue habituation in developing the innate
seed of the practical good apprehended by the habit of synderesis. It underlined the nature of
synderesis as “a kind of prelude to the act of virtue.”1 It can be recalled that synderesis, being
“bestowed on us by nature,”2 is both inherently intuitive (pre-cognitive) and developmentally
apprehensive (cognitive).3 This theoretical presentation of the Thomistic notion of synderesis
echoes Mark Sultana’s own commentary on synderesis where he claims that the precepts of the
primary moral principles remain rather empty and general and would “need to be fleshed out
in more specific ways and…to be accompanied with an apprehension of particular
circumstances.”4
Furthermore, the previous discussion emphasized that the synderetic apprehension of the first
principles of natural law is accomplished effectively via embodiment of virtues. This epistemic
process consequently provides the necessary form (the virtuous life) and the information (the
way of virtuous living) in view of moral development. From the ontological consideration of
synderesis, the discussion descended into the practical consideration of prudence which is
fittingly related to practical reason. This development is not unexpected since prudence, as an
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acquired moral virtue, regulates the means to the ends of moral virtues which synderesis
appoints.5
Aquinas is a realist in considering the capacity of every human person to seek the proper means
of achieving the moral ends. His exhortation that “prudence is not about the ends, but about the
means”6 articulates fully this commitment. It is the reasonable opinion of this thesis, however,
that Aquinas’s commitment to what prudence can realistically accomplish in view of moral
inquiry is underdeveloped. Aquinas left out the faculty of moral imagination (vis imaginativa)
in prudential counsel. It is on this account that this research hypothesizes that moral
imagination, owing to its instrumentality in the prudential moral inquiry of the first principles
of practical reason, ought to be included as one of the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Intrinsic
to prudential inquiry is the imaginative process that allows both past and current concepts or
ideas to produce new forms of knowledge. The inclusion of moral imagination is necessary if
prudence is to avail of all possible avenues for sourcing knowledge within its gambit.
The following sections below will explore the arguments in favour of the consideration of
moral imagination7 in prudential moral inquiry. This will entail the investigation of the various
historical influences that may have influenced the theological disposition of Aquinas.
Alongside presenting the Thomistic doctrine on vis imaginativa, a cursory study of
contemporary scholarship on moral imagination will be introduced to analyse the beneficence
of moral imagination in moral development and functioning. An important inclusion in this
chapter is the original proposition on the two metaphysical moments relating to the act of
synderesis: the intuitive actuation and the pre-cognitive procession. These two metaphysical
moments demarcate the most initial epistemological phases in human intellection. They point
to the epistemological procession prior to what was previously referred to as ideogenesis or
ideation. It is during these phases where the quality of sensitive experience is crucial if the
necessary epistemic materials (phantasms) are to be assimilated for the purpose of the
apprehension and maturation of the practical moral good.
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Prior to elaborating the beneficence arguments in favour of moral imagination, a brief
commentary on the subject matter is in order. There is indeed much to be mystified by
Aquinas’s doctrinal predilection to except the import of imagination in prudence’s quest for
moral knowledge (moral certainty) in moral inquiries. Being an indispensable element in moral
deliberations, prudential moral inquiry seeks the knowledge and understanding of moral
landscapes of given moral situations. Though imagination’s engagement in erotic fantasies is
not unknown, its beneficence, however, is truly well-established in terms of its capacity to
consciously produce appropriate moral contexts. The consideration of moral contexts is
acknowledged by John Dewey when he analogously purported the reality of imagination as
being akin to undergoing a dramatic rehearsal prior to any moral judgment: “Imagination is
primarily dramatic, rather than lyric, whether it takes the form of the play enacted on stage, of
the old story or silent soliloquy.”8 Mental moral contexts can also be construed as producing
imaginative options in the course of moral deliberations. This practical phenomenon is captured
by Mavis Biss in the following quote:
Imagination contributes to moral competence by testing the viability of
options. The anticipation of potential consequences is linked to
imagination because it involves mental imagery (pictorial
imagination), and the mental representation of states of affairs that may
result from future actions. The ability to vividly imagine the
consequences of different parts of actions can be seen as a condition or
aspect of moral judgment, because potential consequences partially
determine which of the available options would be best to take.9
Though Aquinas would have been likely shaped by his time, it still raises important questions,
not least of all academic, as to why he elected not to admit the potential benefit of imagination
in moral deliberations. The following sections will now investigate possible rationales as to
why Aquinas opted not to consider moral imagination as one of the quasi-integral parts of
prudence.
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Imagination’s Absence in Prudential Inquiry: Dominus falsitatis
In view of determining the rationale behind the absence of imagination in prudential inquiry, a
probe into the (a) contextual milieu and the (b) thematic lineage of Aquinas’s teaching on virtue
is in order. This thesis contends that if prudence were to comprehensively guide the human
person cognitively and affectively, it must consider all possible sources of prudential inquiry
that are within the epistemic reach of the human intellect. Though it is outside the scope of this
research, it needs to be mentioned that the affect (passion) contributes also to prudential moral
inquiry. Emotions (or feelings) are spliced into perceived sensitive knowledge which informs
the intellect of moral contexts.10
This research contends that the absence of imagination gravely misses what nature itself is
providing for the ongoing moral development of the human person. Aquinas’s teaching on the
internal sensoria underpins this argument: “As nature does not fail in necessary things, there
must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect
animal.”11 At the disposal of the human person is nature’s gift of imagination whose function,
though potentially corrupted at times, is ultimately necessary for the perfection of human life.
Such is its necessity that in prudence’s judgment and command, if it were to possess a wellgrounded basis for its apprehensive function, imagination must be sought for prudential moral
inquiry. This prudential action, needless to say, fulfils what Aquinas reveals about divine
generosity: “God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature.”12

Contextual Milieu: The Condemnation of Imagination
The consideration of the contextual milieu proffers circumstantial insights into the mind
of Aquinas. History will attest to the well-known fact that medieval scholars preferentially
thought that speculating on imagination was not within the academic interest at that time. This
10
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observation is spelt out by Clarke W. Norris, SJ who commented that Aquinas and many other
medieval scholars were:
all primarily oriented in the intention of their philosophical work more
toward the fullest possible understanding of the real world already
given them by God as a fixed, unchanging order than in creating
something truly new, that is, in expressing their participation in God’s
own creativity as an intrinsic part of their human dignity under God.13
Probing further, there appears to be a deeper rationale for the unfavourable demise of
imagination during medieval times. Richard Kearney makes this important observation in
relation to the perception of imagination as mere substitute of the original reality:
This acknowledgement of the ambiguous status of imagination of the
epistemological plane was expressed in a general attitude of suspicion
– a suspicion exacerbated by the adherence of medieval philosophy to
the ethical condemnation of imagination found in Holy Scripture. The
combination of these two foundational authorities (Greek ontology and
Judeo-Christian theology) resulted in a largely hostile view of
imagination.14
The extent of the influence of the ethical condemnation of imagination found in Holy Scriptures
intimated in the above quote should not be overlooked nor underestimated. In biblical theology,
which extensively influenced medieval thinking, the account of the Fall in the Book of Genesis
is construed thematically as the genesis of human imagination whereby Adam’s transgression,
which universally represents humanity’s desire for immortality,15 manifests his personal desire
to be ‘God’s equal.’ His intention is confirmed by his acquiescence to the serpent’s temptation:
“for God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God,
knowing good and evil.”16 The attempt by the serpent to engage in a dialogue with Adam
explicates right from the outset its wicked plot to drag Adam’s power of imagination beyond
its preternatural bounds. Gerhard von Rad provides an exegesis:
What the serpent’s insinuation means is the possibility of an extension
of human existence beyond the limits set for it by God at creation, an
increase of life not only in the sense of pure intellectual enrichment but
13
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also of familiarity with, and power over with, mysteries that lie beyond
man. That the narrative sees man’s fall, his actual separation from
God.17
Resulting from Adam’s action is the birth of imagination which “enables man to think in terms
of opposites – good and evil, past and future, God and man.”18 The notion of opposites is
striking in this respect as it alludes to the bifurcation of the power of imagination which could
either manifest the good or the bad (evil) depending on the use or abuse of this power. Acutely,
it implies that the human self is split and eternally torn between opposing tendencies.19 These
opposites are graphically rendered by Cain’s murder of his brother, Abel, where Cain
succumbed to one of the opposites at par with Adam’s betrayal of his relationship with God –
his disobedience to God’s law.
Even in the midst of all this, the word of God was still revealed to Cain in respect to imagining
the good as the moral way to overcome personal failures: “Why are you angry, and why has
your countenance fallen? If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well,
sin is lurking at the door; its desire is for you, but you must master it.”20 In the advent of
opposites, humanity then is ordered to master his or her own power in order to achieve moral
development. The expedience of this matter is paramount since life after the Fall has the
potential to navigate itself away from the good and towards the bad (evil) while imagining the
consequences of obedience or betrayal of God’s offer of friendship. Although human
imagination per se has not lost its goodness, human disposition is weakened, and
concupiscence has become humanity’s perpetual reminder of the Fall.
Analogous to the existence of synderesis in every rational soul, human agents have access to
imagination which they can use freely and for a specific teleological purpose. It should be
recalled that St. Jerome held that synderesis was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain
after he was turned out of Paradise and St. Paul himself recognised it as the “law written on
their hearts.”21 Reflecting on the inevitable encounter with opposites, Kearney offers a way
forward in establishing moral integrity in the exercise of freedom: “But whether he decides to
redirect his creative imagination to the way of divine creation – pursuing the way of imitation
17
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– or to continue his wandering through the desert of idolatrous fantasies, man’s ethical choice
remains a free one.”22
The above discussion unambiguously provides an insight as to why Aquinas could have
abandoned any further speculative foray into the realm of vis imaginativa beyond his treatises
in the Summa theologiae. The notion of imagination would have likely been prejudicially
contaminated by the prevailing biblico-theological understanding of Adam’s original sin which
consequently has either diminished or totally dismissed its referential relevance.23 The
investigation below on the thematic lineage will produce further evidence as to why
imagination was probably omitted by the Angelic Doctor in prudential counsel.

Thematic Lineage: The Aristotelian Influence on Thomistic Imagination
Most likely influenced by his contemporaries, Aquinas was not alone in disregarding or
dismissing the importance of imagination. In fact, Tully, Plotinus, Macrobius, Aristotle and
Andronicus, all of whom the Angelic Doctor had mentioned in his Summa theologiae, shared
the same disregard towards imagination.24 By citing them, the Angelic Doctor was apparently
establishing legitimacy and providing justification to his assertion.
The probative investigation below reveals that doctrinal fidelity to the Philosopher, whose
teachings on the interior sensoria are the counterpart origin of the Thomistic doctrine on the
interior senses, would have likely formed part of Aquinas’s thought-consideration to let go of
imagination. The following text appears to demonstrate Aquinas’s disposition that vis
imaginativa may not be a stable source upon which the certitude of reason could be established.
In his Commentary of Aristotle’s De anima, he unequivocally states his indifference towards
imagination:
Appetition and imagination (motive-principles likewise) may be, on
the other hand, either right or wrong. Hence if we act amiss it, in the
last analysis, because we fall short of what we intellectually know; our
previous conclusion stands, that the final-motive comes from the object
of desire. Now this object is either a real good or a seeming good: it is
real good if the mind’s original correct judgment is maintained; it is
22
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only a seeming good if appetite or imagination cause a deflection from
that judgment.25
Aquinas’s view in the above quote echoes the mind of the Philosopher who originally
expressed the same thought: “Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may
be either right or wrong.”26
Noteworthily, the exclusion of imagination observes the inclusion of memory as one of the
cognitive virtues attendant to prudence. Aquinas apparently gave doctrinal preponderance to
vis memorativa over vis imaginativa. This could probably be weighted on the fact that memory
draws information from the cogitative sense (vis cogitativa) which provides knowledge relating
to that which is either pleasurable or unpleasurable, beneficial or harmful, good or evil. This
information is seriously sought by prudence and Aquinas appears to believe that memory is the
lone-sufficient faculty to access the first principles of practical reason. Considering that
information obtained via imagination has the potential to be absurdly irrational, Aquinas would
have considered admitting memory as a firmer and a more stable source of knowledge. Indeed,
experience will confirm that “imagination suffers from certain inexactitudes and failures of
detail which that presence would relieve. The fact is, we are never sure that what is imagined
corresponds exactly to what was originally experienced.”27 In addition, imagination has its own
limits which could jeopardise the operation of memory:
An inability to remember some past event may be due to the failure of
imagination to retain the image…. The memory, relying on these
images, is liable to be misled and to falsely judge of a past event. In
other words, the imagination has the tendency to fill in gaps of memory,
and this causes errors in remembering.28
A closer analysis of the functions of memory and imagination would suggest that “imagination
supplies a basis for memorial procedures.”29 It is not difficult to imagine how this may proceed
in the human mind since Aquinas specifically nominated to each of these interior sensoria their
specific functions maintaining that “nature does not fail in necessary things.”30 When memory
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recalls the past, it necessarily entails the use of imagination. Experientially, their difference is
elucidated by this articulation: it is easier to remember (memory) what a rainbow looks like
than imagine when was the last time one has seen a rainbow.
The doctrinal bias against moral imagination has effectively delimited and constrained a
broader scope for prudential moral inquiry. This is where this limitation ushers in a cognitive
and affective deprivation that malnourishes the human soul of the intellectual and affectual
dynamism that it necessarily deserves. Imagination allows the human mind to inquire and to
probe the deepest recesses of human cognition and affection and brings to the fore the moral
truth that any human decision desires to rely upon.
The negativity surrounding imagination should not be surprising and perplexing. The allusion
to its existence is uncompromisingly negative and damnatory. For example, imagination is
viewed by Immanuel Kant as autocratic in its operation which needs to be harnessed by
prudence.31 From being construed as autocratic, Martha Nussbaum closely asserts imagination
as being “too often egoistic and self-indulgent, too concerned with particulars and with their
relation to the self.”32 It is this reference to the ego or the self that imagination has also been
typified as naturally “prone to frivolous fancy and opposed to reason…(having) little relevance
to practical issues.”33 In the same vein as being a voluntary activity of one’s ego or the self,
Ludwig Wittgenstein is convinced that imagination “does not instruct us about the external
world.”34 Owing to its origin, imagination is considered as the antithesis of rational thinking.
This is basically due to its etymological affiliation with the Greek word, phantasia, that
imagination has become synonymous with ‘fantasy’ – a fanciful term which could pejoratively
mean baseless, impossible, make-believe and absurd. Marie George sums up the above
unfavourable scrutiny: “Imagination cannot be relied upon for judgment of natural things, since
it can represent things as not existing in sensible matter and, also, as existing in sensible matter
but other than they are.”35
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The unsurprisingly negative manner in which imagination has been thought of above discloses
nonetheless of its persisting and indispensable presence in the human mind. After all, speaking
as a moral theologian, Philip Keane, SS articulates that “there is no area of human life which
we do not need to be imaginative.”36 If imagination is being hunted due to its pernicious role
in the banishment of Adam and Even from Paradise thereby causing the fracture of humanity,
or simply because it has been leading people to imprudence, to idleness, to complacency, and
to individualism, these are all indicative of the power of imagination to enthral the human mind
to seek beyond the confines of the sensitive world.
Aquinas himself, echoing Aristotle, contributed to the perceptual mistrust of imagination by
distinguishing it as “the master of falsity” (dominus falsitatis).37 Moreover, his allusion to the
possible capacity of imagination to be influenced by the devil did not help either. He claims
that devils are capable of overpowering the imagination by causing it to form images of evil
nature.38 Considering the possibility of imagination going awry, Aquinas nonetheless stresses
the positive influence of virtue on creative imagination:
[V]irtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same
applies to the intellectual habits, which renders man ready to judge
aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when
man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies,
sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless
those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his
intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes
is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and this the intellectual habit
is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.39

Thomistic Doctrine on Imagination: Passio phantasiae
In Thomistic epistemology, ideogenesis or ideation partly involves the imaginative
apprehension of “a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent.”40
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In his Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Aquinas articulates imagination as a conscious
act: “A passion of phantasy (passio phantasiae) is in us when we will because it is in our power
to form something as it were appearing before our eyes.”41 Imagination is bringing back on the
“screen of consciousness”42 those of which have been sensed extramentally. Aquinas, agreeing
with Avicenna, further extends the power of imagination to “combine and divide imaginary
form[s]”43 which allows for previously sensed forms or ideas to be reproduced and produced.44
The function of combining and dividing forms is specifically accomplished by creative
(productive) imagination. In his classic example of what imagination can produce, Aquinas
imaginatively conceives of a golden mountain put together from previous separate conceptions
of an imaginary form of gold and an imaginary form of a mountain.45
Consistent with this teaching on the empirical nature of his epistemology, Aquinas explains
that the imaginative content of prophecies originate from previously sensed matters: “The
prophet does not need a new infusion of the species of those things which he has seen, but only
an orderly grouping of the species retained in the storehouse of the imaginative power, which
can suitably designate the thing to be prophesied.”46 By extension, an essential understanding
concerning the Thomistic doctrine on imagination is the fact that the creative production of
imaginary forms reveal the human capacity “to generate new possibilities for realising moral
ends.”47 These moral ends are the province of prudence to which it intends to guide moral
agents to their acquisition via imagination.
The question regarding the difference between memory and imagination is an important
epistemological phenomenon. According to Brennan, the fundamental difference lies in their
underlying temporal context. When memory reminisces persons, events, etc., it recalls them as
part of a distant past. On the other hand, imagination represents images as if it is presently
occurring. Brennan states unequivocally that “[m]emory always recognises its revived products
as images of past events, tracing them back to their origin in perceptual experience and placing
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them in a definite temporal context. Imagination does none of these things.”48 Memorative and
imaginative contextualisation is undoubtedly necessary in moral inquiries. Though the latter
reproduces static images from the memorial past, memory is viewed by Aquinas as a legitimate
source of information for prudential moral inquiry. This was more likely the reason why
Aquinas favoured vis memorativa over vis imaginativa in his consideration of the quasiintegral parts of prudence.
The latter, on the other hand, produces dynamic images brought about by its capacity to freely
divide and combine previously sensed forms. Since the process of combination and division
involves the potential securing of a multi-dimensional cognitive perspectives, it permits the
play of thoughts and suspension of judgment until prudence is adequately prepared to make a
judgment.49 Archimedes, who discovered the physical law of buoyancy while taking a bath,
would have imaginatively played with his thoughts before discovering what is now called the
Archimedes Principle. The displacement of water upon his immersion in the bathtub filled with
water would have been in his conscious mind when he was trying to imaginatively suspend his
judgment50 on the possible solution to the king’s request to him to determine the gold content
of his crown after suspecting that his own goldsmith cheated on him by adding silver into it.51
As well with other discoveries and inventions, creative imagination would have been
instrumental in moving the human reason and will to produce proto-types or mental images of
impending discoveries or inventions before taking them out into the physical realm. Thereto,
Biss reflects on imagination “as a bridge between understanding and action.”52
Having considered the conscious element in imagination, it would be remiss to deny the
occurrence of unconscious play of thoughts in dreams where there is evidence of free play
producing images that may be grotesquely inaccurate and irrational. Though it must be stressed
that freedom in creative imagination is not absolute as it is limited only by the moral agent’s
experience and perceptual knowledge that has been admitted into complete ideation,
“imagination…is [still] the necessary condition for the freedom of empirical man in the midst
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of the world.”53 Imagination realises human freedom in seeing through the mind’s eyes multiperspectival moral options for determining the practical nature of the good, alongside the
concrete means of discerning how to avoid evil. This pertinently includes the imaginative
capacity to be in someone else’s shoes (empathy) in order to better understand a person’s moral
situation and moral thinking. There is truth therefore in Keane’s declaration that: “Imagining
is our natural way of coming to moral principles.”54
Of the two Thomistic types of imagination, creative imagination is of particular interest in this
thesis, more than the reproductive imagination, as this function truly allows for creative
exploration when it comes to prudential moral inquiry. In contrast to reproductive imagination
which “picture things as more or less exact copies of original experiences,”55 creative
imagination permeates scenarios that would not have been otherwise experienced in real time
but is made to be virtually (imaginatively) present to provide a dynamic mental context. Such
is Patricia Werhane’s view when it comes to asserting the necessity of creative imagination:
“Without moral imagination, it would appear that one cannot make the links between practical
and the theoretical.”56 Creative imagination therefore is posited in this thesis as the
psychological capacity to mentally represent moral contexts in view of moral ends. The
practical and the theoretical find their convergence via prudence whose incorporation of moral
imagination in its inquiry provide a moral context which could either instigate or foment the
development of the primary moral principles which synderesis apprehends. Creative
imagination therefore may specifically engender the knowledge of the first principles of natural
law either through its capacity to causally influence the intuitive actuation and pre-cognitive
procession of synderesis. The meaning of these two original concepts will be elaborated below.

Moral Imagination’s Role in the Act of Synderesis
Moral imagination is nature’s gift to moral agency that has the potential to assist the intuitive
actuation of synderesis and the synderetic pre-cognitive procession en route to the intelligible
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apprehension of the first principles of natural law. On the basis of Thomistic epistemology, two
metaphysical moments57 are acknowledged in this research: first, the moment of intuitive
actuation occurring during the pre-cognition stage, and second, the moment of pre-cognitive
apprehension in the turn to phantasm (conversio ad phantasmata) phase. Collectively, both
processes comprise the act of synderesis. Speculatively, each moment, organic in their
ontological operation, has an integrated co-relationship with vis imaginativa.
A good grasp of Aquinas’s understanding of self-evident principles is pertinent in
understanding the speculative investigation currently being undertaken in this section. The
habit of synderesis, understood as the capacity to know the first principles of natural law, intuits
the self-evident knowledge of these principles “immediately” (statim).58 In Quaestiones
disputatae de veritate, Aquinas alluded to the ‘the rule of Dionysius’ (‘axiom of continuity’)
mentioned in the previous chapter in his discussion of the topic on synderesis. Aquinas asserts
that human agents have the capacity to know immediate and non-discursive truths like the
angels who come to knowledge “without investigation or movement of reason.”59 On the other
hand, human agents, being the highest form of corporeal creatures in the hierarchy of beings,
depends on the material world to attain knowledge of truth by way of discursive inquiry.
Aquinas confirms this:
Hence, the human soul, according to that which is highest in it, attains
to that which is proper to angelic nature, so that it knows some things
at once and without investigation, although it is lower than angels in
this, that it can know the truth in these things only by receiving
something from sense.60
Inferring from this elucidation, Aquinas insists that no knowledge is completely and absolutely
innate since human agents “are not born with a knowledge of self-evident principles.… Rather,
[human agents] come to a knowledge of the truth of such propositions after [they] have come
to understand the nature and meaning of the terms involved.”61 The intermediary placement of

57

‘Moment’ in this discussion is metaphysically considered for analytical purposes only. It does, however, point
to that psychological event when extramental matters impinge on the external senses eliciting a response from
the internal senses.
58
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 12. See also Mary Christine Ugobi-Onyemere, IHM, The Knowledge of the First
Principles in Saint Thomas Aquinas (Bern, Switzerland: International Academic Publishers, 2015), 65-66.
59
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1.
60
Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 1.
61
Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching, 31-32.

162

rational beings in Aquinas’s hierarchy of beings locates the meaning of self-evident principles
in explaining how human agents apprehend the universal principles via the habit of synderesis.
Keane’s work on moral imagination is instrumental in the following discussion. He propounds
conversion and abstraction as the two main movements in Thomistic epistemology.62 He
formulates the reciprocal relationship between the two where the universal and the particular
coalesce to effectuate the appropriate grasp of reality. Via conversion, the particular is cognised
while via abstraction, the universal is extracted. He maintains that “it is precisely…the
perennial need for an adequate relationship between the concrete and the universal – which
makes imagination such a crucially vital theme for all human knowing, including moral
knowing.”63
Following Keane’s paradigm, this thesis speculates on the two moments mentioned above in
reference to the initial actuation of synderesis when the discovery of the first principles of
natural law is instantiated and which consequently leads to its epistemic maturation that is
constructed in time and through experience.

Pre-Apprehension: Intuitive Actuation
Synderesis, being innately self-evident, “proceeds from the understanding of certain things –
viz., those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason.”64
Qualifying how synderesis grasps those certain things that reason naturally knows, Aquinas,
following Boethius, asserts that there are “certain axioms or propositions [which] are
universally evident to all…[and] whose terms are known to all.”65 The first principles of natural
law are self-evident and are known by the human reason without the need for investigation or
inquiry. In light of this statement, it is imperative to raise this question: Does every human
person have the capacity to know the first principles of natural law without the need to
investigate or to inquire? This question presupposes the innate reality of synderesis which
necessarily requires actuation prior to its act. The act of synderesis takes place the moment the
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reasoning mind interacts with the outside world. This thesis has referred to this metaphysical
moment as the pre-cognitive or intuitive process. Nothing is intelligible at this stage except for
the awakening of the natural inclination to the good. Epistemologically speaking, the
understanding of the terms that Aquinas refers to in self-evident truths is not reached yet at this
initial stage. The cognitive process naturally proceeds from this metaphysical phase. The
apprehensive or cognitive process that ensues facilitates the initial awakening to embody
materiality that characterises corporeal existence. This is the process where the good assumes
intelligibility beyond the undefined inclination to the good. The intelligibility is reached by
human agents at varying degrees; some are cognised with fewer instances of epistemic contact
than others.
This thesis specifically posits that imagination enables the human mind to grasp the meaning
of the terms in self-evident truths. Since cognition involves not only sense but imagination as
well, perceived terms conceptually develop its content via subsequent sensitive experiences
and via imagination. This research further speculates that imagination has a part in the
discovery process of those terms. Both cognition and reasoning are involved in the lifelong
process that begins with an initial contact with the social environment. In the practical realm,
children in their early sensitive years will need time and repeated experiences in order to
understand and develop the inclination to the good. It is inconceivable that the awakening
mentioned above takes place overnight and the resulting outcome would be fully defined in the
subject. Children should be able grasp the notion of the good inchoatively but certainly not at
the first instant. Even their biological inclination is still developing, let alone their
psychological capacities. Thus, there is merit in asserting that imagination subconsciously
contributes to the awakening process whereby it assists in the creation and production of
phantasms that bear not only the universal good but also the particular good. These phantasms
should be able to help the growing mind conceive images of what is morally good from the
perception of goodness in the social environment. During this metaphysical and subconscious
experiences, some of these phantasms will be retained while others will be lost. Ordinary
human experience suggests that there is limit to perceptual knowledge as not everything that is
perceived can be recalled by memory. But for those which have been retained in the storehouse
of vis imaginativa, they will be of use somehow in the inchoative process of understanding the
terms in self-evident truths such as the first principles of natural law.
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In view of actuating the habit of synderesis and of sustaining the effects of its apprehension,
moral education therefore is crucially essential in the early stages of a child’s moral
development. Drawing from the postulate articulated earlier regarding the interior sensoria as
materia causae, imagination in the pre-cognition stage yields sensible forms aplenty for two
important epistemological reasons: abstraction and conversion. The material bases for the
process of abstraction are the sensible species which bear the universal nature in them.
Reiterating a metaphysical assertion noted earlier, the sensible forms are still unintelligible at
this pre-cognition stage. They are indeterminate raw materials yet crucial in the inchoative
process of understanding the terms of the universal moral principles. What is absorbed by the
human mind subconsciously from the social environment is determinant of how these terms
are grasped. Certainly, for terms relating to moral truths, it is only imperative that children are
exposed to situations and conditions that are productive of moral virtues for phantasmal
assimilation. As neuroscientific studies will suggest in the discussion hereafter, the experiences
of young children who grow up being loved and cared for by their parents will be in possession
of raw moral materials (phantasms) that will have impact on their moral development. Their
experiences will continue assimilating other raw and already-formed moral materials through
the years in order to hone their moral understanding. Therefore, intuition entails the espousal,
as it were, between the awakening phase and the cognitive phase where imagination operates
in-between these phases to subconsciously create and produce a horizon for moral
development. Extending the analogy, the progeny in this espousal is none other than virtueembodiment which renders the moral agent good and which fosters the moral life good as well.
The above depiction of intuition can be further explicated on the basis of a careful reading of
article 7 of question 84 in the Summa theologiae’s Prima pars.66 This text profoundly relates
to the “dependence of all…human thinking on the imagination as a springboard”67 where in
the specific process of abstraction, “[t]he release of the universal from the concrete is attributed
to the illumination of the phantasm by the agent intellect (intellectus agens).”68 In this process
of illumination, traditionally called excessus ad esse, loosely translated as “an excess or
openness toward being, toward God,”69 the particular or sensible is met on the “infinite horizon
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of intelligibility”70 by the intellectus agens whose role is to infuse (illumine) divine knowledge
into the particular or sensible.71 From such movement from the particular or sensitive towards
God, first, it paints the practical dynamism and creativity of imagination (phantasm), and
second, it presents the divine involvement in human cognition. It is on the basis of the latter
that the synderetic notion of intuition or pre-apprehension (pre-cognition) is inferred. Through
illumination understood in the Thomistic sense, the intellectus agens arouses the human
rational soul which tells the moral agent to do and pursue the good and to avoid evil. Although
all of these take place on the metaphysical and subsconscious level, the illuminative movement
(or abstraction) demonstrates the human soul’s imaginative creativity in discovering the
universal good. It is during this ontological moment where vis imaginativa’s phantasms,
together with vis memorativa’s phantasms, traverse the infinite horizon of intelligibility towards
the realm of the universal principles. In other words, synderesis meets up with the intellectus
agens to own the first moral principles which Divine reason has instilled in the human soul.
On the other hand, the former, i.e., the practical dynamism and creativity of imagination,
reveals the inherent capacity of imagination to enflesh, as it were, the skeletal moral framework
of the universal first principles which, at this stage, is still devoid of any practical
contextualisation. It is this particularisation of the universal that is at the heart of the conversio
ad phantasmata - the subject matter that will be next discussed vis-à-vis imagination.

Turn to Phantasm: Pre-Cognitive Procession
From the indeterminate particular to the universal, the second moment metaphysically and
subconsciously proceeds from the universal to the particular via conversio ad phantasmata:
“for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity return to the
phantasms in order to perceive in the universal nature existing in the individual.”72 The turn to
phantasm is necessary in order to specifically identify the object that is being perceived. As
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hylomorphic moral agents, this particularisation is essential since the moral agent does not live
in the universe of essences but in the actual physical world. It is worth noting here that:
As incarnate beings who begin with sense knowledge, our way of
coming to the truth in moral matters or any other area, is very much an
imaginative way…. It seems very difficult if not impossible to hold to
the essence of the natural law tradition without acknowledging the
human imaginative process in and through which we are able to form
natural law judgments. We simply would not know the natural law in
a human way without participating in such a process.73
As synderetic apprehension involves pre-cognition, the above quote elevates the issue that for
synderesis to apprehend the first principles of natural law, moral imagination needs to be
considered as integral to this process. While this could still be in the pre-apprehension moment,
moral imagination allows the act of synderesis to consider various forms of universal entities.
Simply put, since the first principles of natural law are universal and abstract in form and bear
no material content, it is necessary for them to embody practical contextualisation for it to be
apprehended by the human soul. “To do and pursue good and to avoid evil” is critically a
universal principle. The human soul is only able to grasp its moral force if both sense and
imagination apprehend its contextualised moral meaning.
Based on the above, it needs to be emphasised that Benedict XVI’s inner sense has a moral
object and so does Aquinas’s law of our mind. The human agent senses what is good by
imagining: e.g., how good is given witness to by agents of moral virtues such as parents and
teachers. The human agent discovers the law of our mind by imagining, e.g., how good
becomes the standard moral way of relating to people. The abstract and universal synderetic
act comes humanly alive when it reaches the stage of specificity, albeit only in phantasms. This
unequivocally raises the importance of the influence of virtues, specifically the virtue of
prudence, to the formation and information of synderesis. We recall here how prudential
inquiry is of utmost importance prior to its judgment and command and how this quest for
moral knowledge is essential to moral development.
The turn to phantasm has therefore two pertinent epistemological implications to Christian
morality: (i) it is pretexted that upon the cognitive ‘return,’ it will find previously sensed and
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formed phantasms that are morally potent and virtue-laden,74 and (ii) it foresees moral options
where its ethical specificity anticipates inevitable distancing from its universal ethical basis.
The former (i) highlights the necessity of practical moral stimuli that will be transformed into
phantasms benefitting moral development. The existence of morally potent and virtue-laden
phantasms does not only promote the intuitive actuation of synderesis, but it also does ease the
pre-cognitive procession of the synderetic first moral principles.
While the promise of an environment where moral virtues can be effectively acquired is
incontrovertible, this impinges nonetheless on the real potential of every moral agent for moral
development. Aquinas agrees to this statement: “Before habits of virtue are completely formed,
they exist in us in certain natural inclinations, which are the beginnings of the virtues. But
afterwards, through practice in their actions, they are brought to their proper completion.”75 He
also concurs with the fact that for this to happen, there needs to be proper moral stimuli coming
from those who are habituating the virtues themselves. In this respect, the Angelic Doctor
explains:
Now in discovery…one person is said to teach another inasmuch as, by
signs, he manifests to that other the reasoning process which he himself
goes through by his own natural reason. And this, through the
instrumentality, as it were, of what is told him, the natural reason of the
pupil arrives at a knowledge of the things which he did not know.
Therefore…a man is said to cause knowledge in another through the
activity of the learner’s own natural reason, and this is teaching. So,
one is said to teach another and be he his teacher.76
In reference to the above quote, the reality of teachers, such as parents and educators, holds a
critical and pivotal role in the virtue-formation and virtue-information particularly of children
in their early sensitive years. Aquinas conceives of these teachers as habitually exemplifying
in prudence where docility is an integral part of its exercise. Aquinas, quoting Aristotle, points
out the meaning of this insight:
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It is right to pay attention to the undemonstrated assertions and
opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and
prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them
an insight into principles…. Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to
be taught.77
This theme regarding ‘teachers’ will be further explored in the following chapters.
The latter consideration above (ii), which pertains to the moral implications of the movement
from universal to particular, anticipates the decreasing ‘enforceability’ of universal moral
principles as they proceed to consider distant particular situations. There is often the tension
between moral principles vis-à-vis moral context where the emphasis on the former is viewed
as absolutism while the complete regard for the latter is considered a form of relativism.
Absolutism and relativism are the antithesis to creative imagination. Aquinas could have
envisioned via imagination that natural law would need to penetrate the various possible moral
scenarios for it to be apprehensible and efficacious. He could have imagined what it would
have been like if natural law were absolutised. He would have articulated this realisation in this
manner: “The practical reason…is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions
are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more
we descend to matter of details, the more frequently we encounter defects.”78
The descent into the particulars can be mirrored by looking into the structural dynamism of the
Aristotelian practical syllogism. In this analytical manner of representing human reasoning, the
middle or minor term, (a.k.a. conscientia), draws moral guidance from the major premise
(primary moral principles) in view of making a practical conclusion or judgment. It can be
observed that the function or role of the middle or minor term is intimately akin to the nature
and operation of the virtue of prudence. While the middle or minor term seeks moral guidance
from the major premise, it also analyses the moral context or situation in order to discern which
action is morally sound. Prudence does the same by studying given moral contexts and
applicable moral principles prior to making any judgment. It is within this dynamism that moral
imagination is outstandingly important since it operates by investigating creative possibilities
via compositio et divisio for a human act to be realised in the here and now while rightfully
considering the dictates of the primary moral principles. This provides clear evidence as to why
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moral imagination is, and should have been, considered as a necessary integral part of prudence
by Aquinas.
The discussion above necessitates the consideration of memory itself which is undoubtedly the
preferred source of knowledge for prudential moral inquiry over imagination. Aquinas states
this preference in this manner: “memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel
for the future.”79 He does, however, implicitly seem to be not wholly convinced about the
absolute reliability of memory. The Angelic Doctor, acknowledging the inherent limits to
cognition due to the corporeal nature of human beings, advocates the perfecting of one’s
memory. This observation is made explicit when he admits that “we remember better what we
saw when we were children.”80 It is in this respect that he recommends that human agents
“carefully consider and set in order”81 their memory, be “anxious and earnest about the
things…[they] wish to remember,”82 and to “often reflect on the things they wish to
remember”83 since memories are fleeting like human aging. This analysis presents another
argument as to why imagination should not have been overlooked considering that either
memory or imagination has natural flaws in them. These flaws, without a doubt, may
potentially influence the truth-reliability of whatever is sensed or imagined.
Considering further the above notion of prudential reasoning, if the infinite horizon of
intelligibility were to be esteemed by moral consciousness, there is clearly the need for an
imaginative exploration by both entities, i.e., major premise (primary moral principles) and
minor premise (moral context, prudential reasoning) in order to foster a dialogical movement
towards moral competence. In the wise words of Biss: “Moral imagination completes practical
reason by generating new possibilities for realising moral ends.” In addition, Mark Johnson,
offers this insight:
What is involved in moving rationally from the formulation of a
supreme moral principle to specifying particular imperatives as they
apply to the messy and intricate circumstances of our lives? …. My
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suggestion will be that the notion of rationality involved here must be
a very broad and rich one, involving imaginative processes.84
Hence, Johnson’s statement endorses what George has articulated in this regard: “Those who
are virtually devoid of imagination will have difficulty discovering anything.”85
Foraying into the disciplines of theology and psychology will be the task of the ensuing
chapter. It will delve into a comparative and analytical investigation between the thoughts of
Aquinas and the American professor of psychology, Darcia Narvaez, regarding their views on
intuition (synderesis), imagination, and ultimately, virtues and human flourishing. The
beneficence of moral imagination will be demonstrated to have scientific support which would
set in order the importance of virtue formation in the actuation of synderesis and the inchoative
moral development of the moral good in human agents.

Summary
The beneficence of moral imagination is proved by its efficiency in constructing imaginative
knowledge beyond sensitive knowledge. Imaginative knowledge offers wide-ranging
possibilities which provide the latitude for moral contexts and the universal moral principles to
dialogue and judiciously produce a course of action which is morally sound and perfective of
the human person. Creative imagination allows the human mind to step-in someone else’s
world to discover the first principles of natural law. To empathise with those who have already
experienced the moral good is an effective practical way of activating and stimulating the
primary moral principles in human agents. The advocacy for the inclusion of moral imagination
in prudential moral inquiry is therefore advanced on this basis.
By Aquinas’s definition, a prudent person is someone who is habitually disposed to grasp the
knowledge of the first principles of natural law and to act them out in the social environment.
Essentially crucial for the first moral principles to actualise and to develop, the habituation of
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prudence occasions the proper formation and information of moral imagination. Virtues form
human agents to be good persons and inform them how to live their lives as good persons.
Synderesis is correlative to virtues. Considered as practical reason by Aquinas himself,
synderesis determines and moves the will to its proper moral ends. This is accomplished by
moral virtues which operate through the human will. This highlights the metaphysical reality
that the act of synderesis does not end in the apprehension of the practical good (intuitive
actuation) but rather, it guides human agents further through the discovery of what the practical
good really means in actual life (cognitive procession).
This thesis speculates on the vital importance of phantasmal assimilation of raw moral
materials in view of the metaphysical and subconscious process of the intuitive apprehension
of the first principles of natural law. This is in view of the role of imagination in assisting the
human mind to be in possession of appropriate phantasms that bear the universal good and
particular good. These phantasms serve as epistemic materials for the human mind to consider
in understanding the terms in self-evident truths such as the first principles of natural law.
Imagination is posited as having a contributory factor in the creation and production of
phantasms to aid this understanding.
The academic interest in moral imagination is precipitated by the observable omission of the
interior sense of imagination by Aquinas in his consideration of prudential moral inquiry.
While the omission may be attributed to an inferior understanding of psychology and
neurobiology during medieval times, modern scientific research now ascertains the efficient
value of moral imagination in moral development. These discoveries will provide greater depth
in the human understanding of moral development as aided by moral imagination.
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Chapter 8
Synderesis and Psychology’s Global Ethical Mindsets

Introduction
In an interview published in the American magazine, The Saturday Evening Post, the German
theoretical physicist, Albert Einstein, said quite poetically: “I am enough of the artist to draw
freely upon my imagination. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is
limited. Imagination encircles the word.”1 For the uninformed, to attribute the revolutionary
scientific discovery of the theory of relativity to imagination seems utterly preposterous. But
the truth of the matter is: “Imagination is one of the most powerful tools we have at our
disposal. Without this ability to speculate about what might be, we would be imprisoned in a
world of fatalism waiting for whatever might befall us.”2
This chapter investigates the correlation between the minds of St. Thomas Aquinas and Darcia
Narvaez who both dealt with the concepts of intuition (synderesis), virtues and moral
imagination in their theological and psychological fields respectively. After carefully analysing
specific details of Narvaez’s evolutionary psychology, its main elements will be compared and
contrasted against Aquinas’s epistemological approach to synderesis. The discussion will
explore the scientific and psychological bases of how synderesis can be transformative and
generative in the lives of moral agents. Synderesis has the potential to transform human agents
when its inaugural actualisation is sustained by the acquisition of moral virtues. It is also
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George Sylvester Viereck, “What Life Means to Einstein,” The Saturday Evening Post, October 26, 1929, 117.
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generative in so far as it has the potential to effectuate moral development in human agency.
Its generative capacity encompasses the power to engender moral witnessing that can motivate
other people in the community, especially young children, to personally cultivate their natural
inclination to seek the good end and the end’s good. The final section under this chapter
highlights the correlation between synderesis and moral imagination. Moral imagination,
which is exercised via the intellectual and moral virtue of prudence, contributes to the
transformative and generative development of synderesis. Moral imagination has the potential
to transform moral reasoning and to generate moral judgments via creative imagination. By
and large, Aquinas’s epistemology (synderesis) and virtue ethics (moral development) are
generally substantiated by evolutionary psychology which, not only does it validate its content,
also “expand[s] and enrich[es] the horizons of reason.”3

St. Thomas Aquinas vis-à-vis Darcia Narvaez
Aquinas lucidly made it evident in the Prologue of his Summa theologiae that “to instruct
beginners…whatever belongs to the Christian religion”4 is his main reason for writing his
theological reflections on the sacred doctrine (de sacra doctrina). His belief is founded on the
doctrine of the necessity of humanity’s salvation which he considers to be “a teaching revealed
by God beyond the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated by human reason.”5
Differentiating it from practical or positive science, the Angelic Doctor maintains that sacred
doctrine is a speculative science which is “chiefly concerned with God.”6 Further specifying
the nature of theology, Aquinas asserts that sacred doctrine is “partly speculative and partly
practical…[which] transcends all others.”7 He explains this by stating that the sacred doctrine
“derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled…[since] this
science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while
other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp.”8
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Although Aquinas was speculatively explicating the contents of the sacred doctrine, he
nonetheless found it inevitable from time to time to particularly cite elements drawn from the
realms of the positive sciences. Among others, he postulated, for example, on the anatomical
position of the head for the purpose of imagination: “For man’s superior part, his head, is turned
towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior
world.”9
It is without doubt that scientific research, particularly in experimental psychology, has
progressed extensively and it would not be surprising at all if Aquinas’s medieval scientific
references would have already been regarded by these scientific disciplines as either unfounded
or obsolete. Needless to say, it ought to be stated that “Thomas Aquinas was first and always
a theologian – in the university, in the pulpit, and in his room writing.”10 Though he asserted
that the study of the sacred doctrine falls under the realm of speculative science, this needs to
be understood only in so far as theology requires philosophical evidence in articulating the
contents of the revealed faith.
In view of this, Denis Larrivee and Adriana Gini, after inquiring about the neuroscientific
significance of the Thomistic notion of habits, made this not-unexpected commentary:
“Aquinas’s observations, therefore, limited necessarily to those of whole systems, cannot be a
guide to particular empirical events that underline systems operations.”11 Viewing it from a
broader perspective, Miroslaw Mroz affirms the Thomistic conceptualisation of virtues which
he assesses as finding concordance with modern neuroscientific evaluations. He states:
“Thomas Aquinas was neither a physician nor a psychiatrist but against the background of his
teaching on virtues… he presents a certain mechanism of their formation or resistance in their
shaping which may serve as a foundation for a possible discussion on modern neurobiology.”12
Similarly, Giuseppe Butera recognises in Thomistic psychology the potential for cooperation
with neuro-treatment: “Aquinas’s philosophical psychology can serve as a theoretical
framework for CT [cognitive therapy]… since [it] provides a profound and cogent
philosophical framework for CT, which in turn is able to draw out much that is only implicit
9
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in Aquinas’s thought.”13 Clearly perceptive of Aquinas’s works as a faith-based endeavour,
Walter Freeman is objectively circumspect with his assessment: “While most of his work is
irrelevant to neuroscience, those parts in which he describes his ideas on phenomenology and
the functions of the body and brains in humans and animals are highly relevant.”14
The above analysis insinuates the academic limitation and inherent freedom that are necessary
for both theology and science to accomplish their specific objectives. The practical foresight
of Misiak and Staudt stands timeless in providing guidance to the rightful relationship between
theology and psychology:
When psychologists confine themselves to the study of human
behaviour, as it can be experimentally studied, they are merely
restricting their field of inquiry; they are not necessarily denying the
existence of the soul. They are simply not studying the soul. That is to
say, they are making a distinction between scientific psychology and
philosophical psychology, and they are electing the former as their
particular specialty and realm of investigation. One does not denounce
the biologist for not studying the soul when he busies himself with a
study of the body’s vital functions.15
In a more contemporary appropriation, Juan G. Roederer explains the possible cooperation
between faith and science:
Religious faith should recognise that one cannot challenge scientific
truth with ideas alone and that many more unforeseen natural
phenomena previously held world views may still be discovered.
Science, in turn, should recognise that there will always be people –
including scientists – who need religion for spiritual guidance and
comfort, and that there will always be questions regarding the “why of
things” to which the scientific method cannot provide answers.16
The question stemming from this implicit limitation and freedom is whether both theology and
psychology can each claim their absolute independence from each other while at the same time
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demonstrating amiable openness and honest objectivity and transparency in the pursuit of the
truth.
The following is an attempt to compare, and at times to incorporate, the research of
psychologist Darcia Narvaez with the work of Aquinas. This methodological approach is
underlined by Craig Steven Titus’s assessment of Thomism who said that: “Aquinas’s
approach to virtue and the Christian life continues to be studied [because]…. [h]is thought and
model of dialogue with the sciences offer a constructive contribution to a Christian perspective
on positive psychology.”17

Triune Ethics Theory
With a doctoral degree in educational psychology and cognitive science, the American
psychologist, Darcia Narvaez, proposes her Triune Ethics Theory (hereafter TET) to advance
psychological goals relative to moral development and moral reasoning. She bases her
assertions on three ‘evolutionary roots’ from which moral dispositions or motivations arise
expressive of their multi-faceted origins:
First are the brain strata that MacLean noted and related to different
global states…. Second, emotion and cognitive systems that have been
studied by affective neuroscientists map onto these different strata….
Third, the evolved developmental niche gives insight into human
nature… These evolutionary inheritances provide insight into the
neurobiological mechanisms for the ontology of different mindsets that
develop from optimal and suboptimal care.18
Generally considering the three ‘evolutionary roots’ mentioned above prior to their specific
and broader investigation below, Narvaez claims that human agents exhibit three global ethical
mindsets expressive of main behavioural motivations or orientations which are considered
biological inheritances emerging from human evolution over a period of time and “are
influenced by early care and social environments.”19 These global ethical mindsets, viz., the
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safety ethic, the engagement ethic, and the imagination ethic, are behaviourally demonstrated
or becomes an ethic when either of the dispositions or motivations are triggered and trump
other values to promote affordances that are descriptive and respective of each ethical type.
The type of ethic that is triggered by social experiences “emerges from the affective stance
underlying the ethic that imbues ongoing experience with a particular moral value.”20 Narvaez
presents the “emerging view…that character or personality is rooted in emotion systems shaped
by enactive interaction with the social world early in life.” Corollary to the evolutionary roots
mentioned above, Narvaez’s theory (also a meta-theory, i.e., a theory based on a theory)
delineates the following three goals in psychology:
First, it attempts to harvest critical findings from neurobiology,
affective neuroscience, and cognitive science and to integrate them into
moral psychology for the purpose of informing psychological research
on the moral life of persons…. Second, it seeks to explain differences
in moral functioning through a person by context interaction…. Third,
it suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral
development.21
These three goals in psychology point to Narvaez’s overarching objective in positing the TET:
to affirm the human “capacity for virtuous morality, which requires taking the path toward the
fulfilment of human essence, socially and personally.”22
With these three goals being made evident in the discussion below, it is important to state at
the outset that several elements in Narvaez’s theory intersect with the teachings of Aquinas
particularly on synderesis (intuition), vis imaginativa (moral imagination) and virtus (virtue
ethics). Not unexpectedly, there will be fundamental differences between the teachings of
Aquinas and Narvaez as determined by the specificity of their respective disciplines. As
Narvaez is theorising from the perspective of psychology, it would not be unpredictable that
the crucial doctrine which Aquinas vigorously defended, i.e., the immaterial soul, will be found
to be excluded. The focus of her scholarship is none other than the brain-body dyad, for that is
what is naturally expected to come out of a neuroscientific study of human behaviour and
relationship. It is, however, foreseeable that on account of her pedagogical framework and
affinity, that a recourse beyond the physical is tenable. The discussion below will demonstrate
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just how creative and imaginative Narvaez is in terms of opening the floodgates of the positive
sciences towards the realms of the spiritual and the supernatural.
Further, it also needs to be pointed out that the one thing that psychology, neuroscience and
neurobiology are particularly held to account for is their propensity towards physicalism.
Broadly, physicalism, as the name implies, regards physicality or materiality as the sole rational
explanation for earthly existence. In effect, it seeks to explain human existence via ascription
to atoms and molecules. It maintains that “[a]ll moral, emotional and religious experiences will
be explained eventually by the physical sciences.”23 Further, a type of physicalism denies the
existence of the human soul.24 These two aspects of physicalism are worth noting at this
juncture in view of the consideration below of the nature of evolutionary psychology that is
inspired by the Darwinian evolutionary theory: “This science considers how the biological
forces of genetics and neurotransmissions in the brain influence unconscious and conscious
intentions, and proposes that these features of biology undergo subtle but continuous change
through evolution.”25

Evolutionary Inheritances
Narvaez’s ‘evolutionary inheritance’ mentioned above refers to the scientific findings of Paul
D. MacLean who pioneered the Triune Brain Evolution postulating that: “Evidence based in
comparative anatomy, ontogeny, phylogeny, and palaeontology indicates that the human
forebrain has evolved and expanded to its great size, while retaining commonalities to reptiles,
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early mammals and late mammals.”26 The attribution of Triune is in respect to the three evolved
features relating to the ancestral origin of the modern human forebrain.
The forebrain is classified as the largest section of the brain which includes, among other subparts, the limbic system where the amygdala, which is responsible for emotions, is located. The
forebrain is also held to be responsible for cognitive complex activities such as memory and
imagination, motivation, consciousness, organisation of sensory information, decision-making
and learning. Though the theory of the Triune Brain Evolution has already been debunked
within the scientific world, Narvaez claims nonetheless that MacLean’s “theory does provide
a helpful understanding of global mindsets that can drive human behaviour.”27 In addition, she
claims that “many of our genes are shared with other animals.”28
Global moral mindsets are crucial to the understanding of the TET since brain functions
contribute to moral functioning. The theory maintains that emerging from behavioural actions
from each of the three global moral mindsets, an ethical orientation typical of each mindset is
observably generated. These global mindsets, representing basic moral orientations or
propensities, possess multiple subtypes which account for the multiple behavioural possibilities
an ethical mindset may effectuate.29 Thus, these tri-partite affective ethical mindsets – the
safety ethic, the engagement ethic, and the imagination ethic – are underscored by “shifting
moral mindsets emerging from the shifts in brain functions”30 and “are fostered by distinctive
early experience and general cultural milieu.”31 Both of these factors consequently mitigate
brain circuitry or neuronal activity which facilitates emerging dispositions expressive of these
three global moral mindsets.32
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Narvaez attests that global moral mindsets which originate from human evolution elicit certain
behavioural responses that have neurological bases. These global moral mindsets are held to
be evolved perceptual affordances that express certain types of moral action that are acted out
to meet the moral needs of human persons. Being evolutionary, these mindsets underscore the
various social contexts that have occurred and continue to persist through human history and
which have shaped and formed how human persons behave the way they do. This account for
the general inconsistencies in human behaviours which are due to the specific type of mindset
that is triggered.33
Narvaez’s TET is arguably unique among developmental theories in psychology in the sense
that it is an interdisciplinary approach covering theoretical and experimental research
particularly in psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, neurobiology.34 This piece of
information is crucial in understanding her theory where the evolutionary thrust is
unequivocally evident and comprehensively advanced. Being foundational to her evolutionary
pedagogy, Narvaez highlights the development of processes and systems which have
progressively formed over the course of human evolution.35 These processes and systems are
natural by-products of evolution and indicate the evolutionary footprints of evolved aspects of
human existence such as learning patterns and emotive behaviours. Within this scientific
framework, she introduces the Darwinian conclusion that moral sense is “the pinnacle of
human evolution.”36 This moral sense37 emerges as a behavioural disposition of human beings
to act out prosocial behaviours such as helping community members. Citing a text from Charles
Darwin’s The Descent of Man, Narvaez highlights the activity of “the social instincts [that]
33
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lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy
[sic] for them, and to perform various services for them.”38 Based on this observation, it follows
that Narvaez views moral development as an evolutionary path towards human flourishing, i.e.,
human behaviours have biological bases.
Connected to the global moral mindsets is the second ‘evolutionary inheritance’ which alludes
to the cognitive and emotive human attributes that underlie moral motivations or dispositions
emerging from global moral mindsets. Narvaez claims that the conceptualisation of ideas in
the human brain is not just simply the result of the social environment making an impression
on the human mind. Rather, her theory conceives of an embodied interplay of both external
and internal influences that catalyse human emotive and apprehensive reactions to trigger.
Internally, brain circuitry involving interconnected neurons fires up and transmits electrical
activity from one neuron to a network of neural circuits to facilitate endogenous cranial
processes via reception of electrochemical information. This brain circuitry is considered to be
the underlying neuroscientific rationale which brings about epistemic and emotive responses,
not excluding non-verbal responses which Narvaez considers as expressive of the human
capacity for intuition.39
In contrast to the emphasis of Aquinas on reason as the driving force behind human willing,
Narvaez claims a predominantly intuitive basis for human activity. She asserts that: “Recent
empirical findings across the behavioural sciences have thrown rationalism on the rocks,
indicating that conscious deliberate reasoning rarely directly guides moral decisions and
actions in the moment. Instead, implicit processes are now assumed to govern most decisions
and actions.”40 It is in this respect that Narvaez makes the following conclusion: “Morality is
influenced by all sorts of physiological systems, most of the time without our awareness. Their
misdevelopment influences moral conceptions and the types of societies we adults create.”41
Narvaez’s intuitionism will be discussed further below. Beyond rationalism, she claims that
the brain responds emotively and cognitively in different ways according to the “initial
template structure and a transforming plastic structure.”42 This observation is based on the
38
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study of neuroplasticity which propounds that the brain has an inherent neuronal capacity for
non-linear processes to occur. Brain functions are far from being exclusively predictable and
paradigmatic. The obvert differences in the moral behaviour of children brought up by the same
parents proves how brain circuitry is personal and embodied.
In the third of the ‘evolutionary inheritances,’ Narvaez conceptualises the so-called Evolved
Developmental Niche (hereafter EDN) as the archetype of the social environment that promotes
the fulfilment of the human essence. Narvaez claims that the ancestral communities called
small-band hunter-gatherers (hereafter SBHG) “encompassed 99 percent of human genus
existence”43 that resembles the typical lifestyle that engenders authentic human flourishing.
She considers these nomadic foraging ancestral communities as the normative lifestyle on earth
for over “thirty million years of social and human mammalian development”44 which
engendered a lifestyle that is characterised by a “mindful morality…[which] involves ‘full
beingness with others’…that promotes flourishing in the broadest sense.”45 The EDN also
reflects the optimal ancestral caregiving practices for the young children of the SBHG
communities that include, but not limited to, the following: “responsiveness to child needs,
natural childbirth, two to five years of breastfeeding, frequent and pervasive positive touch,
extensive free play, multiple adult caregivers, and positive social climate and support.”46
Narvaez conceives of moral development along the lines of baseline virtues that the SBHG’s47
lifestyle whose nomadic foraging communities around the world lived “peacefully and happily
in a companionship culture of shared activities.”48
Narvaez contends that the present-day lifestyles are species-atypical as they fail to represent
the species-typical behaviours that are expressive of the SBHG’s ancestral lifestyle.49 She lists
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a roster of factors50 that support her observations and research that “many humans have become
oriented to self-focused values and behaviours such as tribalism and hierarchy, hoarding and
ecological mindlessness.”51 Narvaez believes that: “Humans are not who they used to be.
People seem to be getting less social, and less socially capable, even though sociality is a key
component of human adaptation.”52
Analysing the evolutionary trajectory, Narvaez has taken note of how far human beings have
departed from the primordial moral sense of the ancestral lifestyle which ancestors have
inculcated in themselves. She believes that the “substantial mismatch between our
contemporary society and the conditions under which the genus Homo has evolved”53 has
increasingly retarded the moral development of the human species. This statement observably
serves as the overarching premise upon which Narvaez postulates for a “return to humanity’s
moral heritages.”54 This is in view of re-securing for the present generation and beyond the
positive effects of moral development that promote genuine human flourishing. Narvaez
proposes practical virtuous ways of dealing with this mismatch in order that human beings of
today may reach their potential as human beings.

The Tri-partite Global Ethical Mindsets
Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory is indubitably revolutionary and on the cutting-edge of
recent advances in developmental psychology. Apart from her attestation that “the dominance
of reasoning in behaviour is undermined by empirical evidence showing that much of
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anxiety and depression are at epidemic levels for all age groups; the percentage of young children with
psychosocial problems and the percentage of young children on psychotropic medication have risen
dramatically; one out of every five children has diagnosable psychiatric disorder, and one out of every 10 suffers
from a mental illness severe enough to impair everyday living.”
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behaviour is initiated before conscious thought or decision,”55 Narvaez also insists that
“[r]esearch shows a complex interaction between genetic vulnerability and environmental
effects, favouring the power of experience.”56 She professes further that human behavioural
manifestations are not merely genetically determined, but also, social experiences account for
and contribute towards the formation of human character. She regards the nature versus nurture
argument as a false dichotomy since both nature (genes) and nurture (social experiences)
influence moral development.57 The global moral mindsets of safety, engagement and
imagination emerge from these interactions which indicate depth of moral development, or
lack thereof, of any human agent. When human agents receive proper care specifically during
their early childhood years expressive of the EDN, they either demonstrate or are on way to
experiencing the fullness of the human essence.
The following sub-sections will now describe the three global ethical mindsets of the Triune
Ethics Theory, viz., the Ethic of Safety, the Ethic of Engagement, and the Ethic of Imagination.

The Ethic of Safety
The safety ethic mindset is triggered in response to perceived threats to the self or the ego. A
global moral mindset shared by all animals, it depicts the “instincts for survival.”58 It is held to
have evolved out of the limbic system of reptiles that instinctively sends an alert signal when
they are in danger. In modern neurobiology, this is determined to be located in the human brain
stem and the lower limbic system. Generally, the emotive-cognitive response is one of either
fight or flight. When the behavioural response to a certain stimulus is directed by the safety
ethic, the protection of one’s well-being is pursued (hence, self-protectionism or selfpreservation). When a surfer is under attack by a great white shark, the flight response is most
likely initiated obviously for personal safety reason. However, the fight response, where
possible, could also be initiated when the only course of action available is to ward off the great
white shark by punching it or pushing it away. This response becomes a moral decision when,

55

Narvaez, “The Emotional Foundations of High Moral Intelligence,” 78.
Narvaez, Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality, 20.
57
Narvaez, Neurobiology and the Development of Human Morality, 20.
58
Narvaez, “The Co-Construction of Virtue,” 259.
56

185

for example, one is publicly accused of being deceitful. The accused could either fight the
accuser or take flight and perhaps avoid any escalation of the situation.
Human instinctive responses to social triggers may also necessarily fall within the moral
purview. In the face of moral situations or dilemma, a moral agent’s experience of the primary
moral principles should mitigate the kind of moral response that is acted out. If a moral agent
has particularly habituated the virtue of prudence, moral situations will be instantaneously
analysed by taking counsel from the dictates of the first principles of moral action. Stored
memories and creative imaginative production of past moral situations will assist the moral
agent reach a personal judicial response. A prudent teenager will self-restrain from physically
retaliating after being smacked from behind by his or her parents. Likewise, a prudent wife or
husband will not recourse to ‘revenge porn’ after discovering her husband’s or his wife’s
infidelity. These examples underline the importance of experience, time and duration in the
intuitive apprehension of the first principles of moral action. Should access to the primary
principles be momentarily absent (due to passion) or have failed to develop (due to ignorance
or a weak will) from a young age, the appropriate moral response is expected to be
compromised or vitiated. Narvaez is forthright in stating in this respect that: “How well needs
are met, especially in the early life, plays a large role in the shaping of neurobiology,
personality, and morality.”59 As will be revealed by its connection to the other global mindsets,
safety ethic’s generic response of either fight or flight is relative to and dependent upon the
kind of moral development, or lack thereof, of young children. When habituated, the safety
ethic could morph and polarise to either withdrawal or aggression. In principle, this
conceptualisation is intimately linked to the Thomistic notion of virtues where the habituation
of virtues promotes self-fulfilment and self-perfection. Inversely, when evil or immoral acts
are persistently habituated, they could turn into vices, e.g., white lies becoming a pathology
(mythomania, psuedologia fantastica). Prudence, in the face of perceived physical assault,
assists on inquiring about which course of moral action to take: fight (aggression) or flight
(self-preservation). Imprudence, on the other hand, does consider fight and flight, too, with
little or without recourse to any moral inquiry.
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The Ethic of Engagement
The second ethical mindset is the engagement ethic which evolved out of the paleomammalian
brain where the emotions are located. The amygdala is considered to be the seat of human
emotions located in the temporal lobe of the forebrain. This moral mindset generates intimate
and emotional relationship with people brought about by an optimal environment marked by
social caring and human bonding. The engagement ethic is particularly crucial in the early
years of a child’s human and moral development where prosocial activities which engender
cooperation and social competence60 are introduced to foment supporting relationships. A child
of early years who lacks proper care from parents and grows in a nonoptimal environment
where there is distrust and enmity will, instead of engaging, disengage relationally from people.
When the engagement ethic is triggered at a young age and honed through the moral
development of a young child, the values of compassion, openness and tolerance are
facilitated.61 Applying the Triune Ethics Theory in moral development, Daniel Fleming and
Thomas Ryan underline the important role of emotions in motivating and directing specific
values that shape human behaviour.62 Further, echoing Narvaez’s stress of the role of emotion
in the development of innate moral knowledge, they assert that “moral motivation rests at the
level of affectivity, not rationality.”63 Narvaez claims that, as opposed to safety ethic, the
engagement ethic is not innate but developmental, being primed by an optimal environment
and supportive care nurturers.64 Further, she considers Darwin’s consideration of the moral
sense as being underpinned by the engagement ethic.65
The safety ethic and the engagement ethic combined can be observed as being broadly related
to the intuitive actuation and pre-cognitive procession by synderesis mentioned earlier
respectively. Analytically, the self-preservation (flight) in the safety ethic can be construed as
a way of acquiescing to the primordial good apprehended by synderesis. When moral agents
follow their moral intuition, they manifest their desire to preserve the primordial good that
ontologically orients all human persons to God. To depart from the primary moral principles
(fight and, in some sense, flight) is to destroy, instead of actively preserving, what naturally
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constitutes the human person. Further, the ethics of safety, when assisted to develop into an
ethic of engagement, develops into virtues which are perfective of the human person. Positive
inter-personal human engagements, e.g., parent-child relationship, loving one’s neighbour and
enemies, foment the primordial orientation of moral agents towards the good enhancing their
ontological good-ness and making their actions morally good. It needs to be stated that though
comparison may be drawn between the first principles of moral action and the ethics of safety,
metaphysically speaking, the former precedes the latter. It is only because of the assumption
that all human beings are created good that the first principles of natural law admit no
exceptions. The reality, however, situates all human persons as almost always being
fundamental confronted by good and evil tendencies. It is in this respect that opportunities for
moral development must be introduced to the lives of young children if maturated growth is
truly envisaged.

The Ethic of Imagination
Considered as the most recently evolved of the three mindsets is the imagination ethic. This
mindset is thought to have evolved out of the neomammalian brain of modern primates which,
in modern man and woman, is located in the frontal lobe of the forebrain. This mindset enables
the human person “to abstract from present moment and consider alternatives.”66 It allows for
creativity and ingenuity in navigating relationships via the generation of adaptive skills and
foresights which attend to concerns beyond the present. It is also via the imagination ethic that
the coordination of instincts, intuitions and principles are located.67 Moreover, Narvaez claims
that: “Imagination comprises executive functions that include metacognition about morality.”68
This observation underscores the human capacity of all human agents to self-reflect on their
actions as either good or bad. These therefore establish the environmental foundations for
imagination to consider the contingencies of human situations and varying social factors that
impinge on moral behaviours. It is within these realms where prudence and practical reason
are considered and could potentially flourish when provided with proper nurturing and care.
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Narvaez differentiates two types of sub-mindsets under this heading: “When coupled with a
prosocial orientation and using humanity’s fullest reasoning capacities, it reflects a communal
imagination. When it is coupled with the threat-oriented emotions of the security ethic, a
vicious imagination results.”69 She later added a third one, the detached imagination, which,
as the name suggests, is disconnected or disengaged from emotional connection.70 That said,
these sub-mindsets reflect their possible propensities when they are either supported or not
during the early years of a child’s rearing. The theme of imagination ethic will be further
developed in the ensuing discussion.
Narvaez declares that: “Everyone has morality – that is, everyone aims for what she perceives
to be good in the moment.”71 Owing to evolutionary determinations, the three-mindset ethics
are within the disposable of almost everyone during their lifespan. Depending on the stimuli,
the appropriate affected ethical mindset responds emotive-cognitively and may necessarily
involve all other different ethics and their sub-types at varying degrees of intensity. Narvaez
contends that the default ethic is the safety ethic where the human agency’s personal and
immediate affective-moral disposition is that of self-preservation.72 She maintains, however,
that “when we remain in a safety ethic, even when we know better, when we nurse it and
knowingly use imagination for safety ends, we cease being a human self to others.”73 The
habituation in an ethics of safety may also possibly translate into selfishness, passivity,
dissociation, or defensive action during occasions when the ego is under pressure or attacked.
The negative effects of a traumatised early childhood characterised by the negation of the EDN
may necessarily contribute to the demise of the reality of self-fulfilment which the ethical
mindsets can be poised to attain.74 Be that as it may, when basic human needs that foment
human flourishing are attended to during a human person’s lifespan, particularly during the
early childhood years, the ethics of engagement and imagination become the moral motivation
or disposition that engenders the “normative human telos”75 according to Narvaez.
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Of the three brain moral mindsets, the imagination ethics is of specific concern in this chapter
owing to its potential correlative value to the Thomistic notion of moral imagination. The
ensuing discussion below will highlight this potential. The question on a possible correlation
between Triune Ethics Theory and Aquinas’s lex naturalis (and synderesis) will be investigated
in the following chapters.

Thomistic Synderesis vis-à-vis Narvaez’s Empirical Moral Intuition
An important element in human flourishing is moral functioning. Narvaez claims that “both
intuition and reasoning are integrated into the realms of moral functioning.”76 Specifically,
Narvaez’s intuitionism, categorised as a form of empirical moral psychology,77 is analysed
herein against the theological notion of intuitionism as propounded by Aquinas in his
presentation of his doctrine on synderesis. This is carried out in view of determining the
possibility of a neurological basis for intuition and how it can temporally influence moral
functioning (virtue habituation). Pivotal to the critical analysis of Narvaez’s concept of
intuition, the following section will analyse two Thomistic realities germane to synderesis: (1)
synderesis by nature is innate, and (2) synderesis appoints the ends to moral virtues.

Synderesis by Nature is Innate
Aquinas maintains that synderesis is innate. There exists in every created being a natural
habitual disposition called an inner sense or the law of our mind which equips moral agency
with the disposition of doing good and the avoidance of evil. It is doctrinally held that
synderesis is divinely implanted to sustain the implicit ordering of moral agency towards God.
Explicitly, virtues assist in this respect by formally integrating material contents to synderesis
via interaction with the environment without which, it remains unrecognisable by the human
intellect.
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Limited by the purview of her research, Narvaez does not seem to extend her conceptualisation
of intuition beyond its neurological basis. She explains at length:
We know now that neither moral reasoning nor moral intuition is set in
stone but that each is cultivated within the dynamic interplay among
the developing organism; environment; and the time, duration, and
intensity of interaction. If moral reasoning and intuitions are not innate
blueprints but are artifacts that are shaped and moulded by culture and
experience, normative questions become of utmost importance.78
While Narvaez treats intuition extensively, it is apparent from the above quote that her
conceptualisation of intuition is incompatible with the Thomistic notion of synderesis from the
fundamental perspective of its origin. As earlier mentioned, Aquinas’s synderesis is of divine
origin while Narvaez’s intuition is dynamically cultivated. However, the epistemology
underlying its operation appears to be intimately similar. Recalling the discussion on ‘selfevident principles’ relating to the knowledge of the first principles of natural law, this suggests
that data from the social environment is part and parcel of the knowledge of the universal moral
principles. This evidently relates to the reference to artifacts in the above text. Narvaez’s
temporal-based intuition scientifically grounds Aquinas’s assertion that knowledge
apprehended by synderesis necessitates epistemic materials from extramental realities.
Having already affirmed that the origin of Narvaez’s intuition is temporal as opposed to
synderesis being divinely implanted, she posits that “most of what we learn and know is
tacit.”79 Thereto, she describes intuition as “that feeling of knowing without explanation.”80 In
the two synderetic moments mentioned earlier, i.e., intuitive actuation and pre-cognitive
procession, Narvaez’s intuitionism dimly alludes to both processes although with the exclusion
of the element of illumination that is enacted by the intellectus agens. Evidently, TET does not
express the full Thomistic notion of synderesis since, having no divine origin as the ultimate
source of its existence, Narvaez’s intuition is
formed from unarticulated person-environment exchanges that occur
implicitly between environment stimulation and the individual’s
phenomenological experience…. The tacit system operates with little
effort or deliberation, often without conscious awareness, according to
78
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“nonintentional, automatic acquisition of knowledge about structural
relations between objects or events.”81
This elaboration purports remotely the nature of synderesis conceived as an inner sense which
intuitively makes the human person desire the good without investigation. Likewise, synderesis
construed as the law of our mind may be intimately linked to an implicit moral disposition
towards the good since “individuals have moral knowledge more than they can express.”82 As
pointed out earlier, Narvaez accommodates the scientific observation of the existence of nonverbalised knowledge which she claims to be the basis of most human intellection.83 Her claim
seems to find evidence in the human experience of knowing that ‘I have a heart that keeps me
alive’ yet ‘I don’t know how my heart does it.’

Synderesis Appoints the End to Moral Virtues
Moral ends are pre-determined by synderesis serving as practical reason which habitually
disposes the human person towards the first principles of natural law. Morally self-evident, if
good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided, moral ends are consequently achieved.
Referring to the earlier-discussed synderetic metaphysical moments, this denotes the precognitive procession that inchoately advances the knowledge of the first principles of natural
law. The enfleshing, as it were, of the knowledge of the first principles of moral action takes
on a journey which involves repeated ontological events of conversio ad phantasmata, some
of which take place instantaneously while others a lifetime.
On account of the evolved global mindsets where ethical propensities are real possibilities
under optimal conditions, Narvaez confidently bases, and thereby presupposes, the reality of
intuition or tacit knowledge in moral development. This aligns somehow with the role of
synderesis in determining the ends of moral virtues. Recalling the thoughts of Aquinas,
synderesis, since it bears the knowledge of the universal principles, points the moral virtues to
their appropriate ends. Global brain states somehow do the same pointing when SBHG’s
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ancestral lifestyles are introduced resembling optimal conditions favourable to human
flourishing.
The strength of the arguments above admittedly misses the mark when viewed from the
theological perspective. Without the categorisation of the origin of synderesis as emanating
from God, intuition may probably succumb to what Narvaez refers to as truthiness – “the
attachment to one’s opinions because they ‘feel right.’”84 The role of the intellectus agens in
illuminating human reason is beyond merely emotional. Rather, it turns human reason to the
mind of God to receive knowledge in the way angels receive them directly from God. As
discussed earlier, scientific conceptualisations would not be unexpectedly limited to the
physical realm since it maintains the positive sciences as its province. However, to
imaginatively cross the infinite horizon of intelligibility and to subsequently postulate a
scientific proposition that admits the assumption of a supernatural deity may not necessarily be
unexpected on the basis of the self-evidence of the truth in any given scientific research
outcome.
Evident in Narvaez’s theory is the pointer towards moral functioning via virtue habituation.
Though for a while it portrays the exclusive involvement of human temporal faculties, she has,
in fact, underlined a far deeper grounding for these ethical dispositions to materialise. In
discussing pathways to wisdom in her award-winning publication, Neurobiology and the
Development of Human Morality, Narvaez spoke of the human capacity for transcendence:
At the highest levels of practice, the individual becomes a cocreator. In
fact, this is what the world “theology” meant. Theology is not talking
about God in linear, rational discourse but actually about participating
in the logos (or creative intelligence) of theo (God) as it shapes itself
into new forms through unitive seeing, a timeless creativity.85
Without a doubt, the transcendental characterisation of the search for wisdom alluded to in the
above quote elucidates perfectly, albeit implicitly, the essence of synderesis. Narvaez, imputing
perhaps an original conceptualisation, purports the neurobiological assignation of synderesis
as a participation in the creative intelligence without articulating the term itself. The depiction
is sound and sensible since, being an articulation from the neurobiological perspective, the
quest for the truth (wisdom) points to the physical intuitive intelligence reaching out to the
84
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metaphysical creative intelligence. This, in effect, is the surreal marriage between theology and
science: the human mind intuiting the mind of God who in turn illumines the human mind with
eternal wisdom.

Thomistic Imagination vis-à-vis Narvaez’s Ethic of Imagination
The arguments previously proposed for the inclusion of moral imagination as one of the quasiintegral parts of prudence rest on the importance of its capacity to provide the all-important
information required in prudential moral inquiry. It was earlier argued that moral imagination
engenders the contemplation of various situations and options that are required for prudence to
make a reasonable judgment and command. The virtue of prudence therefore operates naturally
by inquiring about universal moral principles and particular situations before making a
conclusive judgment. Prudence is able to undertake moral deliberation owing to the capacity
of imagination to compose and divide (compositio et divisio) phantasms of sensible objects that
allow broader and deeper insights into realities and possibilities that can be mentally produced
as images. Images of possible scenarios that have never been conceived before are all
conceivable for as long as previously conceived sensible species exist as phantasms in the vis
imaginativa and in the vis memorativa. This is essentially the creative imagination that Aquinas
alludes to in his discussion of the interior sensoria.
The argument for inclusion of moral imagination should be further bolstered by the following
investigation into its neuroscientific basis as well its neurobiological foundation.
Narvaez explicates that as one of the evolved global brain states, the imagination ethic is able
to “to sort out multiple elements involved in moral decision-making and action in particular
situation.”86 Implicit in this statement is the extent of the landscape which the moral
imagination has to deal with in order to produce the fruits of good decision-making. This points
congruently to the fact that “moral functioning is dynamic and shifting moment to moment.”87
It is in this light that Daniel Fleming and Terence Lovat underscore the ethics of imagination
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in fostering the “vision of dialogue”88 in fostering interreligious relationship in the midst of
differing worldviews. Imagination engenders dynamism that creates possibilities for
congruence never envisaged before. Analysing this statement further, Narvaez contends that
“experience and the shifting social environments induce epigenetic changes and
reorganisations of the brain/mind during development.”89 This concept is evidently traceable
within the evolutionary process. Mind functioning is non-linear, and so is the social
environment. The evolution of the brain presupposes shifts that necessarily require adaptative
responses for “self-preservation, affiliation and reflection.”90 For Thomism and the TET, it is
during everyday shifting moments that imagination is most useful and vital to moral
functioning. Though the extramental world is forever in a flux, human imagination is able to
capture moments of perceived never-ending movements and represent them via imagery in the
human mind, albeit these movements have receded into the past.
On account of shifting social and moral conditions, Narvaez acknowledges the inherited
evolutionary role of imagination in facilitating moral functioning. She firmly advocates that
“nothing makes sense in moral development outside of evolutionary systems, specifically,
evolutionary developmental systems.”91 Being a given evolved function of the imagination
ethic, moral imagination enhances moral development through its specific contribution to the
acquisition of knowledge needed to succeed in a particular environment.92 Evolutionary
responses to shifts involve both the body and brain. Studies in neurobiology have been able to
confirm that “front lobes are critical in situations of free choice or situations of
ambiguity…since [its prefrontal cortex] is the only part of the brain capable of integrating
information from the outside the world with information internal to the organism itself.”93 This
modern scientific delineation of the function of the frontal lobe provides neurobiological
evidence to the function of the medieval interior sensoria. Moreover, it confirms a number of
Thomistic propositions which have been earlier raised.
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Imagination Ethic Affirms Sensitive Empiricism
On the scientific basis of the frontal lobes’ capacity to integrate information from the outside
to information that is held internally, this discovery fundamentally substantiates the empirical
nature of the Thomistic epistemology. With respect to the medieval understanding of the
interior sensoria, this sheds light upon the integrative function of the Thomistic common sense
in determining the particularity of sensible species. Moreover, it maintains hold of the species’
commonality under the one and the same sensed object. Aquinas is therefore accurate in his
philosophical observation that psychology is never isolated from sociology.94 Intellections
generally begin in the sense that act as the initial point of contact between the human agent and
the social environment. This manner of philosophical thinking is evident in the consideration
of the association between the imagination ethic and the engagement ethic. Through this
linkage, Narvaez is able to formulate the concept of communal imagination.
Narvaez formulates the connectivity between the imagination ethic and the engagement ethic
in view of the ethic of engagement’s indispensable connection with the social environment.
She claims in fact that “the Ethic of Imagination coordinates the older parts of the brain using
humanity’s fullest reasoning capacities to adapt to ongoing social relationship and to address
concerns beyond the immediate.”95 Underlying this is her belief that “[h]umans are at their
most moral…when the Ethic of Engagement is linked with the Ethic of Imagination.”96 As the
latter brings about face-to-face social interactions, the imagination ethic enhances possibilities
on living in communion with others. Hence, the socially engaged imagination is referred to by
Narvaez as communal imagination which is
grounded in embodied social experience that establishes a sense of the
limits but also the promise of humanness. Communal imagination does
not mean “making things us,” but seeing what is true and that which
may not be manifest. It means understanding that experience and mind
and linked – that human agency is not an insertion of “will” into an
animal body, but a collaborative movement in relationship. It
understands that morality is integrated into one’s being and into one’s
relationship as they occur, instead of adopted as a separate, intellectual
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code of ethics. The capacities of engagement ethic…are extended into
communal imagination as a framing for relationship and for being.97
The interrelation between human agency and the social environment is one reality that is well
pronounced both in virtue embodiment and in moral functioning. This will become clearer
when moral functioning is discussed in relation to virtues in the next section.

Imagination Ethic Affirms Intuitive Knowledge
Moral imagination possesses the capacity to provide images of the social environment even
when it is absent or not visibly present before the human eyes. Bearing in mind the implications
of its inevitable state of shifting, this capacity is most beneficial in discerning the moral
framework and moral ground of a situation under moral consideration. In addition, these
shifting social environments and situations do not just require immediate socio-cognitive
interpretation and discernment, but reciprocally, it forces human agency to ‘shift gears,’ as it
were, to actuate appropriate emotional and intellective responses given the observable
changing environmental states. Sensible knowledge, including perceptible shifts impinging on
the exterior senses, is essential in the imaginative process. Patience, however, may be required
in this endeavour since apprehended knowledge is “accumulated slowly and with repeated
experience (but also sometimes after only one impressive exposure) whereby associations of
simultaneously experienced stimuli are retained largely unconsciously and expressed primarily
nonverbally.”98 This configuration expresses the Thomistic imaginative acts of composition
and division alluded to earlier.
It was intimated earlier that intuition is located in the ethic of imagination. This should not
come as a surprise since apprehended knowledge, where imagination and sense are constitutive
of its cognition, is operationally governed by both intuition and reasoning. Considering the
relation between intuition and reason, “[d]eliberation allows one to assess the signals of
intuition and the construction of reasons and to scrutinise their validity. Reason assesses the
rationale behind instinctive attitudes, whereas intuition evaluate signals for reasoning’s
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products.”99 Moreover, it is only logical that as imagination deals with shifting social
environments, intuition’s malleability should be a perfect complement. Narvaez believes that
it is the case since “[m]oral intuitions are malleable under the right circumstances and with the
appropriate guidance. New information can change cause-consequence chains of reasoning that
undergird an intuition, leading to a different intuition.”100 For example, some pro-choice
advocates of abortion have had a change of heart when they were shown the video of how an
unborn foetus was pushing away the surgical forceps which were surgically trying to terminate
the pregnancy. Following on, it should be pointed out here again that intuition is empiricallybased according to the mind of Narvaez and is non-verbal in many of its projection. Tacit
knowledge or intuition may be analogous to knowing how to send text messages yet one does
not how the mobile phone does it.
Acknowledging the frontal lobe of the brain as the location of the imagination ethics, Narvaez
advances the scientific observation that “[t]he frontal lobes are considered the pinnacle of
human evolution. They are the source of our deliberative thinking, which includes much more
than rational thought in the traditional sense.”101 Pre-supposed in this statement are other
functions of moral imagination already intimated in the above discussion such as creative
imagination, perspective thinking and planning into the future.102 These three functions, among
others, certainly express a connection with Thomistic imagination. It is interesting to recall that
these descriptions resonate the earlier attribution to imagination as a play of thoughts and
suspension of judgment. The confirmation of the frontal lobe’s capacity for imaginative moral
thinking substantiates a solid argument for moral imagination’s consideration as a veritable
source of information for prudential moral inquiry. Without access to the capacity ‘to see
beyond the now’ (foresight) and ‘to be in some else’s shoes’ (empathy, perspective-taking),
prudential judgment will be like walking blindfolded in the dark. Through imagination, one
gains moral vision in the midst of life’s darkness and moral certainty beyond life’s ambiguities.
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Imagination Ethic Affirms Imaginative Discernment
Immediately related to the above, moral perception and cognition are not merely based on sense
but also on moral imagination. In situations of free choice or situations of ambiguity, moral
imagination is able to discern the appropriate course of response via composition and division
of images, from both current and previously cognised forms or ideas. This observation is
obviously stated in Thomistic language. The ability to be perceptive and sensitive to what moral
conditions dictate is evidently a capacity which moral imagination is able to foster. Narvaez
provides an explanation for this: “moral imagination requires being sensitive to the morallyrelevant aspects of situation, envisioning different alternatives for action, and thinking about
the ramifications of an action for people involved.”103 This capacity for imagination is relevant
specifically to the consideration of prudence since it attempts to open up possibilities as either
reflections on past experiences or those of which have been generated artificially by creative
imagination.
As earlier described, one of the benefits of communal imagination is the possibility to explore
someone else’s state of mind. This imaginative exercise, empowered by the imaginative
capacity for abstraction and freedom from time constraints, allows human agency to empathise
with others. Empathy moves the human agency to seek the welfare of others. Along this line,
Narvaez mindfully states that:
Failure to help others commonly occurs because empathy is not
engaged [since]…[f]or individuals who do not imaginatively regulate
and heighten their emotional response adaptively, ‘sympathy is easily
aroused but quickly forgotten.’104
Moreover, communal imagination which fosters empathy is adopting a ‘heart’ view by
allowing oneself to be connected to others not intellectually but on an emotional level.105
Empathy engages moral imagination to “step outside of the usual boxes of habit or intellectual
detachment”106 in order to experience the freedom of choice to emotionally relate to others and
to liberate oneself from the baggage of uncertainty which can cripple the brain or the mind
from empathising with others. Certainly, prudence would be better off if an imaginative inquiry
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is accommodated to allow the mind to represent itself in someone else’s shoes and to feel what
it is like from the perspective of another person. Biblically, Christ often incited his listeners to
be intuitively imaginative: “but whoever wishes to be great among you must be your
servant.”107
Moral imagination’s capacity to operate in situation of free choice or situation of ambiguity is
owed specifically to the “ability of the frontal lobe structures to elaborate on the external world
[which] increases problem-solving and learning capabilities.”108 According to Narvaez, one of
the indicators of a mature moral functioning is “the employment of moral imagination, taking
time to deliberate when appropriate while being aware of the fallibilities of both intuition and
reason.”109 Once again, this credibly links moral imagination with prudential moral inquiry.
Taking time is to the advantage of prudential moral inquiry since it allows more insights and
broader perspectives in view of gaining sufficient moral knowledge prior to prudential
judgment and command. Practising the virtue of prudence is like buying time or haggling
before buying in order to gain moral reasoning that is critical for discovering the truth.

Thomistic Virtue and Narvaez’s Virtue Embodiment
The theological paradigm, exitus-reditus, attributed to the soteriological theme of Aquinas’s
Summa theologiae, finds resonance in Narvaez’s TET. Narvaez has definitely heard of the
medieval saint as evidenced by her scant references to his thoughts in a few of her many
publications110 and the specific use of the Thomistic conception of virtues111 which she refers
to almost always in concomitant with Aristotle. Narvaez’s moral empirical psychology appears
to be more particularly aligned with Aristotelianism, most notably her empirically-based ideas
on intuition and human flourishing (virtue). Regarding intuition, Narvaez claims that “[t]he
Aristotelian emphasis on intuition development evident in traditional character education is
more empirically aligned with everyday human behaviour.”112 On the other hand, her views on
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human flourishing see her affirming the western philosophy of Aristotle: “As Aristotle pointed
out, human flourishing necessarily includes individuals and communities, a perspective
corroborated by the biological and social sciences.”113 Empiricism which is closely linked to
TET’s proposition on everyday morality is apparently the underlying principle governing the
positive sciences.
The seeming intimacy of Narvaez’s work with Aristotelianism should not be considered as a
hindrance in explicating her thematic parallelism with Thomism, particularly her view on
elevating human nature to what it can potentially achieve. The theme of transgression to
redemption is implicit in the TET’s evolutionary conceptualisation of the theme, mismatch to
human flourishing. The theme of transgression biblically refers to the infraction committed by
Adam and Eve when they ate the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden. Their disobedience
merited their banishment from the so-called Paradise by God’s command.114 Narvaez, on the
other hand, conceives of the theme of the mismatch on the basis of the scientifically-based
discrepancy between the life of SBHG ancestral communities and today’s generation. The
extent of the mismatch is at the grandest scale:
The human genus spent 99 percent of its existence in a lifestyle that is
egalitarian, emphasising individual autonomy, immersed in nearly
constant pleasurable social activity – whether gathering, hunting, social
leisure, or sleeping, attending primarily to the here and now with
minimal possessions or planning for the distant future. So different
from the modern Western context, it is not surprising that the two
environments foster different moral personalities.115
The effect of the Adam and Eve’s disobedience also had had a punitive effect on future
generations through the inheritance of original sin:
And to Adam he said,
“Because you have listened to the voice of your wife,
and have eaten of the tree
about which I commanded you,
‘You shall not eat of it,’
cursed is the ground because of you;
in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life;
thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you;
113
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and you shall eat the plants of the field.
By the sweat of your face
you shall eat bread
until you return to the ground,
for out of it you were taken;
you are dust,
And unto dust you shall return.”116
Both themes of transgression and mismatch underline a compelling need and an expedient
thrust towards a return to former glory: the return of humanity’s sinful state to the redeeming
grace of God according to the mind of Aquinas117 and the return to humanity’s moral heritages
represented by the ancestral lifestyle of the SBHG communities in the evolutionary psychology
of Narvaez.118 Under both perspectives, every human agent must personally commit to the
co-construction of global humanity. If redemption is humanity’s goal for Aquinas, human
flourishing is for Narvaez. To reach the end, both Aquinas and Narvaez have an almost
identical proposition – the path of virtues.
The concept of virtue is espoused by Aquinas and Narvaez on varying degrees. However,
because of their dissimilarity in the contextualisation of human nature, their ultimate goals are
evidently different, so it seems. If we take Narvaez to be confined by her scientific
commitment, then, the ultimate end for her would be human flourishing achieved via virtue
embodiment. However, if we subscribe to her openness to the pathway to wisdom or what she
refers to as the goals for a deeper conscience, then, her virtue embodiment would be akin to
Aquinas, and such virtue embodiment would be their ultimate end. For Narvaez, the pathway
to wisdom is
to apprehend the truth by bringing into alignment the three centres
(intellect, body, and emotion). The aim is not so much to experience a
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mystical vision but seeing reality in a lucid and objective manner that,
in contrast to the ordinary way of seeing, seems visionary.119
Somewhere in her description, a Thomistic undertone is present most specially when Aquinas’s
explanation of Whether God is Truth? in the Prima pars of the Summa theologiae is considered:
Truth is found in the intellect as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in
things according as they have been conformable to an intellect. This is
to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only
conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His
act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and
of every other intellect, and he Himself is His own existence and act of
understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that
He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.120
There is no attempt here to commit the academic sin of unwarranted doctrinal imputation, but
rather, the least that can be proposed is the discovery of the connection between Aquinas and
Narvaez. It may appear that what can be at least proposed is to state that Narvaez has taken
Aquinas to where he could not go. Narvaez actually grounds and expands Aquinas’s
assumptions on the capacity of human nature to achieve self-fulfilment and self-perfection. In
characterising what virtue is, Aquinas states that “virtue implies the perfection of power.”121
The following quote situates the existential commonality between Aquinas and Narvaez:
From the beginning of life, humans are embodied creatures who are
shaped by experience. The trajectory for a unique start is set in early
life as the brain is being moulded by relationship with caregivers. Each
person’s universe is different from that of another, setting up a unique
moral grammar for social life that shifts among engagement, security,
and imagination from moment to moment, situation to situation,
relationship to relationship.
Yet individuals have power to change themselves. Although the
beginnings of the self are established by caregivers before a child can
select for herself, with autonomy throughout life, individuals can shift
their personalities, capacities and virtue, ‘growing themselves.’
Individuals can deliberately foster an ethic or another in themselves or
others by the activities they choose, -- activities that enhance the ego,
fear and the security ethic, or activities where they let go of the ego
through interaction with nature and with others in social delight,
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encouraging an engagement ethic and communal imagination. The
world is overfilled with the former and needs more of the latter.122
On the basis of this quote, the discussion will now deal with the two fundamental factors that
relate to the human power to change: (1) virtues and the changing social environment, and (2)
moral education to human flourishing. Virtues and moral education constitute two factors that
immediately and directly relate to synderesis and its growth during the critical years of growing
young children.

Virtues and the Changing Social Environment
Narvaez particularly accommodated the virtue theory framework in explaining the nature of
dispositions which is her more preferred nuance over the ubiquitous Aristotelian and Thomistic
concept of virtue as good habits repeatedly done. She is aware of the common understanding
of equating virtue with disposition such as: “a set of sensibilities and capacities (perceptions,
orientation, attitudes, feelings, thinking, motivation, action) that become natural with practice
and essential to oneself”123 and as “schemas developed from patterns of experience.”124 While
Narvaez grounds her understanding of virtue specifically on the ideas of the Stagirite, she
nonetheless claims that her work is “enriched by psychological insight.”125 Hence, she defines
disposition in the following terms:
Dispositions are stance toward experience and represent response
tendencies to that experience. Dispositions are composed of such things
as embodied memory, genetic expression, unique experience, and
personal agency. A disposition is primarily an unconscious frame that
is deeply tied to learning, both conscious and unconscious, and
associative and non-associative.126
As Aquinas’s moral virtue is grounded in the theory of hylomorphism where it involves the
operations of reason (soul) and passions (body), Narvaez conceives of an embodied morality,
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i.e., brain/mind and body. This is an important concept in virtue theory since dispositions, apart
from its genetic template, are also transcriptional. This means that dispositions are products of
neurobiological interconnections whose networks “encode all of our memories, emotions, and
behaviours, interacting and integrating information.”127 The neuronal transcriptions allow for
brain impulses to send electrical impulses between networks of neurons to other networks not
just within the brain but to the different parts of the body. This basically characterises physical
motions that are motivated by brain activities. An important element in this consideration in
respect to virtue formation is the assertion that while the “majority of our brain structure is
formed after birth, much of this is guided by experience, influencing how genes are expressed
(epigenetics). Therefore, our environments play a significant role in shaping our brains.”128 As
epigenesis takes places, human emotions and understanding grow as they interact with the
world outside the human brain.129 Narvaez adds that in response to experience, neurons expand
in numbers continually by creating new neuronal connections which fortify existing networks
or establish new neurons.130 This forms part of Narvaez’s basis that “individuals have the power
to change themselves,” which could also mean that every individual has the potential to be
virtuous and to live a virtuous life (moral self-regulation). In the words of Aquinas, “virtue is
a good habit, productive of good works.”131
The above description demonstrates how extramental impulses causally create an internal
experience which not only could materialise into epigenesis, but it could also potentially
translate into ideogenesis. The neurological factor in this process is the plasticity of neurons
which is characterised by its capacity to generate those internal responses from external stimuli.
Dispositions, which are expressions of the brain’s neuroplasticity, demonstrate the following
dynamism:
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[It] emerge[s] from the patterns of neural networks built from
experience, and they are continually refined. These are not mechanical
responses, but complex and dynamic processes of contextualised
understanding, responding, and learning. Neural integration, in terms
of strong, dense, and high quantities of neuron connections, represent
a history of understanding the world around us, and allow for efficient
use of our powers.132
It can be inferred from the above that the expanse in the numbers of neurons is mutually related
to the moral growth of a person. This means that while neuronal responses exhibit a personal
neurological capacity, it also reveals the character of a person.
The influence of the social environment is undeniably paramount in the virtue formation and
information of moral agents, particularly acquired moral virtues. There are therefore many
elements in the social environment that could potentially induce positive changes to a human
person. This factor would have led Narvaez to define virtue as “[behaving] in the right way at
the right time according to the particular situation.”133 Framed in the Scholastic sense, it needs
to be asked what sort of sensible objects could positively actuate human potentials? The next
section will attempt to answer this question.

Moral Education to Human Flourishing
The habituation of virtues is achieved through moral education. Narvaez claims that “[t]he
context for development…[is] the early caregiving environment that supports moral
development.”134 The underlying principle supporting this statement suggests that “morality is
an embodied aspect of humanity that grows from interaction with the world from the
beginnings of life.”135 This process is underscored by various neurobiological states of the
modern human brain which determine the required optimal states for moral functioning.
Optimal moral functioning means that the human person is primed to be formed by virtues and
is living a virtuous life. To understand this fully, the evolution and development of the brain
need to be understood.
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Backed by researched science, Narvaez stresses that the critical age for virtue formation of a
growing young child is from conception136 till five years of age. She explains:
Over the course of human evolution encompassing such things as
bipedalism, human babies became increasingly helpless and immature
at birth, emerging from the womb nine to eighteen months early,
compared to other animals. Humans have 75 percent of the brain left
to develop over a lengthy period of maturation (over 20 years) but most
of it by age 5.137
This scientific data underpins Narvaez’s EDN constituting, as earlier mentioned, the ancestral
caregiving practices138 that promote the optimal social environment for virtue formation. When
appropriate caregiving is provided to growing young children by caregivers, e.g., mother,
father, etc., moral formation moulds young children into virtuous people during their early
years of age. Evolutionary history suggests that the ancestral lifestyle of the SBHG
communities prove to be an effective social environment where virtue formation can truly and
effectively foment.139
Virtue formation is conclusively not just a neuroscience affair but a social matter as well.
Narvaez categorically specifies this by stating that: “Virtue learning, like all learning, is
biosocial.”140 This statement points to the value of caregivers who are instrumental in providing
an environment where virtue could be sown and grown, as it were. Aquinas himself
acknowledges the importance of being trained in the virtues:
Man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must
be acquired by man by means of some kind of training…. Now it is
difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this
training…. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from
another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those
136
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young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural
disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training
suffices, which is by admonitions.141
On such pretext, Narvaez proposes the combination of the engagement ethic and imagination
ethic as the ideal configuration that best enhances an environment that is conducive to moral
formation in today’s environment. She states:
EDN-consistent care fosters a disposition towards relational
attunement in-the-moment that relies on capacities for emotional
presence and emphatic embrace, an Engagement orientation takes into
account the welfare of the face-to-face other. With development and
maturation, Engagement capacities form the foundations for
Communal Imagination – an inclusive use of abstracting capabilities.
In this case, autonomy is kept within the bounds of empathy – actions
are taken with the welfare of others in mind. The human inheritances
of Engagement and Communal Imagination are egalitarian and attuned
to the social world.142
The aforementioned quote clearly reveals that the process of virtue formation necessarily
requires key players in order for virtues to be imparted, at least by some form of witnessing. In
this process, the growth of virtue formation is envisaged as a ‘bottom-up’ process where initial
data and experience are built on by subsequent experiences. This also means that knowledge
and experience begin in early life and maturate as the human person grows to maturity.143 These
people who have grown in maturity would be likely candidates to be the virtue experts. In the
realm of neuroscience, an expert in virtue is one who “is more experienced and has developed
a more complex understanding of the domain in terms of conceptual associations, action skills,
and conditional knowledge.”144 Moreover, “experts have a richer declarative and procedural
knowledge base that increases processing speed, directs attention and perceptual pick up, and
triggers automatic, goal-dependent skill usage.”145 More importantly, in view of virtue-related
traits, “moral exemplars in the fullest sense demonstrate moral (knowing good) and practical
wisdom (knowing how to carry it out in the situation). Moral expertise is applying the right
virtue in the right amount of time at the right time.”146
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A thought-provoking observation in the TET scheme is Narvaez’s insistence on the priority of
the quality of caregiving consistent with the EDN configurations over consideration of the
identity of the caregiver. She formulates her point in this manner:
As it turns out from extensive anthropological and epidemiological
research, children’s well-being benefits most from multiple committed
caregivers. It does not matter who the several caregivers are, but how
much they support the child through responsivity and provisioning.
Historical evidence indicates that the nuclear family has existed only
for about 100 years. The government and business policies supporting
nuclear families at the expense of other family configurations were put
in place with deliberation and forethought, based on information,
reasoning, and intuitions that have turned out to be incorrect.147
While the above assertion may be controversial, it does prove that human relationships are not
a given. Human relationships obviously involve a lot of hard work, patience, love and
caregiving. Consequently, this raises the contemporary question regarding the effectiveness of
the traditional composite of the human family as the viable locus for parents, biological or not,
same-sex or not, for the rearing of a child, let alone for bringing up a child into a life of virtues.
The following chapters will further shed light on this matter.
When Aquinas considered the acquired moral virtue of prudence, he was aware of the benefits
of the process of moral inquiry particularly from virtue experts or moral exemplars: “Hence in
matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by ‘old
folks’ who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters.”148 Akin to
Narvaez’s claim, it is evident from this statement that it is not so much the identity of the ‘old
folks’ that really matters, but rather, the quality of an old folk’s knowledge of the first principles
of practical reason. Needless to say, the age of a person may not necessarily indicate depth of
knowledge.
Teachers are given an important place in the teaching of Aquinas since “they teach the truth
and enlighten the mind.”149 Teachers are able to lead pupils, using Aquinas’s terminology,
either through discovery or by instructions. A teacher’s role is obvious when it comes to
guiding pupils to learn by instructions. Aquinas presupposes, however, that the natural mind is
able to grasp the unknown things through the aid of natural reason. This does not seem to be
147
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absolute since a pupil may still need to be led to the knowledge of the primary moral principles.
Aquinas points this out:
Now, in discovery, the procedure of anyone who arrives at the
knowledge of something unknown is to apply general self-evident
principles to certain definite matters, from these to proceed to particular
conclusions, and from these to others. Consequently, one person is said
to teach another inasmuch as, by signs, he manifests to that other the
reasoning process which he himself goes through by his own natural
reason.150
As abovementioned, the manner of knowing via discovery is one critical task in prudential
moral inquiry. Prudence seeks to know the primary moral principles in order that the judgment
of the mind will be in consonance with the truth. It also investigates the infinity of singulars,
and the primary moral principles as well, in order to proceed towards enacting a sound and
reasonable prudential judgment. In and through all of these, the human mind is not merely
digging up from a storehouse of static and unrelated data. Rather, there are scores of phantasms
created by the brain circuitry to facilitate ideogenesis, including via division and comparison.
Imagination participates in the search for truth and is never without it. Being both related to
the cognitive and affective parts of the brain, imagination contributes its own fact-finding
mechanism to the quest for truth, where memory appears handicapped in bringing about the
desired outcome. In this respect, Narvaez focuses on the role of caregivers in fostering the
emotional development of young people: “In moral development, the caregivers first provide
the relational environment that wires the brain for sociality.”151 Stemming from this
experimental observation, a child will more than likely experience serious problems in socially
interacting with people and would exhibit passivity and reclusion from the social environment
without the proper emotional nourishment from caregivers. Narvaez’s claims seem to suggest
that the affect carries a meaning which reason can so verify. There is profundity in why St.
Bonaventure located synderesis in the affect and why Benedict XVI thought of synderesis as
an inner sense. While it may not categorically be found in the teachings of Aquinas, there are
compelling reasons to consider why synderesis may actually be driving moral agency not just
cognitively but affectively as well. If a desire for the good is indeed in us, there is argument
for feeling such a desire to grasp intuitively the first principles of practical reason due to our
natural inclination. Natural inclination moves the heart, as it were, to discover the good that
150
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frees the moral agent from the cloud of darkness and uncertainty. Beyond the intuitive actuation
of synderesis, there is experiential evidence of the persistence of the human desire for the good
and the truth, remaining and inviting the mind, the body and the soul to move towards the good,
for it is only through this movement that moral agency will eventually and ultimately achieve
its ends. Synderesis will never fail in pointing human agents to their beatific telos.152

Synderesis and Moral Imagination: A Comparative and Synthetic Analysis
The above discussion has demonstrated how Narvaez’s TET provides discriminate scientific
support to Aquinas’s doctrine on synderesis. This support, however, is limitedly functional
rather than categorically doctrinal. Though Narvaez makes references to Aquinas’s thoughts in
some of her publications, in none of these is synderesis ever directly and explicitly inferred.
Her thoughts on intuition fundamentally differ from Aquinas regarding its origin. Aquinas’s
intuition originates via divine implantation (synderesis) and is actualised by sensitive
experience while Narvaez’s intuition is had via experience within a social environment
(empirical). Their empirical similarity is conclusively proximate save for the aspect of divine
implantation. Without the supernatural aspect, Narvaez’s intuition would appear to be
fundamentally aligned with Thomistic epistemology, albeit unintended but empirically sound.
Narvaez’s empiricism would be no different from Thomistic epistemology in so far as the
cognitive process emanates from and is stimulated by the material world. Narvaez would agree
with Aquinas that knowledge is acquired via sense and imagination. She would, however, insist
on the unconscious aspect of acquiring sensitive knowledge which underlines the origin of tacit
or intuitive knowledge.153 The unconscious element in Narvaez’s intuition may indirectly
allude to the unconscious or innateness of synderesis in the human person. As synderesis is
constitutive of pre-cognitive (non-cognitive) and cognitive processes, Narvaez’s intuitionism
is basically akin to Thomistic epistemology.
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According to Aquinas, synderesis is “never destroyed” (Cf. Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 3.) and there is “no
error in it” (Cf. Aquinas, De veritate, q. 16, a. 2.). Synderesis only fails when a person suffers from some form
of brain impediment or when intellect is consumed by passion or bad habits (vices) so as to deflect the proper
use of reason. This failure is understood only as the failure to apply the universal moral principles to particular
situations and not necessarily the extinguishing of the innate habit.
153
Darcia Narvaez claims that “[a]s a result of implicit learning…the effects of prior experiences are manifest in
a task even though previous learning is not consciously evident to the performer. In other words, implicit
learning is ‘phenomenally unconscious.’” See Narvaez, “Moral Complexity,” 167.
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Narvaez’s fundamental disposition towards the positive sciences in theorising on the
dependence of human experience on the social environment154 affirms indisputably the
importance of sensitive knowledge in permeating the human mind with the necessary epistemic
materials for human intellection. Jonathan Haidt agrees with Narvaez in this respect by
maintaining that “moral reasoning is ubiquitous [and] it is best studied not as a private search
for truth but as an aspect of our sociality.”155 Further extending this assertion, Michael
Lacewing also agrees with Narvaez that the human person has the capacity to “seek out
situations that will bring about change in our intuitions or adopt other means of indirect
influence, such as mindfulness training and psychotheraphy.”156 It is in this respect that the
interior sensoria of Aquinas, which would have been placed by Narvaez in the frontal lobe
where cognitive processes take place, possess key roles in acquiring sensible forms pregnant
with moral contents necessary for the actuation of synderesis and the inchoative maturation of
the knowledge of the first principles of practical reason. Without these moral contents obtained
from the social environment, synderesis would be deeply disadvantaged, and eventually,
seriously malnourished, in fomenting the understanding of the practical good. Narvaez’s theory
underpins this assertion when she elevates the social practices and lifestyle of the SBHG
ancestral communities as the typical environment conducive for human flourishing. She
particularly gives preponderance on the provision of appropriate and constant caregiving by
adult members of the community to very young members of the community.157 Hence, if the
social environment is the key to human flourishing, the same can be said of moral situations in
effectively actuating the habit of synderesis and the inchoative maturation of the knowledge of
the practical good. Aquinas would agree with Narvaez that this, in the end, may potentially
deliver human flourishing. He would, however, posit further that this may possibly pave the
way for the realisation of beatitudo, i.e., happiness with God.
Narvaez’s imagination ethic is generally and loosely expressive of the Thomistic
conceptualisation of vis imaginativa as well. Apart from the obvious fact that imagination takes
place in the absence of existing objects before the human eyes, Narvaez’s description of
154

Darcia Narvaez maintains that: “Virtue is fostered through extensive immersion in good environments
(fostering intuitions) and mentoring (fostering deliberation and assisting in the selection of environments for
intuition development). One learns intuitions from the environments in which one is immersed.” See Narvaez,
“Neurobiology, Moral Education and Moral Self-Authorship,” 38.
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Jonathan Haidt, “Moral Psychology Must Not Be Based on Faith and Hope: Commentary on Narvaez,”
Perspective on Psychological Science 5, no. 2 (2010): 182.
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Lacewing, “Expert Moral Intuition and Its Development: A Guide to the Debate,” 413.
157
Darcia Narvaez asserts that: “Trajectory for a unique self is set in early life as the brain is being moulded by
relationship with caregivers.” See Narvaez, “Neurobiology, Moral Education and Moral Self-Authorship,” 39.
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imagination depicts the Thomistic capacity and potentiality of imagination to divide and
compose forms or ideas either previously or recently acquired. This affiliation is not
unexpected considering Narvaez’s subtle affiliation with Aristotelianism. Narvaez’s
attributions of abstraction, perspective-taking and mental re-organisation, to name a few, as
expressions of the global moral mindset of imagination ethics are brought about by the mind’s
capacity and potentiality to re-arrange one’s thoughts, as it were, to creatively produce new
mental forms or ideas. The neuroscientific affirmation that imagination is an integral global
mindset ascertains imagination’s pivotal role in human psychology and epistemology. Unlike
in the Thomistic consideration where imagination, as it were, ‘failed to capture Aquinas’s
imagination’ in his teachings on prudence, Narvaez has just informed Aquinas that imagination
is an indispensable constitutive element of human psychology that enriches human knowledge,
both tacit and deliberative.
In the mind of Narvaez, imagination is pivotal in fomenting tacit and deliberative knowledge,
most specifically in life situations where a moral tenor subsists. This assertion substantiates the
argument of this research that moral imagination is and should be an indispensable faculty in
Thomistic prudential moral inquiry. Since virtue helps moral agency in the actuation of
synderesis and the growth of the practical good in the human person, moral imagination helps
the mind sort out various and possible scenarios where the human agency can best achieve selffulfilment and self-perfection. Imagination can help prudential moral inquiry weigh options
and consider hypothetical solutions prior to making judgments. Narvaez should be then
wondering why Aquinas bypassed imagination in his appropriation of prudential moral inquiry
considering its organic functional role in human cognition. Imagination can help a moral agent
have a feel of the moral situation via empathy. Not only does moral imagination metaphysically
and subconsciously assist in the actuation of synderesis, it does also help extend the presence
of synderesis in and through ongoing human endeavours by making it sure that moral agency
does not lose sight of what is truthfully and practically good. Nonetheless, Narvaez cautions
any oversimplification of the function of the human brain explaining that “our experience and
our brains are more complicated than simply applying moral principles as situations arise.”158
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Narvaez and Junkins, “Disposition Formation and Early Moral Development,” 112.
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Intuition and imagination are both indispensable and instrumental in the habituation of virtues.
Narvaez considers virtue habituation as a bio-psycho-social reality.159 It engages the entire
human person – mind and body – that is not independent of the community and the social
environment from where one acquires their meaning. Aquinas, on the other hand, also
considers the integrity of the human person – soul (mind) and body – where the habituation of
moral virtues that prepares the moral agent towards being perfected by the divinely-infused
virtues actively takes place. Both Aquinas and Narvaez advocate the critical importance of the
social environment in transforming human agency to where it needs to be. Each recognises
humanity’s fractured reality, i.e., Aquinas’s transgression and Narvaez’s mismatch, that is in
need of transformation. Narvaez considers the necessity of the so-called virtue experts160 in the
community to provide moral education to young people. Aquinas, on the other hand, views the
lives of ‘old folks’ who have discerned the first principles of practical reason as potential
teachers of virtue to young people. He upholds their example as crucial to young people’s moral
formation and education.
Aquinas asserts the inviolable importance of virtue in the actuation of synderesis and its
influence in sustaining within the confines of moral agency the synderetic order of the practical
reason. Though Narvaez does not have the reality of synderesis in her TET, she does, however,
positively assign the origin of human values from the lifestyle of ancestral SBHG ancestral
communities. These values are arguably expressive of the practical good that synderesis
apprehends.161 There is evidently a vast difference between the understanding of the notion of
good from the psychological and theological perspectives. Narvaez attributes the notion of
159

This refers to Darcia Narvaez’s claims of the so-called evolved developmental niche (EDN) which serves as
the early caregiving environment which supports optimal moral development. EDN is viewed to have “effects
on the bio-psycho-social wellbeing of the child for the long term. For example, a mother with less social support
and greater stress during pregnancy yields a more irritable baby.” See Narvaez and Junkins, “Disposition
Formation and Early Moral Development,” 100.
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Darcia Narvaez provides examples of the moral expertise of these virtue experts: “Experts in ethical
sensitivity are better…at quickly and accurately reading a moral situation, taking the perspective of others, and
determining what role they might play. Experts in ethical judgment solve complex moral problems by reasoning
about, for example, codes, duty, and consequences for a particular situation. Experts in ethical focus revere life
and deepen commitment. Experts in ethical action know how to keep their ‘eye on the prize,’ enabling them to
stay on task and take the necessary steps to get the ethical job done. Experts in a particular excellence have more
and better organised knowledge about it, have highly tuned perceptual skills for it, have deep moral desire for it,
and use at least some highly automatised, effortless responses.” See Narvaez, “Moral Complexity,” 171.
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Darcia Narvaez’s conception of what virtues are is framed in evolutionary terms, not theological. Hence, her
descriptions of the effects of virtues are couched in socio-behavioural terms rather than ideologically formal
terms such as ‘do good and avoid evil.’ Thus, she describes the effects of an adoption of ancestral lifestyles in
these terms: “Children whose mothers has positive attitudes about all ancestral parenting practices display more
joy, consideration, empathy, and imagination and social attunement.” See Narvaez, “The 99 Percent Development and Socialization Within an Evolutionary Context: Growing Up to Become ‘A Good and Useful
Human Being’,” 352.
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good as generally living a virtuous life in harmony with the community. Specifically, she
considers the good as that which people perceptibly aim for emotionally and cognitively as
their response to social triggers.162 She would view this as virtue embodiment, understood from
the neurological perspective, which implies that:
morality “goes all the way down” to neurological function, to habitual
resonance with others (and, over the course of development, resonance
with ideas that guide actions which promote flourishing). Morality
involves social and situation activation of different physiological
patterns with corresponding thoughts and emotions, based on prior
experience. These “somatic markers” signal which actions are better or
worse. “Embodied (sensorimotor) structures are the substance of
experience” and “experiential structures” motivate “conceptual
understanding and rational thought.” And these are not soloist matters.
The individual resides in a flowing world of relationships, of
movement toward and away from humans and nonhuman entities.163
Aquinas, on the other hand, conceives of the notion of good as reaching the summum bonum
of human relationships, i.e., friendship with God. This fundamentally differentiates the notion
of moral good between the perspectives of psychology and theology. Beyond the present order,
Narvaez would be thinking of improving and eventually displacing the mismatched moral
lifestyles of the present generation with that of lifestyles of the nomadic foraging ancestral
communities. She envisages that the virtues of the ancestral communities, which had
dominated the ninety-nine percent of genus history, will offset the one percent that now has
defined contemporary lifestyles. On the other hand, Aquinas’s teleology goes beyond the
natural progression of events to the supernatural life. It does, however, entail the habituation
of virtues that perfects earthly life in preparation for the supernatural life with God. As
synderesis appoints the ends to moral virtues, and in turn, prudence determines the mean of the
practical reason, virtues cannot escape the necessity of heeding the demands of synderesis in
growing human consciousness towards an awareness of all the moral goods that are perfective
of human nature. Synderesis would be bereft without moral virtues; moral virtues would be
imperceptive without synderesis. Not without prudence, synderesis facilitates the moral
consistency of human affairs pointing moral agency, via virtues, towards its natural origin –
the heart and mind of God.

162
163

Narvaez, “The Co-Construction of Virtue,” 261.
Narvaez, Embodied Morality, 35.
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Summary
The academic interest in moral imagination is precipitated by the observable omission of the
interior sense of imagination by Aquinas in his consideration of prudential moral inquiry.
While the omission may be attributed to an inferior understanding of neurobiology during
medieval times, modern scientific research now ascertains the efficient value of moral
imagination in moral development. A comparative and analytical study between the Triune
Ethics Theory of Darcia Narvaez and the doctrine of synderesis of St. Thomas Aquinas
demonstrates an intimate correlation between their assertions on intuition (synderesis), virtues
and moral imagination. Apropos of Aquinas’s synderesis, Narvaez’s scientific observations
based on evolutionary psychology affirm the following Thomistic assertions: (i) sensitive
stimuli are necessarily required to actuate the first principles of natural law by synderesis, (ii)
the habituation of virtues is essentially the path to moral development, and (iii) moral
imagination facilitates moral development by empowering human agents to discover their own
moral paths that will lead to their flourishing. These affirmations summarily confirm that there
is considerable science behind Aquinas’s teaching on synderesis.
In respect to Narvaez’s initial observation mentioned above, Aquinas’s synderesis is without a
direct attribution in her Triune Ethics Theory. Its absence is understandable considering that
the research objectives of scientific endeavours pertain to the material or physical and not to
the spiritual or metaphysical. Nonetheless, the recognition of external stimuli which effectuate
neurotransmissions affirms Aquinas’s epistemology that apart from imagination, human
intellection must proceed from sensitive experience of the social environment. On account of
the second observation, the reality of sensitive experience highlights the importance of practical
moral virtues in realising the actuation of synderesis and its role in the development of the
knowledge of the first principles of natural law. It is here where both Narvaez and Aquinas
concur that positive witnessing from community members is essential in moral development
particularly among young children. With both Aquinas and Narvaez agreeing on this, moral
exemplars, virtue-enablers or ‘old folks,’ whatever terminology is used, their role in providing
authentic virtue-formation to the next generation is indispensable and vital for human
flourishing. Lastly, the third observation affirms that with the benefit of prudence as a moral
virtue that engenders prudential moral inquiry of the first principles of moral action, human
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agents are able to forge a moral path by and through which the realisation of not only human
ends, but most importantly, the supernatural ends could come about.
A key theological proposition in this chapter is the emphasis on moral imagination as the power
within the moral agent’s reach to facilitate moral reasoning and judgment. Specifically brought
into play via the acquired moral virtue of prudence through which prudential moral inquiry is
exerted, the power of moral imagination both forms and informs the human mind about the
primary moral principles. It is formative in so far as it contributes to the pool of epistemic
materials (phantasms) during pre-cognition where primary moral principles begin merely as a
formless entity devoid of any material content. Moral imagination is also informative as it
creates and re-creates mental realities that enable the human mind to cognise that which makes
human actions morally good and thus become perfective of human nature. Without moral
imagination, the human mind is impeded and hindered from morally assessing moral contexts
where knowledge is incipiently drawn and where its intricacies and complexities express the
materiality of moral dilemmas without which nothing is ever in existence.
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Chapter 9
Naturalis inclinatio and Triune Ethics Theory

Introduction
This chapter principally studies the reality of the natural law whose natural inclinations are
expressed in and through human nature. By its etymology, it should clearly point to the
hylomorphic unicity of the human person as the starting point of its investigation. Its objective
is to demonstrate that the teaching of Aquinas on the first principles of natural law is both
knowable and imaginable. As previously asserted, knowing and imagining the primary moral
principles have ethical implications in guiding moral deliberations that bear on the telos of
human agency.
Synderesis operates in and through human agency by illuminating the human soul about the
moral good that is not only humanizing but also salvific. This operation highlights the
imperative for synderesis to be understood as an immanent and historical act in its intuitive
apprehension of the perfective good.1 This task involves the hermeneutical consideration of the
universal moral principles and the contingencies of human historicity without which the
knowledge of the first principles of natural law is left unintelligible and inept in bringing about
moral formation. By studying the natural inclinations of human beings, the historicity and
1

For readers of ancient philosophy, the pursuit of a physical (as opposed to metaphysical) understanding of the
(moral) good is a fait accompli on the basis of an understanding of its Greek etymological origin. The notion of
‘good’ is believed to have originated from the word, agaqos (agathos = the proper execution of a social
function by a nominated person), and even more specifically, areth (arete = the quality of a person whose
allocated social functions are performed well) where its meaning is attributed to those specific qualities relating
to the discharge of a person’s designated role in maintaining order in society. MacIntyre also opines that ‘arete’
is usually and misleadingly translated as ‘virtue.’ See Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History
of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1966/1998; repr.
2010), 5-13.

contingency of human conditions are given empirical foundation and its operations are given
not just cognitive determination, but physiologically (neurobiologically) as well. The
Thomistic doctrine of hylomorphism underlines and necessitates this consideration.
Aquinas’s alleged and contentious physicalist perspective on his doctrine on natural law will
be treated below. Following the methodological approach of from below, the question on
whether the natural law should be discerned from the perspective of the order of nature or of
the order of reason will be explored in the proceeding section. It is essential and inevitable that
in any study involving the historicity of the human person that science is necessarily
accommodated. Thus, this chapter will take a closer look at the parallelism and distinctions
between Narvaez’s scientific propositions and Aquinas’s theological assertions. It will come
as a surprise, but not unintelligible, that convergences in their thoughts and observations make
it appear as if Narvaez is generally echoing the medieval teachings of Aquinas in contemporary
scientific language. Without becoming overly confident, this research bridges the centuriesapart understanding of what is nature and natural which facilitates the practical grasp of
contextual key issues relating to human flourishing in the present generation. It explores how
natural law can be imagined today in the hope of creating moral pathways that will fulfill
humanity’s essence and the acquisition of the supernatural end - the vision of God, for those
whose journey decidedly embraces the contemplation of the truth about God.
As this research has been focusing all throughout on moral agency, it once again affirms that
the main purpose of the discussion below is to particularly assist society’s moral exemplars or
virtue-enablers in their virtue-formation by proposing practical matters on how they could fulfil
their task in society. Generally, it envisages these same practical matters for all human agents
in view of their moral development. By and large, all these attempts echo the query of the
biblical personality on how to gain the supernatural ends: “Good Master, what good thing shall
I do to, that I may have eternal life?”2

2

Mt 19:16.
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Two-Pronged Natural Law: Reason vis-à-vis Nature
The Vatican’s International Theological Commission published in 2009 the document, In
Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, to specifically evaluate age-old
concerns regarding the natural law and to recommend ways on how to move forward. At the
outset, the document acknowledges the problem that it wishes to address:
It is true that the term “natural law” is a source of numerous
misunderstandings in our present cultural context. At times, it evokes
only a resigned and completely passive submission to the physical laws
of nature, while human beings seek instead – and rightly so – to master
and to direct these elements for their own good. At times, when
presented as an objective datum that would impose itself from the
outside on personal conscience, independently of the work of reason
and subjectivity, it is suspected of introducing a form of heteronomy
intolerable for the dignity of the free human person. Sometimes also,
in the course of history, Christian theology has too easily justified some
anthropological positions on the basis of the natural law, which
subsequently appeared as conditioned by the historical and cultural
context.3
The above observations by the International Theological Commission present the most recent
attempt by the Catholic Church to explicitly identify and address the pressing concerns
surrounding magisterial teachings on natural law. It sets out its goal in the following terms: “It
is…important today to set out the traditional doctrine of the natural law in terms that better
manifest the personal and existential dimension of the moral life.”4
Such an attempt, noble as it may be owing to its honest intention to consider the personal and
existential dimensions of human agents’ moral lives, appears to be an inadequate attempt to
interpret the natural law as a universal ethic with a new look. This is evidenced by the fact that
after around four years after its publication, the collated results arising from the Preparatory
Document published in November 2013 by the General Secretariat for the Synod of Bishops
for the purpose of surveying peoples’ views on the family, reveals that ecclesial concerns
regarding the interpretation of natural law remain. The Instrumentum laboris, which contains
the collated results of the global survey and subsequently published for the convocation of the
III Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops on the Pastoral Challenges of the
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International Theological Commission, “In Search of a Universal Ethic,” § 10.
International Theological Commission, “In Search of a Universal Ethic,” § 10.
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Family in the Context of Evangelisation, delineates just how seriously persistent the concerns
are regarding the inadequacy of the natural law teaching in its current form. The ecclesial
document sums up the general orientation of the collated results: “In a vast majority of
responses and observations, the concept of natural law today turns out to be, in different cultural
contexts, highly problematic, if not completely incomprehensible.”5 The results of the survey
did not actually reveal anything new about how people generally perceive the natural law.
Public perceptions regarding the natural law are well too familiar to the Catholic Church as
these concerns have been articulated many times before, the most recent being the alreadymentioned publication by the International Theological Commission four years prior.6 By and
large, the survey results distil the following concerns: (i) the term ‘natural’ is easily
misconceived since it proposes different meanings in different cultures and contexts,7 (ii) the
perspective of science predominates peoples’ views about what actually governs human life
and not some abstract law such as the natural law,8 and (iii) “the natural law is perceived as an
outdated legacy.”9 On account of these compelling observations, the document further echoes
the proposals expressed by the survey respondents: “[to bring] the issue to public discussion
and [to develop] the idea of biblical inspiration and the ‘order in creation,’ which could permit
a re-reading of the concept of the natural law in a more meaningful manner in today’s world.”10
The honest interest in discovering a new pedagogy in imparting the doctrine on natural law to
people demonstrates an invigorated desire arising from the grassroots to imagine the natural
law in dialogical consideration of the historical contingencies of human persons.
Specifically, the historicity of each and every human person in relation to natural law is
traditionally considered under the order of reason versus the order of nature debate. Through
the order of nature, human agents are able to reach the knowledge of the natural law via
reflection on how human nature works. God being the source, natural law is already embodied
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General Secretariat of the Synod of Bishops, The Pastoral Challenges of the Family in the Context of
Evangelisation, Instrumentum laboris (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2014), § 21,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20140626_instrumentum-laborisfamilia_en.html. (Accessed 8 December 2020)
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See George M. Regan, “Natural Law in the Church Today,” The Catholic Lawyer 13, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 241, then 91; Charles E. Curran, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1985), 119-172; Michael B. Crowe, “The Pursuit of the Natural Law,” Irish Theological
Quarterly 44, no. 1 (1977): 3-29.
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General Secretariat of the Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum laboris, § 22.
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in human nature. On the other hand, the order of reason underlines the role of human rationality
in serving the purpose of grasping the knowledge of natural law through human experiences
“taken in all its complexity and its relationships.”11 Through reason, human agents are able to
discover human potentials in human experiences that are perfective of human nature.
It is held that this debate entered the public square as early as during the high Middle Ages12
and its influence continues to be felt in the present times where magisterial teachings “vacillate
between two polarities – naturalism and idealism”13 – which are expressive of the order of
nature and order of reason tendencies respectively. These two sides of the argument, emanating
from the alleged ambiguity found in Aquinas’s doctrine on natural law in the Summa
theologiae, point to the variances regarding the source of moral law and the epistemological
manner in which human agents are able to grasp knowledge of the natural law. Curran makes
the following observation in view of these variances:
The Thomistic natural concept vacillates at times between the order of
nature and the order of reason. The general Thomistic thrust is towards
the predominance of reason in natural law theory. However, there is in
Thomas a definite tendency to identify the demands of natural law with
physical and biological process.14
Curran’s analysis of Aquinas’s doctrine on natural law unearths a subtle openness to a possible
physicalist interpretation of natural law. His observation is based on the text of Aquinas himself
in the Summa theologiae where the Angelic Doctor spoke of human natural inclinations in the
context of natural law: “Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order
of the precepts of the natural law.” 15
The alleged physicalist interpretation of the natural law is drawn from this unidentified quote
in the Summa theologiae: “which nature has taught to all animals” (quae natura omnia
animalia docuit).16 This quote, however, is traditionally attributed to Ulpian (c. 170-228), a
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Press, 1989), 239.
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Curran, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, 127. See also Gula, SS, Reason Informed by Faith:
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Roman lawyer, who distinguished ius naturale (natural law) from ius gentium (human law)
where the former is proper to all animals while the latter is proper to humans exclusively.17
According to Michael Crowe, Aquinas’s use of Ulpian’s natural law definition is “something
a little puzzling”18 considering his well-known bias towards the natural law of reason. There is
no question about Aquinas’s preference for Ulpian’s natural definition which he had used
consistently in his works.19 The ensuing use of this definition by Aquinas has, however, become
problematic. The danger lies in interpreting the natural law in purely physicalist or biological
terms and ignoring its personalist interpretation. Richard Gula, SS offers his observation:
The interpretation of natural law which corresponds to the “order of
nature,” or generic natural law, in St. Thomas is influenced by Ulpian’s
definition of jus naturale [sic]: what nature has taught all animals. This
way of understanding natural law emphasizes human physical and
biological nature in determining morality. It suggests a “blueprint” or
“maker’s instructions” theory of natural law which supports
physicalism over personalism.20
Further, Gula stresses that physicalism “emphasise[s], or even…absolutise[s], the physical and
biological aspects of the human person and human action independently of the function of
reason and freedom.”21 He explains that since God is acknowledged as the source of moral
order, natural law reveals this order. Hence, “the human task is to examine the givens in nature
in order to understand their arrangement and purpose. Moral obligation can be read off what
nature requires in order to fulfill its inherent design.”22
Further into Aquinas’s preference for Ulpian’s definition of natural law, he demonstrates what
could be interpreted as an unprecedented prejudicial shift towards the order of nature over the
order of reason. Discussing the issue regarding the morality of sexual matters, Aquinas wrote:
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Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to
nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature,
before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be
observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just
as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that
which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on
man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against
things as determined by nature.23
The above text provides a clear deviation from the rational orientation of Thomistic moral
philosophy. Aquinas underlines this paradigm shift by stipulating an equally valid
philosophical presupposition to justify the pre-eminence of the order of nature over the order
of reason in respect to the nature of moral acts: “Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds
from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature,
whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature.”24
This paradigm shift attunes moral philosophy to the truth regarding the primacy of God in
moral theology. Even before reason is able to grasp any knowledge of God, it must ground
itself first in nature since it is only through it being grounded in nature that the intellective
process proceeds. Nature bears the footprints of God, as it were, not immediately discoverable
by any stretch of imagination, but via heuristic pondering on the works of human nature. Hence,
the order of nature must take precedence over the order of reason by reflecting the reality of
nature which is expressive of the nature of God. On account of Aquinas’s logic, reason must
conform to nature since it must express the truth in reality, a reality whose origin is God. Be
that as it may, reason is not, however, absolutely beholden to nature since reason has its own
qualities that originate from God. For example, synderesis bears the vestiges of original
humanity that expresses the unadulterated presence of God in human agents. Through nature,
reason accomplishes its intrinsic role in the human soul, i.e., for the human mind to open up to
the infinite horizon of intelligibility and discover the laws of nature that express God’s eternal
laws in human history.
In addition, the quote cited above further reveals Aquinas’s inconsistency when it comes to his
doctrine on the natural law. Nature appears to take precedence over reason in the moral
determination of human acts. His inconsistency nonetheless could imply the possibility of a
restrictive physicalist interpretation of his natural law doctrine. It is proposed to be a restrictive
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interpretation since, if it is taken to its extreme, biologism could possibly take hold and
effectively deny that the human person is composite of body and soul. Hence, echoing Curran’s
affirmation: “[T]here is in Thomas a tendency to identify the demands of the natural law with
physical and biological processes. Thomas, too, is a historical person conditioned by the
circumstances and influences of his own time.”25
The affirmation of the possibility of a restrictive physicalist interpretation of Aquinas’s
doctrine of natural law counterbalances what could be generally perceived as an idealist
presentation of natural law. Based on this perception, moral laws are believed to be:
abstract, a priori, and deductive. It wants to cut through the concrete
circumstances to arrive at the abstract essence which is always true,
and then works with these abstract and universal essences. In the area
of moral theology, for example, the first principles of morality are
established, and then other universal norms of conduct are deduced
from these.26
It has been previously stated that synderetic apprehension necessitates the element of sensitive
experience since Thomistic epistemology identifies sense and imagination as the two sources
of knowledge. Contact with the social environment is indispensable in Thomistic
epistemology, including the synderetic apprehension of the practical good. This demonstrates
the indispensable complementarity between intellective experience and the sensitive
experience in the development of human moral awareness.
Complementary as they are, understanding human nature as manifested via human inclinations
is still the key, according to Aquinas, to reason’s proper grasp of human reality. Nature’s role
is obviously to be ‘on the ground’ and ‘to be grounded’ in history in order to experience the
contingencies of human conditions. The corporeal nature is the only medium human agents
possess which mediates the possibility for reason to know the truths existing outside the human
mind. It is apparently through an inductive process, rather than a deductive process, that human
agents move from the reflection on their human experiences to making conclusions about moral
concerns via recourse to primary moral principles. In this endeavour, it should be noted that
“historical consciousness as a methodology is an abstraction, but an abstraction or theory that
tries to give more importance to particular, concrete historical reality.”27 This consideration is
25

Curran, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, 127.
Curran, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, 140.
27
Curran, Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology, 140.
26

225

of primary importance in moral development since morality is fundamentally human acts that
express human agents’ disposition to do and pursue the good while effectively avoiding evil in
the historical circumstances of their existence.
The complementarity between the order of reason and the order of nature is indisputable, at
least from the perspective of this thesis. What is directly being proffered, however, is the
dynamic reasonableness of an inductive approach in effectively grasping knowledge of the
natural law in due consideration of human contingencies. Certainly, when the first principles
of natural law are spoken of, it need not be exclusively stated as absolute, definitive and
moribund categories whose universal applicability is presumed to be valid to the disregard of
any practical knowledge of the historical plane upon which it operates. The dynamism of reason
affords the human intellect to draw from human contingencies pieces of information, both
known and discoverable, in forming conclusions about moral realities. There is therefore
personal freedom that is exercised in attempting to piece together relevant information in view
of determining the ethical weight of a moral situation or dilemma. This freedom rests on the
human capacity to interact, and even interfere, with human contingencies to allow for the truth
to be seen, felt, heard, smelt, tasted and eventually remembered and imagined. Rahner speaks
of this freedom quite eloquently:
Nowhere more than in the Christian religion is man the free partner of
God, so much so that he does not passively undergo his eternal
salvation but must achieve it in freedom (even though this achievement
considered as his free act is given to man by God, his creativeness and
grace).28
Moral imagination expresses human freedom in concrete ways in the reproduction and creation
of images performed at the service of seeking knowledge of being and the historical truth.
Epistemologically, imagination draws data from the external social environment which
emphatically drives the truth about the indispensability of human and material involvement in
their consideration by the universal moral principles. Rahner explicates humanity’s necessary
involvement in existential creativity in history:
Man today has clearly and definitely entered in his historical
development into the phase of peculiar creativeness and has become
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the rationally planning master of action and power both with regard to
himself and with regard to his environment.29
The ability of moral imagination to foster dynamism in its endeavour to produce and create
phantasms suits the requirements of moral inquiry to explore the historicity of human agents
and their social environment fully and adequately. To speak once again here of reaching the
infinite horizon of intelligibility via conversio ad esse which happens when the intellectus agens
opens up the human mind to the truths about God, nature and reason converge to be illumined
by such openness to being and to truth. This infinite horizon of intelligibility engenders an
appreciation of the marriage between nature and reason, the practical and theoretical, the
empirical and ideal, where it allows a deeper cognitive penetration into the intricacies and
vicissitudes of human life. It is through this marriage that the objective finds its practical base
in the subjective providing a unity that could only benefit the cause of the knowledge of moral
truth. Curran uses a modern analogy to stress this point: “The modern cinema confronts the
viewer with a very subjective view of reality that calls for imagination and perceptivity on the
part of the viewer.”30 Imagination therefore must be considered as a necessary faculty in moral
inquiry for without it, human agents ignore potential avenues for reaching ethical resolutions
that seek only the moral truth. Moreover, imagination is a must in terms of grasping knowledge
of the natural law and appropriating its demands in the context of human history. If natural law
is meant to provide at least some form of guidance in understanding moral precepts proceeding
from the first principles of natural law, the human mind must engage the services of moral
imagination in order to arrive at specified depths and breadths in the moral assessment of social
conditions. Curran agrees that Aquinas “did leave room for the virtue of prudence and the
creativity of individual[s]”31 to know their self-creaturehood within the confines of human
historicity.
The question regarding the capacity of the human intellect to lead the moral mind to discover
the truth via imagination has already been settled. What needs to be further asserted is the
service which moral imagination provides to prudential moral inquiry. The discovery of the
truth via prudential moral inquiry may be likened to putting together the pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle. It would require the mental task to imagine how the small pieces fit in together, working
out imaginatively what pieces lock in together in relation to the overall picture or image that
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the puzzle represents. There would be times when a small puzzle piece would have to be turned
clockwise or counter-clockwise in order to find out which side locks in with another piece. It
would also involve the work of imagination in determining how a piece could lock in with
another piece which was previously held. Overall, the play of imagination will serve the
ultimate purpose of locking in all together the jigsaw puzzle pieces. In real life, the play of
imagination serves the horizon of prudence in unearthing the truths discoverable via the first
principles of natural law and the practical truths embedded in historicity.
The horizon of prudence is the locus where eternity meets ephemerality, where divinity meets
humanity, where synderesis meets the Zeitgeist. In the perduring convergences of these realities
throughout a lifespan, moral imagination facilitates the marriage, as it were, of both ends of the
spectrum to effectuate an honest and thorough assessment of given realities for the purpose of
assisting human agents to make prudential conclusions or judgments when confronted with
moral situations or dilemmas. When human agents dwell on the horizon of prudence, their
experience affords them the guidance of the first principles of natural law and the sensitivity to
the historicity of human affairs. As given realities coalesce, human nature is illumined by
reason which presents pathways and possibilities that are perfective of natural and supernatural
ends. Human agents are not mere passive spectators on this horizon of prudence but are directly
and intrinsically involved since the realities of the spectral ends that inter-play are their own
human knowledge and experiences. The horizon of prudence is like a playing field where
human agents actively interact and wrestle with known and discoverable truths and the
contingencies of human affairs. The time spent on the playing field varies but certainly, the
longer time spent on it would translate to a more thorough evaluation of realties. The length of
time would also avert any extreme relativity or absolute subjectivity that would tend to create
tension between realities that potentially may negate or disrupt the appropriation of telic goals.
The reported vacillation of the Catholic Church’s moral predisposition between the order of
reason and the order of nature takes place on this horizon of prudence. Ecclesial history attests
to the fact that when there is an over-emphasis on the absolute moral norms, the particularity
of human affairs is neglected. On the other hand, when there is a heavy preponderance on
human experience, the likely tendency is to completely ignore the moral principles. The
horizon of prudence is not a moral fulcrum that operates by striking a balance or finding the
moral mean that will satiate both ends of realities. Rather, the horizon of prudence is the moral
plane where human agents discover the will of God that promotes freedom of action which
fulfills the human essence and telic ends. The intellectus agens allows for this discovery and
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experience via the excessus ad esse – the opening of the human self to the illuminating grace
of God’s presence in one’s personal history.

Naturalis inclinatio and Triune Ethics Theory
Benedict XVI maintains that: “moral development and scientific research must go hand in
hand.”32 Implicit in this statement is the real potential for mutual co-operation between
theology and science in pursuit of the common good. This pursuit of the common good which
natural law promotes is a multi-faceted undertaking which no entity should be allowed to
monopolise: “Academic and scientific reflection on the cultural, political, economic, moral and
religious dimensions of our social existence nourishes this reflection on the common good of
humanity.”33 In clearest terms, the International Theological Commission states that:
“Christianity does not have the monopoly of the natural law. In fact, founded on reason,
common to all human beings, the natural law is the basis of collaboration among all persons of
good will, whatever their religious convictions.”34 In the hope of achieving this, it insists that
all efforts must “transcend egotistical and partisan tendencies and develop a global approach
of the ‘ecology of values’ without which human life risks of losing its integrity and its sense of
responsibility for the good of all.”35
A respectful acknowledgement of the unique objective pursuits of the specific disciplines of
theology and psychology should not cause any tension nor dissent. That said, while the
synthesis between Aquinas’s moral theology and Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory reveals a
generally close relationship, with the exception of the reality of the soul which psychology
does not recognise being a non-physical entity, further speculative analysis on the notion of
natural law and its derivatives should build on what has already been established previously
regarding moral agency.
Expressive of the starting point for any study in psychology, Narvaez’s bottom-up
understanding of moral learning focuses on human agents’ immersion in experience starting in
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early life.36 This scientific approach parallels the proposed restrictive physicalist approach in
the interpretation of natural law in Aquinas’s Summa theologiae where such a perspective is
accommodated in view of understanding the historicity of human agents. Notwithstanding, the
Christian hylomorphic anthropology of the human person undergirds this speculative approach.
The attempt in this thesis to speculate from the bottom up does not intend to disregard the bodysoul unicity. Rather, it attempts to employ the transcendental methodology where drawing from
the contingent nature of the human person, observations are made by elevating those
experiences and reflectively evaluating them through the lens of moral principles, specifically,
the first principles of natural law. In this inductive process, human historicity is viewed not as
an added-on exercise, but rather, this approach is underlined by the truth that: “Man does not
merely have a history: he is history.”37 And it is within this history where the infinite horizon
of intelligibility rises to illuminate the human soul of the truths about human creaturehood and
the ends of human existence. The search for a universal ethic, therefore, if it truly intends to
provide a new outlook, must establish its starting point from the historicity of the human person
in order to discover the practical content of natural law:
With the help of his reason, man seeks for concrete norms, the content
of natural law, which will serve his effort at self-realisation, and reject
those which radically contradict it. In its recognition of what is natural
law, reason is not autonomous. There are data which man must
necessarily take into account. His “natural inclinations” give a first
general orientation as to the goals to which human conduct should be
directed.38
These natural inclinations, construed as primal goods39 that promote the realisation of natural
ends, point to the laws of nature which every person (1) “has in common with all substances”
(in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis),40 (2) “has in common with other animals” (in
qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus),41 and (3) is proper to him “according to the nature
36
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of his reason” (secundum naturam rationis).42 Aquinas specifies that these natural inclinations
have a moral character, which means that the pursuit of these is good and the neglect or
violation of these is evil. The teleological attribute of the good delineates natural law’s moral
orientation and its role to cause human agents to will that which natural inclinations point
reason to will in view of human perfection and self-realisation. Aquinas states this in this
manner:
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural
inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and
objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural
inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.43
It is important at this junction to succinctly clarify the relationship between the order of natural
inclinations and the order of the precepts of the natural law. Human agents discover the natural
law through reflection of their natural inclinations within their lifespan of experiences. These
natural inclinations point to the goods which promote the fullness of humanity:
Every human being who attains self-awareness and responsibility
experiences an interior call to do good. He discovers that he is
fundamentally a moral being, capable of perceiving and of expressing
the call that…is found within all cultures: “One must do good and avoid
evil.”44
Through experience and reflection that gradually pave the way for the discovery of the natural
law inscribed in human hearts, these goods, which are construed as ends as well, are therefore
rendered as the ontological bases upon which practical reason apprehends that which is good
for the human person.45 “By searching for the moral good,” the International Theological
Commission propounds, “the person contributes to the realisation of his nature, beyond
impulses of instinct or the search for a particular pleasure. This moral good testifies to itself
naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et
similia. (Emphasis mine)
42
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and is understood from itself.”46 By this clarification, it maintains that the order of natural
inclinations is correlative to the order of the precepts of the natural law. It should also be
maintained that both ‘orders’ constitute the one and the same reality: the human person acting
as a moral agent. Hence, natural law:
designates an orientation of the practical reason which indicates to the
moral subject what kind of action is in accord with the basic and
necessary dynamism of his being that tends to its full realisation. This
law is normative in virtue of an internal requirement of the spirit. It
springs from the heart itself of our being as a call to the realisation and
transcending of oneself. It is not therefore a matter of subjecting oneself
to the law of another, but of accepting the law of one’s being.47
It is thus important to keep in mind when reflectively dealing with the order of the precepts of
the natural law and the order of natural inclinations that:
the human subject is not a collection or juxtaposition of diverse and
autonomous natural inclinations, but a substantial and personal whole,
who has the vocation to respond to the love of God and to unify himself
by accepting his orientation towards a last end that places in the
hierarchical order the partial goods by the various natural tendencies.
[Also], in this organic whole, each part preserves a proper and
irreducible meaning, which must be taken into account by reason in the
elaboration of the overall mission of the human person.48
Furthermore, as previously alluded to, these natural inclinations require temporal specificity in
order for practical reason to historically address its configurations within the confines of human
experiences. While “[t]he perception of the fundamental moral goods is immediate, vital, based
on the connaturality of the spirit with values,”49 the International Theological Commission is
adamant that the practical reason’s grasp of the natural law “is often imperfect, still obscure
and dim…[dealing] with the data of the most simple and common experience, implicit in the
concrete action of persons.”50 It evident from this statement that while some very basic
understanding of the natural law is grasped at the moment of conscious awareness of the
external world, the apprehension of the contents of natural law is by no means a foregone
conclusion. Moral agency must continue to actively and reflectively engage with the social
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environment in order to foment what was initially grasped. This entails, too, the facility of the
faculty of imagination which is also a source of knowledge according to Aquinas. Thus, the
apprehension of the first principles of natural law is meant to be a dynamic rational and
emotional experience which fosters growth at all levels of human moral development. The
International Theological Commission posits that: “This natural law is not at all static in its
expression. It does not consist of a list of definitive and immutable precepts. It is a spring of
inspiration always flowing forth for the search for an objective foundation for a universal
ethic.”51 It is not as if synderesis has finally done its job the moment the conscious awareness
of the external world has actuated the first principles of natural law. Reiterating what was
earlier stated, synderesis continues to seek and guide moral apprehension since it is its nature
as an innate disposition of the practical reason to lead human agents to always find themselves
“immediately in the sphere of morality.”52 In this realm of morality, a morality that is
historically present, Narvaez’s evolutionary psychology has much to contribute towards
heightening the human awareness and understanding of the nature and content of these natural
inclinations.
The moral (religious) contents of natural law (and its derived natural inclinations) impose no
specific obligation to psychology since “natural law which is the basis of social and political
order does not demand the adherence of faith, but of reason.”53 This does not mean, of course,
that “the natural law would be binding on all ‘even if there were no God,’”54 as the modern
rationalist model of natural law would insist. This statement invites once again the
consideration of the notions of the order of reason and the order of nature in regard to the
interpretation of natural law. Whichever approach is undertaken, or both as exemplified by the
magisterium of the Catholic Church, it does not, and should not for that matter, ignore in either
case the element of faith. Theology expects psychology to make pronouncements in relation to
the sciences and not to faith. It would be unreasonable for psychology to propose matters of
faith when it is evidently outside its province. When psychology faces the limits of its scientific
domain, theology could only hope that it will make the ‘leap of faith’ to posit the congruence
of science as an ally of theology rather than its nemesis. As will be elaborated below, Narvaez’s
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evolutionary psychology offers and affirms invaluable scientific observations that are nothing
short of providential and beneficial to moral theology.
Regarding these tiers of natural ends where their universal applicability to all human persons
is recognised and affirmed, every human agent bears the moral obligation to fulfill the demands
of the various natural inclinations. In the mind of Aquinas, the order of natural inclinations
implies the moral obligation accruing from this order. Gula explains that: “The origin of our
specific moral obligation lies in these natural inclinations which give content to the
fundamental requirements to do good and avoid evil.”55 This line of thinking assumes that these
three fundamental expressions of natural law are derivatives of the first principles of natural
law, i.e., good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Since the primary moral
principles are construed as formal principles, the natural inclinations frame the natural law in
practical terms. Thus, the good that is grasped by the order of reason is the telos that perfects
and fulfills every human agent. When fundamental inclinations are realised, human agents
acquire a holistic existence where the natural ends are met and which, if pursued further, the
supernatural ends may ultimately be obtained. Moreover, the universal nature of this holistic
experience unites every human person with all created things or substances, with fellow animal
creatures and with themselves.
Gradually, the moral weight of these natural inclinations become more demanding as it
descends from the universal to the particular. The characterisation of this descent as being more
demanding is based on the order of reason that recognises ultimately that the natural inclination
to know the truth about God is paramount. That said, it is certain in the mind of Aquinas that
human persons, as naturally social beings,56 necessarily exist not in isolation but in a history
that is shared by all. The social dimension of human existence discloses something about the
human agents’ involvement in human history:
Man is a social being; and as social is involved in historical
development; his actions cannot be judged by reference to an abstract
metaphysical nature. Man’s nature is part of the development – it is
changing and man himself is in some way author of change – which
increases, not diminishes, man’s responsibility.57
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In relating the above to Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory, the telos of moral development via
the ‘evolved nest’ (Evolved Developmental Niche) for optimal development is aimed at
“foster[ing] emotion systems and mindsets that skilfully guide prosocial moral action.”58 This
moral obligation to oneself extends to and effectuates the moral obligation to the community
by “bring[ing] awareness to the mind, courage to the heart and strength to each other so that
[human agents] can construct a society and world where all thrive.”59 These considerations in
psychology overlap those theological realities pertaining to the derivative expressions of the
natural law, i.e., the natural inclinations.
Since the epistemological perspective of knowing the natural inclinations has already been
dealt with, the focal point of the ensuing discussion will be the synthetic investigation of the
natural inclinations in relation to the global moral mindsets appertaining to Narvaez’s Triune
Ethics Theory.

“In qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis” vis-à-vis Safety Ethic
Aquinas suggests that in common with all substances (in qua communicat cum omnibus
substantiis), all human persons possess the natural inclination to seek “the preservation of its
own being, according to its nature.”60 Based on the fact of the created-ness of human life that
is integrally part of the created universe, the moral obligation to conserve human life can be
drawn. Reason recognises that since human life has meaning and purpose, i.e., life is considered
a good within the web of interrelationships in the universe, there is a moral obligation to fulfill
that which perfects the ends of the human person. It would obviously be mute to speak of the
natural ends in the absence of an actually existing subject that freely rationalises and commands
the inclinations. Aquinas’s teaching on the preservation of life is subsequently explicated in his
treatment of suicide and killing in self-defence.
In relation to the former, Aquinas frames his position against suicide by utilising secular
reasoning in his first two arguments (that universally apply to all including non-believers),
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while the third and last ultimately grounds the sinful nature of suicide to divine ownership of
human lives:
It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because
everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything
naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can….
Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole…. Thirdly,
because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power.61
In view of the latter, Aquinas maintains the primacy of the preservation of life even in cases of
self-defence by considering the moral value of the life of not just the victim, but of the offender
as well:
Wherefore if a man, in self-defence, uses more than necessary violence,
it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel [sic] force with moderation his
defence will be lawful…. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man
omit [sic] the act of moderate self-defence in order to avoid killing the
other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than
of another's.62
Narvaez’s Security or Safety Ethic projects the global moral mindset of self-preservation which
is relatively expressive of Aquinas’s natural inclination to the preservation of life. An
additional detail in Aquinas’s articulation of his natural inclination doctrine includes the action
phrase, ‘warding off its obstacles,’ which relates to the specific type of human reaction to
various life-endangering stimuli. Narvaez claims that: “At birth we emerge with a set of
phylogenetically ancient basic emotions systems that we use for survival. These self-protection
mechanisms ensure that the organism has the equipment to stay alive through exploration and
under threat.”63 Her claims sufficiently provide a plausible scientific foundation to the natural
inclination to preserving life. Brain structures are equipped with neurological mechanisms that
stimulate the mind to either fight or take flight in the face of danger or stress situations. The
notion of ‘warding off its obstacles’ characterises this neurological reaction to danger and stress
stimuli. The behavioural propensity that has been in existence since evolutionary ancient times
suggests that human beings have always experienced either or both of their natural disposition
to self-love or to view life as part of a bigger reality. Aquinas’s third argument relating to life’s
preservation due to its divine origin (God is the creator of life) may not necessarily and
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immediately enter into people’s worldview yet but may be experientially introduced, directly
or indirectly, as life progresses.64
Narvaez confirms that the Safety or Security Ethic is the default global mindset, which when
not conditioned in early life, may tend to dominate personality.65 As mentioned in the previous
chapter, children in their early years require caregiving patterns that promote genuine
interrelationships (e.g., touch, physical presence of caregivers, etc.). This necessarily involves
quality time provisions by caregivers towards children. When caregiving is present and
sufficient, it fosters a well-developed brain that, in the face of danger or stress situations, is
able to manage its survival system responses to these stimuli. In other words, emotions are able
to be managed during these types of situations.
On the other hand, the absence of these elements will likely leave a traumatic upbringing which
pronounces the Safety Ethic in situations of danger or threat. When the Safety Ethic dominates
personality, the behavioural reactions of fight or flight are activated and become the immediate
behavioural response. The fight reaction in view of perceived security threat could exhibit
behaviours such as, among many other predictable behaviours, an “impulsive hostile
aggression”66 or rage that aim to neutralise the perceived danger and to “return to homeostasis
– a feeling of safety.”67 On the other hand, the flight reaction in the face of threatening
situations activates the “self-focused survival systems”68 which involves, but not exclusively,
behavioural reactions such as narcissistic dispositions, fear, panic, withdrawal from social life,
defensive behaviours, the development of pathologies such as obsessions and compulsions, and
many other behavioural patterns that serve only one thing: self-preservation.69
The preservation of life has been a contentious issue since time immemorial. Narvaez’s claims
of the mismatch lifestyle of the current generation compared to the ideal ancestral lifestyle of
the small-band hunter-gatherers (SBHG) are indicative of the serious concerns regarding the
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contemporary valuation of human life. If from the onset of human life children are not receiving
the kind of caregiving that will promote a well-developed brain that manages emotions and
behaviours well in social life, then there is every chance that the children of this generation and
beyond will fail to come out of the mismatch. Narvaez is not wrong in positing that those selffocused contemporary behaviours displayed these days are indicative of the decadence of what
is meant to be a flourishing community. The reigns of individualism and subjectivism in
contemporary societies are symptomatic of the lack or absence of a sense of commitment
towards the preservation of life. Based on Narvaez’s assertion, it is not difficult to infer that
caregiving is seriously affected by individualism and subjectivism. Caregiving involves ‘going
out of one’s way’ to look after another person, let alone one’s child. But when the stress is illplaced on promoting self-fulfilment at the expense and neglect of committing one’s time and
energy to the moral development of other people such as into child caregiving, a traumatic
child upbringing will more than likely result in the development of behavioural patterns that
do not reflect the baseline virtues that are developmentally essential for personal and communal
flourishing.

“In qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus” vis-à-vis Engagement Ethic
Aquinas posits that in common with all animals (in qua communicat cum caeteris animalibus),
all human persons seek the preservation of the human race through “sexual intercourse,
education of offsprings [sic], and so forth.”70 The earlier-mentioned physicalist interpretation
of the natural law is evident in this articulation expressing the natural disposition of all human
persons to the prolongation of life, just like all animals which possess the same capacity.
Aquinas’s preference for Ulpian’s definition of natural law mentioned earlier elucidates how
he conceives this law as emanating from nature itself. 71 By adopting this definition, Aquinas
evidently views nature itself as the material cause of the natural disposition to sexual
intercourse. The fact that this specific natural inclination is presented as being “in common
with all animals” tells of a very fundamental disposition that excludes rationality, a
characteristic feature which obviously inheres only and exclusively in human beings.
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Once again, in what could be perhaps considered as a Thomistic explanation rendered in
secular, non-religious terms, Aquinas further addresses the specific question of the nature of
the prolongation of the human race in the Summa theologiae under the subject matter of The
Parts of Lust (De luxuriate partibu).72 In the following quote, Aquinas points out morality’s
dependence on the order of nature regarding what natural law demands of every human person:
[W]herever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the
venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of
lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right
reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in
addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as
becoming to the human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice."
This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without
any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the
sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by
copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called "bestiality."
Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female
with female…. Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of
copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and
bestial manners of copulation.73
Subsequently, Aquinas presents the theological (religious) rationale behind the prioritisation
of the order of nature in the consideration of what is ‘natural’ in the order of sexual activity:
“Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God
Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an
injury is done to God, the Author of nature.”74 This argument has proved to be useful in many
ecclesial declarations in justifying the order of nature as the basis for human morality. The use
of this rationalisation is well known in supporting some form of ethical biologism evident in a
number of Catholic Church’s magisterial declarations specifically in the area of sexual ethics.
The case of the Catholic Church’s teachings on homosexuality holds true in this regard.
When he was then Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger issued the document, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral
Care of Homosexual Persons, and presented the Catholic Church’s moral teaching on
homosexuality. It can be observed that the order of nature appears to be the guiding principle
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in this ecclesial pronouncement. Its declaration that homosexual “inclination itself must be seen
as an objective disorder”75 is premised on the moral understanding that the “union of the sexes
is directed to the common good of the human race.”76 This unequivocally posits that the
complementarity of sexes, i.e., man and woman, is inscribed in natural law which guarantees
that the prolongation of the human race – which is a common good – is pursued as a moral
concern. Homosexual activity specifically is viewed as an ‘objective disorder’ because of its
inability to fulfill the dictate of natural law: “Homosexual activity is not a complementary
union, able to transmit life.”77 This and many other ecclesial documents uphold the validity of
the order of nature argument, explicitly or implicitly, which, in a positive way, points the
direction of the moral consideration of the matter towards the historical or humanistic
perspective, although admittedly not far enough. In this strict respect, the historicity of the
human person must not be limited to biological or physical determinations. Human morality
must explore the depths and breadths of what it means to be fully human in order that a just
consideration of the morality of human acts can be achieved. Moreover, to pursue the ‘objective
order’ must necessarily include the ‘subjective order’ since without the consideration of both,
there is no human morality to speak of. Equally, the application of the first principles of natural
law must consider the historical nuances of the human person before a prudential conclusion
could be morally justified and executable.
The natural inclination to the prolongation of the human race expressed in this specific form
does not have a counterpart in Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory. However, the nuancing of the
Engagement Ethic is more descriptive of the underlying physical nature of the second natural
inclination:
Engagement ethics are about communion in the here and now: ‘It’s
about me and being with you (us).’ This represents a dual universe
(instead of the solo universe of the safety ethic) – losing oneself
trustingly in the moment to attune to the Other.78
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For a while one may think here that Narvaez is talking about marital love. But the truth of the
matter is, Narvaez is speaking about the quality of relational attachment that humans are
capable of and is developed right at the crucial period of a child’s early years of receiving
parental caregiving. This therefore stresses once again the importance of the ‘evolved nest’
where, when optimal environments are created by parents for their children, children’s moral
development are on an uphill trajectory. Narvaez supports this claim by asserting that:
Infants are endowed with the ‘set-goal’ of staying close to mother, a
characteristic that evolved to increase infant survival by motivating
them to remain close to their primary source of safety. At the same
time, infants are equipped with a motivation to use the mother as a
“secure base” for exploration, quickly returning to her when becoming
scared.79
The scientific assertion rendered above surprisingly moves far deeper than and beyond merely
presenting the natural inclination towards the prolongation of the human race in terms of the
physical act of sexual intercourse. Narvaez’s narration centres on emotional relationship rather
than biological activity which far describes the behaviour of the animal kingdom in contrast to
Aquinas’s ‘materialistic’ approach. She attributes this to an early-life supportive care
environment marked by “presence, synchrony and intersubjectivity, empathy, mentalising and
perspective taking.”80 She articulates the quality of relationship that is formed out of this care
environment as demonstrating “close relationship with others, feelings of empathy.”81 Narvaez
refers to this phenomenon as “vicinity companionship”82 which descriptively expresses the
closeness of the parent-child relationship that is developing.
Narvaez points out that the Engagement Ethic could either be characterised by “calm or
distressed.”83 She suggests that when the Engagement Ethic is not fully formed in terms of
emotional regulations, the human person “may have a cacostatic reaction, either
overinvolvement

(entanglement

in

relationships,

codependency,

helicoptering)

or

underinvolvement (empathic distress), shifting attention to the self.”84 Evidently, when trauma
defines a person’s early childhood years, the default system of the Safety Ethic dominates
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human behaviours. Thus, the ‘shift to the self’ is expressive of this default ethic that is
stimulated when the Engagement Ethic is unavailable.
The Ethic of Engagement’s link to the natural inclination to the prolongation of the human race
is evidently underscored by the human natural propensity to inter-relate (engage) and respond
in an emotionally stable manner to stressors in life. This form of relationship is most sublime
in the “engagement of the heart”85 that can be expressed in manifold relational ways and not
just through sexual intercourse. Accordingly, ‘engagement’ in the mind of Narvaez is “about
connecting and bonding in the moment, right now, on an equal basis, person to person, entity
to entity.”86 This statement points to the depth of human interrelationships that the act of sexual
intercourse in itself is not able to offer. That said, although Narvaez considers the Ethic of
Engagement as providing the foundation “for higher moral capacities, [it is] “insufficient for
the moral life of an adult.”87 What will be sufficient is the Ethic of Imagination, the topic that
is next-in-line for discussion.

“Secundum naturam rationis” vis-à-vis Imagination Ethic
The third natural inclination focuses on that which every human person has in common with
each other - rationality (secundum naturam rationis). Owing to this specific nature, human
persons are naturally disposed “to know the truth about God, and to live in society.”88
According to Gula, “This is the ‘order of reason’ strain of interpretation of natural law, which
is consistent with St. Thomas’ fundamental definition of natural law as the human participation
in eternal law through the use of reason.”89 Aquinas holds that the knowledge of God is
metaphysically tenable (self-evident) since in articulating that ‘God exists,’ the predicate itself
contains and provides the truth about the reality of God. In other words, nothing mitigates
between God and His existence since both expressions are true and point to the same truth.
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Experientially, however, it is only through demonstrations that human persons are able to know
some truths about God:
"God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as
the subject, because God is His own existence…. Now because we do
not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us;
but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us,
though less known in their nature - namely, by effects.90
Since the knowledge “that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by
nature,”91 experience therefore is exigent in actuating what is implanted in us by God. The
Quinque viæ or the Five Proofs of the Existence of God92 are Aquinas’s ways of demonstrating
how human agents are able to acquire some knowledge of the truth about God. In this regard,
Aquinas is confident in the human capacity to grasp those truths which can be known naturally:
“[T]here is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith,
something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.”93
Accordingly, that the third natural inclination is in a sense not universal is meant to be
understood that knowledge of God is not immediately available to the human mind. Though
reason is present only among human beings and not in all created substance, let alone animals,
it is not guaranteed, however, that the human mind will freely seek truths about God. Though
synderesis is viewed by Aquinas as the ‘law of our mind,’94 the ordering of reason which
facilitates the motion of human agents towards the active perfecting of their human essence
does not always come to fruition due to the influence or the perversion of “passion, or evil
habit, or an evil disposition of nature.”95 Thus, the innate existence of synderesis in all human
persons is a not a practical guarantee that every human person will live moral lives. The natural
disposition to the moral good is a reality that requires human commitment and diligence in
order for it to foment in human lives. Synderesis therefore needs to be understood within the
framework of natural inclinations which are responsible for driving nature towards the
realisation of practical actions to which human agents commit. This means, while there is the
innate disposition to apprehend the first principles of natural law, synderesis needs to be
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understood as capable of developing co-operatively with natural inclinations in view of leading
human agents towards a growing understanding of the truth which could lead to the Ultimate
Truth, who is God. It is evident from this narration that acquiring some knowledge of God is a
gradual developing experience that requires a personal commitment. Synderesis, being the seed
of moral life, is reinforced by natural inclinations to dispose human persons to those which are
perfective of human nature. Ultimately, the perfection of human nature is realised by seeking
the truths about God.
While the ultimate and necessary goal of the third natural inclination is God, the process that
Aquinas is proposing to achieve it is accordingly historical, i.e., the use of natural capacities
will enable human persons to know something about God. This means therefore that the faculty
of reason possesses in itself the capacity to lead human agents to acquire some degree of
understanding and knowledge about the moral life. Reason is the natural vehicle that can take
human agents to wherever they ought to be based on their very nature. It is generally and
casually said that humans are limited only by their imagination. Aquinas, without doubt, used
imagination to conceptualise the Quinque viæ. It could not have been otherwise. He made use
of sensitive experience in order to penetrate the knowledge of the transcendence. For example,
he made use of the human experience of motion in order to inductively conclude that there
must be the primordial source of all earthly movements since otherwise, it will be a vicious
circle trying to determine the beginning of life in the universe.96 To posit God through this
sensitive experience can only be a product of imagination.
The involvement of imagination in the consideration of natural law is not only inevitable, but
essential. The intellective process is not fully achievable without imagination. For the human
mind to penetrate the infinite horizon of intelligibility, this requires the imaginative process.
Similarly, for the human mind to dwell in the horizon of prudence, moral imagination is
necessary in order to know the different manifestations of the truth (and untruth) appearing on
the moral landscape. In both of these horizons, the human experience of excessus ad esse allows
human agents to imaginatively discover and appreciate the moral good that is perfective of the
human self. Moreover, moral imagination ensures that morality is not kept to the secular
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minimum but rather, is prudentially ingenious and explorative in considering that the
manifestation of the truths could transcendentally lead to the Ultimate Truth, who is God.
It is in this respect that Narvaez considers the Imagination Ethic as belonging to a higher order
among the global ethical mindsets. This ethic builds on human interrelationships (Engagement
Ethic) which facilitates a beyond-now awareness between you-and-me and which “enlarge[es]
the field of possibilities and broadening the landscape for action.”97 This description of
imagination reflects previous attributions on imagination, specifically imaginative prudence,
where the human soul enquires about given realities and moral principles in view of providing
human agents a determination to which moral course of action to take. The determination
essentially involves the imaginative consideration of human contingencies (beyond-now
awareness of you-and-me) and the discovery of various possibilities and scenarios (‘landscape
for action’) while attending to the concrete application of the moral principles (syneidesis) in
consideration of these practical realities. Narvaez adds: “Imagination intervenes deeply in our
moral lives as the ‘capacity to concretely perceive what is before in light of what could be’; it
‘amplifies perception beyond the immediate’ and ‘constitutes an extension of the environment
to which we respond.’”98
Narvaez’s moral imagination encompasses a broad systematic investigation on its possible
stimulants, its internal operations, and its synthetic organic ability. She reports on the causal
effect of external triggers on moral imagination such as contextual cues, environmental
affordances, social influence and situation press.99 She also attributes to moral imagination the
internal processing of principles (e.g., being a kind person, being a team player), gut feelings,
current goals and preferences, past and current reactions and outcomes (of self and others),
mood and energy.100 Likewise, she ascribes to moral imagination the capacity to “coordinate
the interrelations of multiple elements by evaluating the logical coherence of action
possibilities with one’s self-image,…remembering and filtering the present through prior
experience,…balancing one’s goals and needs with the goals and needs of others in the
circumstances,…and “consciously letting go of conflicting (sometimes moral) goals.”101 All of
these attributions point to the dynamic and complex reality of moral imagination and to the
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external and internal realities of how moral imagination consummates its inherent operations.
They provide scientific evidence as to why the Imagination Ethic is characterised as belonging
to a higher order than the Safety Ethic and the Engagement Ethic.
In reference to three global ethical mindsets, the role of the emotions appears to be more
pronounced in Narvaez than in Aquinas whose epistemology arguably favours reason over the
affect. Aquinas has shown his cautious approach regarding passions (emotions) while Narvaez
is fearless in presenting her Triune Ethics Theory as fundamentally affective in orientation.
Although it may be outside the scope of this study to investigate how much of the affect is
reflected in Thomistic epistemology, Aquinas never discounts the effect of emotions on moral
actions: “Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet
it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will.”102

Summary
Aquinas’s natural law and its three natural inclinations find parallel synthetic conceptualisation
in Narvaez’s global ethical mindsets. The outcome of the synthesis scientifically provides
substance to Aquinas’s medieval observations regarding moral agency. Somehow, it also
thwarts the notion of the impossibility of any conceptual convergence due to the extent of the
diversity of both disciplines. The possibility of a restrictive physicalist reading of Aquinas’s
natural law allows for the discussion to speculate via empirical perspective. Having such an
approach as the starting point of the speculative investigation, it maintains human nature as the
common springboard upon which moral development can be analytically studied. The three
natural inclinations resonate in Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory revealing thematic links which
generally and legitimately affirm Aquinas’s assertions in moral philosophy and moral
psychology. Inversely, it also broadly asserts the possibility of grounding scientific research in
Thomistic philosophy and psychology. Aquinas’s natural inclinations to preservation of human
life, to preservation of human population, and to seek the truth, all find congruence in the Ethic
of Safety, Ethic of Engagement and the Ethic of Imagination respectively. This congruence
validates the basicity of natural law as truly being founded in nature and by extension, as a
fundamental element in human evolution. Specifically, Narvaez’s scientific research has given
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ascendancy to the reality of imagination as a necessary faculty in cognitive and moral
development. Considered by her as expressive of human evolution reaching its pinnacle,
imagination supports the theological assertion that the faculty of reasoning images God’s
presence in every human being. Since imagination is constitutive of the moral agent as an
intelligent being in a moral universe, there is no reason why prudential moral inquiries should
be disenfranchised by disregarding moral imagination as one of its sources of knowledge.
Narvaez’s scientific research indisputably confirms that moral development is handicapped
without the services of moral imagination. When the moral mind is underperforming, moral
development suffers where moral outcomes may not just be detrimental to natural ends, but
more importantly, to supernatural ends.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion: Imagining the Natural law

Introduction
Moral development is viable due to moral imagination. Moral imagination, specifically
imaginative prudence which serves practical reason in moral inquiries, fosters the moral
determination of human acts that are completive and perfective of the human essence. The
moral ends of human acts are always necessary since being moral good themselves, they serve
as natural and supernatural ends of human acts. According to Aquinas, moral ends are sought
naturally by human agents since every human person has the capacity for God (capax Dei).
This quest, however, requires imagination to effectuate a moral change in the disposition of
human agents. Imagination opens the moral mind to the good of life, to the good of sexual
intimacy, and to the good of the truth. These goods are humanly achievable, but it would
necessitate change, both personal and communal, in order that human completion and
perfection are achieved.
The scientific research of Darcia Narvaez will continue to be explored in this chapter following
on the previous chapter. In concert with Aquinas, she also emphasises the important reality
about the human agent’s capacity to change. Narvaez believes in internal and external factors
that allow the possibility for human agents to adapt to their changing environment and to

habituate in the moral virtues even at a later stage in their lives.1 She states the following in
this respect:
First, like everything human, morality emerges from biology and
embodiment – our lived experience…. Second, our morality is
multidimensional and arises from our evolved brain propensities.
Through epigenetics and developmental plasticity, early experience
shapes not only how well the body works but also how our social
capacities function…neurobiological beginnings matter for all
[human] capabilities, including emotional, intellectual, and moral.
Third, cultures are malleable. Cultures foster or undermine health and
well-being and encourage or discourage our highest human nature. A
society can intentionally foster greater capacities in its citizen….
Fourth, individuals can self-author virtue and wisdom capacities to
facilitate change. They can join together to reauthor their communities
and make them places where all thrive. With mindful self-cultivation
and communal choices, humans together can develop relationships and
institutions that stimulate and foster well-being and flourishing for
every individual in the lifescape.2
Narvaez’s assertions above are expressive of Aquinas’s thinking that human agents are not
consigned to the resulting effects of Adam’s fall. Aquinas believes that: “Man’s nature is
changeable” (“Natura autem hominis est mutabilis”).3 Thereto, Aquinas believes that change
is good for human nature: “For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant
to us because our nature is changeable.”4
The transformation that is envisaged by Aquinas’s exitus et reditus principle is anchored in the
capacity of all intelligent beings to change. Likewise, Narvaez’s intent to overcome the
mismatch between the present generation’s lifestyle and to recover the ancestral lifestyle of the
small-band hunter-gatherers is realisable on account of the moral person’s capacity to change.
In this respect, Aquinas gives his advice on how to go about embracing change in human life:
“if we do what we can, that is, follow the guidance of natural reason, God will not withhold
from us that which we need.”5 Natural reason espouses imagination since this human faculty
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is divinely given in order for all human persons to overcome their human limitation and thereby
cross its boundaries in view of achieving their telic ends.
The ensuing discussion presents Narvaez’s idea of primal wisdom that is observed to be
behaviourally linked to the indigenous lifestyle that gave rise to the optimal environment called
“evolved nest.” If primal wisdom may have had a hand in this lifestyle optimisation, there is
reason to believe that apart from merely being understood as a social practice, primal wisdom
may actually reflect the primal goods (natural inclinations) of Aquinas. This reflection is
underlined by the moral value of these goods and wisdom in effecting change and fostering
moral development. Imagining natural law today is vital in occasioning the growth of practical
knowledge which synderesis intuits and apprehends. Moral imagination specifically helps in
this endeavour by creatively providing perspectives, both representational and hypothetical, in
forging a moral path that serves the purpose and goal of human life. Further, imaginative
prudence, when habituated, assists moral agents by inquiring about the perspectives of the
universal moral principles and the infinity of singulars prior to committing to a moral act.
Both Aquinas and Narvaez agree on the need for discernment in this respect. Apart from the
mental calmness that it provides, discernment engages the moral mind to contemplate on the
expediency of change for moral development to take effect and maturate in the human person.
Discernment lends the imagination of the natural law the locus for ethical changes to take shape
in human life. It makes it certain that any moral act that is decided upon has gone through
imaginative consideration of the various contingencies of human historicity. Truthfully,
synderesis can only and truly serves its purpose if temporal conditions are deliberately
considered in prudential moral inquiries. When the moral mind attempts to imagine the natural
law, it should imagine synderesis for the practical good that it pursues and the evil that it avoids
in real life.

Aquinas’s Primal Goods and Narvaez’s Primal Wisdom
The science of psychology can only speak of human agents as potentially capable of acquiring
the natural ends. To speak of supernatural ends is the concern of practical theology. Aquinas’s
primal goods and Narvaez’s primal wisdom both consider the historical dimension of human
affairs which when their potentials and capacities are realised can practically achieve human
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natural ends. The difference lies, however, in that the primal goods achieved via acquired moral
virtues are viewed as imperfect yet preparative of the supernatural ends. Narvaez’s primal
wisdom falls within the imperfect although its existence is absolutely beneficial in enabling
human persons discover the limits and potentials of human nature in achieving the supernatural
ends alluded to in Catholic moral theology.
Though Narvaez expectedly appears to be silent on the terminological articulation of natural
law, she, however, posits the reality of the primal wisdom which seems to express very
proximately the idea of the Thomistic fundamental universal ethics or natural law. Her idea of
primal wisdom “appears to be part of human essence”6 whose social practices foster the
survival and human flourishing of small-band hunter-gatherers at both the individual and
community levels.7 There is an observable parallelism between these concepts that rests on the
fact that both deal with human nature and human (moral) agency. Both claims that the path
towards fulfillment of human goods (Aquinas) and wisdom (Narvaez) is multifarious. Aquinas
claims that “everything desires its own perfection…that which he desires as his perfect and
crowning good.”8 On the other hand, Narvaez confirms that “[t]here is more than one route to
wisdom.”9 She admits, however, that the present generation cannot return to this ancient
lifestyle at this stage but assumingly asserts that “maybe we can learn from them in order to
shift our own cultures in a direction more in line with our human essence.”10
The proceeding discussion attempts to outline possible learnings that can be drawn from this
primal wisdom in view of the natural law.11 For Narvaez, wisdom “is a body of knowledge that
crosses cultures and historical periods and has interdisciplinary support.”12 She purports that
primal wisdom is integrated in the lifestyle of nomadic foragers and various indigenous and
aboriginal peoples and “is broader than what is discernible from the writings and practices of
Western wisdom traditions.”13 It needs to be reiterated here that Narvaez’s understanding of
the development of the moral self in early life “begins with the development of implicit
procedural knowledge, based on pattern of cognition.”14 This implies that this manner of
6
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acquiring knowledge precedes the capacity for reflective self-awareness15 (or discursive
knowledge).
In reflecting on these social practices that represent the ninety-nine percent of global optimal
lifestyle that forms the evolved developmental niche accrued from the study of numerous
existing small-band hunter-gatherers around the world, it discloses natural dispositions that
are expressive and comparable to the contents of the Thomistic natural law. Not only does
studying this ancient lifestyle provide clarity on some of the aspects of natural law, but they
also affirm and confirm how ‘natural’ natural law is since the practical dispositions emanating
from the primary moral principles appear to be consistently present throughout human history.
The following discussion on Narvaez’s primal wisdom can be found to be beneficially
informative as it provides a deeper and broader understanding of the three natural inclinations
that Aquinas purports as primal goods which emanate from the primary principles of natural
law.

Natural Law Appeals Universally
The International Theological Commission’s search for a universal ethic is premised on the
teaching of natural law as a given reality:
This law, in substance, affirms that persons and human communities
are capable, in light of reason, of discerning the fundamental
orientations of moral action in conformity with the very nature of the
human subject and of expressing these orientations in a normative
fashion in the form of precepts or commands.16
It is evident from the above that if an ethic is meant to be ‘natural’, i.e., etymologically
understood as that which is present at birth, it would necessarily have to have a universal
appeal. Such is Narvaez’s understanding of human agency within the primal wisdom
perspective: “the self is expansive, communal, and multidimensional.”17 If Narvaez maintains
that “[t]there is no solitary self, but instead a sense of self as part of the larger common self that
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is shared with all entities,”18 this reflects Aquinas’s understanding of the human person as
“naturally a social being.”19 The social nature of all human beings points to their natural state
as interrelated to all created beings or entities. Observably, Aquinas points out that the first
natural inclination is “in common with all substances.” This foundational assertion is pivotal
in ascertaining that all created beings are not merely subjective realities, but also objective
realities who are deeply linked with the life and dynamism of the social environment around
them. In this respect, Narvaez states that “[i]n this type of worldview, the subjective and
objective are not really distinctive.”20 This primal wisdom lends substance to the essence of the
first natural inclination to the preservation of life. The interrelatedness of human person,
specifically with fellow creatures, is a natural given that stresses the moral imperative for every
human person to not just have a regard for oneself but more universally, to each and every
human person on earth. Along this line, Narvaez emphasises the scientific finding that “for the
small-band hunter-gatherer, suicide is a ridiculous notion.”21 On this basis, the regard for the
sanctity of human life is therefore not merely a Christian construct. It can be argued that as a
primal wisdom, it has a universal appeal that evidently underlines Aquinas’s appeal to preserve
life as a primal good based on natural inclination. The social dimension of suicide is often
demonstrated by the community’s mourning and grieving upon the death of a community
member.

Natural Law Espouses Equal Partnership
Intimately linked to the above is the primal wisdom which asserts that “[a]ll are partners in the
oneness of reality.”22 This reality goes deeper than the previous primal wisdom and penetrates
the heart of human existence: “A real human being does not violate others, whether human or
non-human, with a lack of courtesy, generosity, or respect.”23 As previously articulated, the
preservation of life particularly encompasses not just the subjective life, but also the objective
life, i.e., the life of each and every person in the global community. Primal wisdom underscores
the intrinsic value of equality as governing human and ecological relationships. Specifically,
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the acquired moral virtue of justice is clearly at the heart of human relationship. Aquinas posits
that justice is “rendering to each one his right.”24 Every person enjoys equal right and the right
to life is inherent is every person. This implies that as every person has the right to life, killing
encroaches upon other people’s right to life. People’s right to life therefore limits other people’s
right to life, with the exception of a duly considered morality of self-defence.
Inversely, Aquinas’s first natural inclination specifically espouses the preservation of human
life via the universal respect for the human race. This necessarily lends to Aquinas’s second
natural inclination which points out the equal responsibility of all human beings to preserve the
human race via the propagation of the human population through sexual intercourse and the
education of offspring. The preservation of the human race is a shared responsibility and is
considered as ‘a law inscribed in human hearts’ where human agents are expected to take
necessary steps in realising this primal good. Biologically, this shared responsibility naturally
falls upon heterosexual couples to procreate for the sake of the common good. This common
good also extends to the proper rearing of children. Narvaez’s insistence on quality caregiving
or companionship care of children underscores and emphasises the essence of this primal good.
The emphasis on establishing optimal early child care conditions is crucial since its neglect
will most likely lead children to experience dysfunctional lives in their adult life.25 In Catholic
sacramentology, the institution of matrimony safeguards the primal good by contextualising
procreation and education of children as constitutive of family life which has been elevated to
the level of a “domestic church.”26 The sanctity of marriage upholds not just the natural
responsibility of parents to procreate, but also to protect the right of children to be cared for
appropriately by their parents, most particularly by looking after their moral development. The
second natural inclination is therefore at the epicentre of human survival (Safety Ethic) and in
the flourishing of human interrelationship (Engagement Ethic). When optimal conditions are
provided to children during their early years of life, homeostasis27 will define their social and
psychological states during their adulthood.
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Natural Law Seeks Beauty and Goodness in the Truth
Narvaez declares that “[t]he agile brain/mind is mesmerised by the beauty of the earth…. It
does not just call us to growth, but it is a transforming presence wherein we unfold towards
growth almost before we realise it.”28 She observes that among the community of small-band
hunter-gatherers, beauty is sought in the wholeness of creation where art, science and social
life are integrated.29 Her observation implies that seeking and seeing beauty in the social sphere
is part and parcel of the day-to-day life of small-band hunter-gatherers. She compares this
primal wisdom to the traditional wisdom represented by Aquinas who, as she interprets him,
“contended that truth, goodness, and integrity belong, in essence, to beauty.”30
Aquinas equates beauty and goodness synonymously based on form, i.e., people basically
perceive beauty and goodness in things around them. This perception of beauty and goodness
resonates in the primal wisdom which Narvaez cites above. Aquinas, however, further
differentiates goodness and beauty logically, i.e., goodness is appetitive while beauty is
cognitive.31 Being an appetite, goodness points to the human disposition which seeks moral
good as an end of moral acts. Hence, the third natural inclination to seek the ‘truth about God’
is understood as seeking a good end. On the other hand, beauty, being a cognitive faculty,
relates to that which pleases the human mind upon perception. When human agents see
something beautiful, they cognise the elements of beauty present in such a particular thing. The
perceptual knowledge that is brought upon by the sight of beauty could be perhaps what
Narvaez views as the transformative effect of beauty. But for Aquinas, truth as a primal good
has a far deeper transformative causality.
The third natural inclination presents the human disposition to seek the ‘truth about God.’ As
stated earlier, though it is a primal good and is meant to be self-evident, the knowledge about
God is not immediately known. To know God entails the freedom to seek the ‘truth about God.’
When it does happen that human agency takes the human intellect to seek the ‘truth about God,’
not only does it transform the human person intellectually, it also transforms the whole of the
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person integrally. Truth is transformative owing to its very nature as exclusively belonging to
God Himself who is Truth par excellence:
[T]ruth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it
is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an
intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is
not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect;
and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other
being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence
and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in
Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.32
Furthermore, seeking the truth means seeking the ultimate good end. This underlines the
teleological inclination of the third primal good. We recall the words of Christ: “I am the way
and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father through me.”33 This statement is
understood in salvific terms; the road to human salvation is by having faith and following the
footsteps of Christ who is Truth Himself. The integrative disposition of the primal good
concerning beauty points to the universal truth which brings about wholeness and salvation. If
the primal good of beauty integrates the self to the cosmos, the primal good extends this beyond
the cosmos to God who is the sole Creator of the universe. This is the truth according to
Catholic doctrine where, when beauty and goodness meet in the infinite horizon of
intelligibility, an encounter with God takes place.
As earlier intimated, it is on this infinite horizon of intelligibility where the human mind
discovers the first principles of natural law through synderesis. The excessus ad esse
experience, traditionally understood as the ‘openness towards God,’ marks the meeting of the
divine with the human, of the universal with the particular, of eternity with historicity through
the instrumentality of the intellectus agens. This encounter ushers in the experiential
knowledge of the presence of divine in the human, of the universal in the particular, and of
perpetuity in the contingent. It is through this experience where natural law ceases to be merely
an abstraction, but rather, takes on human historicity as its locus of enlightenment or
illumination. Further, it is on this same infinite horizon of intelligibility where imaginative
prudence operates to morally guide human agency towards enaction that is self-realising and
self-fulfilling, and that which likewise fosters human flourishing via acquisition of natural
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ends, and hopefully supernatural ends. The horizon of imaginative prudence looms large in the
infinite horizon of intelligibility.
The proceeding discussion endeavours to elaborate more on the dynamism inherent in this
infinite horizon of intelligibility where, through imaginative prudence, the natural inclinations
which are expressive of the natural law are reflected as determinants of the moral order. The
horizon of imaginative prudence inserts itself in the infinite horizon of intelligibility in order to
serve as vehicle for the moral discernment of contingent matters. This would have important
practical implications in moral agency as the encounter should involve dynamic flexibility on
the part of universal principles in considering the different facets of human vicissitudes.

Imagining the Natural Law Today
The pursuit to imagine the natural law today lies at the heart of appropriating the historicity
and contingencies of human experiences in the consideration of the first principles of natural
law. What it hopes to achieve is the cognitive and appetitive grasp of the moral context through
which a moral discernment could aptly be determined. This attempt of contextualising the
application of the natural law via prudential moral inquiry, whose nature originally stems from
the science of hermeneutics, avoids abstractionism and universalism in decision making which
sees it generally ignore human experiences and conditions. What is required, henceforth, is a
thorough and open dialogue between moral principles and human contingencies in view of
avoiding the neglect, not just of the first principles of natural law and their derivatives, but of
crucial contextual facets that are inherent in the lived experiences of human agents. The first
principles of natural law make practical sense only when viewed from the lens of the moral
concerns of human agents. On its own, the first principles of natural law are of no use and do
not govern anything. Considered within human historicity, it becomes an illuminating factor in
the search for appropriate teleological moral paths. In this respect, to posit the opposition
between the law and humanity is, henceforth, absurd since, as St. Paul reminds his followers,
people should delight in the law of God, who is present in their inner being.34
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The methodological approach from below rather than from above is advanced in this thesis in
view of unravelling the intricacies of human contingency that are vital and crucial for moral
discernment. If we go by the scientific premise of Narvaez that today’s generation represents
only one percent of human history that is species-atypical in contrast to the species-typical
EDN representing ninety-nine percent of human genus history, the value of the Ethic of
Imagination is vitally important for moral development. On the other hand, the virtue of
imaginative prudence is necessary if human agency is to give itself the indispensable
opportunity to discern conscientiously the moral path when faced with ordinary and
contentious moral dilemmas. Acquiring imaginative prudence (as well other acquired moral
virtues for that matter) nullifies the realities that may impede the seed of synderesis from
maturating in the lives of human agents. Ignorance, passions, weak will, evil habits, sin and
concupiscence may potentially stall this maturation but when human agents habituate in the
virtues, specifically in the virtue of prudence that accords the discernment of the first principles
of natural law vis-à-vis the real contingencies relative to the moral dilemma in consideration,
human agents penetrate the infinite horizon of intelligibility where moral paths are resolutely
determined. Virtue-enabling is therefore expedient in human agents so that, as moral
exemplars, they can both achieve moral self-authorship and at the same time concretely
contribute to humanity’s journey towards achieving its potential natural ends. If human agents
are truly virtue-enabled, accessing the infinite horizon of intelligibility and the horizon of
prudence become second nature. This certainly equips them with the necessary qualities in
guiding children of early years towards their moral development. When imaginative prudence
is exercised by virtue-enablers, moral decisions centre on acquiring the natural ends for the
good of human agents and the greater humanity. Consequently, if human agents abound in
virtues, so to speak, then imparting or giving witness to the practical good would not be an
imposing herculean undertaking. Figuratively speaking, virtues have a mind of their own to
effectuate a reflection of its nature from its bearer without the necessity of the reason or will.

Absolutism vis-à-vis Realism
A brief commentary on the methodological approach from below necessarily needs to be
undertaken in order to position itself against any form of philosophical thinking that manifest
the tendency to fully depart from considering particular historical conditions in moral inquiries.
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The clarification can be best elaborated by eliciting Pope Francis’s statement in his PostSynodal Exhortation Apostolic Exhortation, Amoris laetitia, on ‘discernment’ vis-à-vis an
alternative interpretation of the Aquinian text the Roman Pontiff used to this effect.
Pope Francis’s interpretation of Aquinas’s text mentioned in section 304 received numerous
adverse commentaries35 particularly on its seeming implication that universal moral principles
are rendered nugatory when moral situations being considered are far too remote to be
addressed by moral principles. Pope Francis claims that there are real instances when moral
principles “cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations”36 due to the possibility of
“forms of conditioning and mitigating factors.”37 Pope Francis’s statement is an attempt to
reflect Aquinas’s thoughts that “the more we descend to matters of details, the more frequently
we encounter defects.”38
Pope Francis upholds the credibility of the primary moral principles explicating that “general
rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected.”39 It may be understandable
why certain moral ambiguity may arise from his statement; however, he seems to be mainly
suggesting that absolute moral norms would have to contend with real contingent matters. This
manner of articulation similarly expresses the earlier articulation of this research that the first
principles of natural law are of no use and do not govern anything outside the spectrum of the
contingent world. In other words, the first moral principles are immaterial without the material
world. This philosophical way of reading Pope Francis would not in any way appease the strict
followers of Aquinas who, rightfully so, would desist from interpreting Thomistic texts in
isolation from the totality of all his doctrines. Appended to their interpretation of Aquinas
above is the strict observance of the traditional moral teaching which considers some acts as
morally evil without any qualifications: “there exists acts which, per se and in themselves,
independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object.”40 This
35
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text is often rendered regrettably with the exclusion of its immediate following sentence which
reads: “These acts, if carried out with sufficient awareness and freedom, are always gravely
sinful.”41 This sentence explicitly qualifies the previous sentence specifying that in cases where
there is insufficient awareness and freedom, acts may not necessarily be gravely sinful. In
effect, it does emphatically declare that extenuating circumstances vitiate culpability and the
imputability of sin. The moral tradition in the Catholic Church teaches that for an act to be
considered a mortal sin, it “require[s] full knowledge and complete consent.”42 This traditional
moral teaching is never negated by Pope Francis in his exhortation, but rather, it resonates in
itself the necessity to seriously consider the contingent experiences of human persons in
discerning the appropriation of moral principles on human acts. In the end, a person may after
all be “in an objective situation of sin [and] which may not be subjectively culpable.”43
Pope Francis’s specific discussion of the plight of those who are in irregular marital situations
without the benefit of the Catholic Church tribunal’s declaration of nullity is seriously
attempting to engage people to discern with him and with these people to avoid the fallacy of
thinking “that everything [is] black and white.”44 Leading by example, it is evident that the
Roman Pontiff is demonstrating the virtue of imaginative prudence in finding moral resolutions
to an age-old moral dilemma that has estranged so many of Christ’s followers. The real world
is not a world of lifeless abstract entities, but rather, it is an ever-dynamic, malleable, contingent
world where moral principles are “written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God,
not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human hearts.”45

On Contemplation and Mindfulness Exercises
Both Aquinas and Narvaez would agree that discernment is vital if the present generation is to
sojourn ahead to achieve a better future. A quick look at the dictionary suggests that
discernment is the ability to “discriminate”46 truth from error. Basic as the definition maybe,
the path to moral excellence is really doing and pursuing good and avoiding evil. This thesis
41
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contends that the discernment processes of contemplation47 and mindfulness48 are
indispensable exercises in moral development. In consonance with other mental exercises,
contemplation, which is far from being merely a bodily posturing exercise, can move human
agents to certain ethical actions. Mindfulness, on the other hand, “engage[s] in mindful
observation of sensations, perceptions, emotions, and beliefs without detaching from one’s
social and environmental context.”49
According to Aquinas, contemplation ultimately involves the “contemplation of truth.”50 In
addition, he maintains that prior to contemplation, the mental act of meditation necessarily
takes place. He defines meditation as the “process of reason from certain principles that lead
to the contemplation of some truth.”51 He regards meditation as “personal study”52 that
synthesises various sources of information and experiences. Citing Richard of St. Victor’s six
species of contemplation53 in his Summa theologiae, Aquinas explains that knowing something
about the truth follows an ascending motion towards the contemplation of God.54 The ascent
to the truth according to Richard St. Victor is had through the aid of reason and imagination.
In fact, he appears to suggest that the contemplation of truth is preceded by imagination. This
points heavily to the reality that imagination serves as vehicle in contemplating the truth which,
when not employed in contemplative exercises, unnecessarily causes disservice to the very
nature of the truth. The third natural inclination mentioned above, a disposition in which human
agents have in common with all rational beings, manifestly reveals the necessity for
imagination in contemplating on the perfective truth. As a primal good it is, it logically follows
that human reason is able to arrive at the knowledge of the other two natural inclinations via
imagination as well.
Narvaez places serious importance on affording attention to the self (self-authorship) through
the espousal of the meditative exercise, mindfulness, where human agents attend to their
“embodied experience in the here and now…[by] being physically, emotionally, and
cognitively present to what is happening in oneself and the vicinity.”55 Moral knowledge,
47
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which is instantiated tacitly first and then discursively in Narvaez’s virtue epistemology, begins
in the early years of a child’s life where through the course of a lifespan, the human agent
“constructs a moral universe based on social experience.”56 The personal effort in constructing
one’s moral universe entails, as a necessary part of it, the development of virtues that must
remain the focus of mental attention.57 This includes, as well, the kind of environment and
activities human agents elect to undertake.
Mindfulness according to the above description provides human agents the opportunity to
experience their “being-ness”58 which effectuates the discernment of the movements of their
various dispositions, be it actual, emotional or cognitional. According to Narvaez, “[p]ractising
mindfulness and attending to one’s micro reactions to situations lead to the awareness of ethical
shifting.”59 These shifts account for the ethical swings human agents experience which alert
them, for example, to instances when shifts go the wrong direction.60 Implying more is required
than mindfulness, Narvaez suggests the next stage of moral reflection which “allows post-hoc
self-examination of perceptions, motives, and biases in one’s past.”61 Mindfulness and moral
reflection account for the possibility for the human awareness of ethical discrepancies. That
said, Narvaez insists that it would take “moral fitness”62 to effectuate real change in human
behaviours. Moral fitness means developing human skills to thwart ethical downshifting.
Narvaez certainly believes in the human capacity to develop behavioural processes for
upshifting rather than downshifting and action habits.63 This assertion applies to Aquinas’s
process of contemplation as well which specifically relates to the power of the mind to seek
and to be aware of the truth. Correspondingly, being a rational power, contemplation has the
potential to change the appetitive (behaviours) and emotive (feelings) dispositions of human
agents.
It can be gleaned from the above considerations that the overarching notion of discernment,
exercised as contemplation and mindfulness, is truly indispensable in moral deliberation. The
imagination that is involved in the discernment exercises provides the necessary broader
perspective in meditating and minding what is true or false, what is good or evil, what is right
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or wrong. For synderesis to foment, it is expedient that human agents engage in discernment
since it alerts moral agents of the corresponding downshifts in their ethical mindsets.
Discernment truly creates opportunities for human agents to experience freedom from what is
false, from what is evil and from what is wrong. To engage in discernment exercises therefore
is not just an act of being morally being responsible, but rather, it is a noble personal act of
fulfilling the human essence.

Discernment in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises
The value of discernment has long been appreciated and practiced in the Catholic Church. The
Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola (a.k.a. Thirty-day Retreat) is generally known for
its emphasis on the “discernment of the spirits”64 which empowers human agents to desire and
choose “only what is most conducive for [them] to the end for which [they] are created.”65
Though discernment was already widely practised in monasticism during medieval times,66 it
was St. Ignatius who gave its momentum in Catholic spirituality. The discernment involved in
imaginative contemplation has become a standard method of prayer in parishes, schools, retreat
programs and many other spiritual exercises. It certainly has been and can be adopted for
personal and private use. It involves becoming sensitive to the “motions of the soul”67 such as
the movements of passions, thoughts, imagination, attraction and repulsions. The internal
operation of the Spiritual Exercises resonates the behavioural movements of upshifting and
downshifting in Narvaez’s scientific observations. The above elaboration lucidly demonstrates
the human capacity to experience and observe not just the external world, but the human
interiority as well.
Of specific interest to this thesis is The Second Contemplation which takes place during the
second of the four weeks of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises. This involves the imagination of
The Story of the Nativity where people (retreatants) engage with the story and its characters.
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The virtual interaction can be very intimate depending on the disposition of the person. The
use of imagination makes the story come vividly alive and allows people to structure and design
the story as they see fit. The invitation to engage with the characters and the narrative context
helps draw and understand intended moral lessons which elicits a personal response in return:
“We explore the stories and images with the mind, respond to them with our feelings, interact
with them in imagination, reflect on them in solitude and calm and allow these varied activities
ultimately to influence our choices and commitments.”68
Directly or indirectly, discernment creates mental possibilities that impinge upon moral
undertakings. There is an underlying ethical reason as to why imaginative contemplation and
mindfulness are essential in delivering the necessary outcomes for imaginative prudential
moral inquiries. Warren Kinghorn would fully agree with this assertion with himself declaring
that:
Mindfulness has become a modern practical value; for some in Western
culture, it may be the greatest of the virtues. But when considered in
the context of Christian reflection on the virtues, a striking parallel
begins to emerge. In the thirteenth century Thomas Aquinas, drawing
on sources unrelated to Buddhism, also described a practical virtue that
renders humans more attentive to context, more aware of body and
emotions, and more capable of confronting the challenges of living and
developing secure relationships. He called it not “mindfulness” but
prudentia.69
Contemplation and mindfulness establish opportunities for human agents to gain clarity of
mind and soul required for effectively reflecting on particular singulars prior to making any
moral judgment. Through the virtue of imaginative prudence, the first principles of natural law
are reflected upon, not on its own, but vis-à-vis the historical contingencies of human affairs
within the confines of a calm and conducive headspace. Kinghorn provides his own perspective
on this matter:
Prudence is the virtue that integrates the theoretical knowledge of
synderesis and the other intellectual virtues with the attention to context
that results in clear-sighted and wise practical action, taking note not
only of universal principles of reason but also of singulars. In doing so,
prudence aims at what is also a significant goal for modern mindfulness
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practice; namely, to render the acting person more able to notice and to
attend to the relevant context of his or her action.70
This is the pivotal underlying factor which, as the quote below suggests, potentially motivate
human agents to specifically translate the process of contemplation into prudent moral
deliberations:
While this kind of contemplation engages the whole person with the
varied capacities and powers that belong to the human person, it also
gives a special place to imagination and the different levels of feeling
and commitment which can be touched and moved through
imagination.71
To have a better understanding and feeling of St. Ignatius’s imaginative contemplation, The
Second Prelude in The Second Contemplation is rendered below. It describes how imagination
is used to become mindful of the story being discerned. The exercise invites retreatants to still
the body and to enter into silence. After the initial recounting of the Nativity Story of Jesus (The
First Prelude), the following takes place:
The Second Prelude. The composition, by imagining the place. Here it
will be to see in imagination the road from Nazareth to Bethlehem.
Consider its length and breadth, whether it is level or winds through
valleys and hills. Similarly, look at the place or cave of the nativity:
How big is it, or small? How long or high? And how is it furnished?”72
The exercise allows for the retreatants to be mindful of their interior motions. It is allowing the
Spirit of God to work through the human soul and not the other way around. It is the same
Spirit who will work through human attempts to be imaginatively prudent without
discriminating the state of the person’s interiority.
Although the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises was intentionally designed for monastic lifestyles,
its operating principle is adaptable for day-to-day use, even in non-religious or secular
environments. The experience of God certainly is not bound by the four walls of worship places
nor monopolised by any organised religion. Learning from St. Ignatius himself, he sees
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contemplation as “finding God in all things.”73 God-like attributes such as those of moral
virtues and their derivates may still inspire, form and move the human will and appetites to
loving action even when the divine element that may be present in particular history is obscured
or unintelligible. Non-gospel stories and daily ordinary events may be used as sources for
ethical guidance. They may resemble as a praeparatio evangelica akin to the International
Theological Commission’s recognition of the existence of ethical truths present in the wisdom
traditions of the different religions around the world.74 Non-gospel stories may include the lives
of the saints, e.g., St. Maximillian Kolbe’s celebrating the Holy Eucharist while imprisoned at
Auschwitz with smuggled bread shared to fellow inmates as Eucharistic food, or, the story
when he volunteered to take the place of a fellow prisoner, Franciszek Gajowniczek, who was
originally handpicked to die by starvation but pled for his life on account of his family.75
In addition, a powerful and meaningful non-gospel story may include the 2008 occasion when
the then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offered a national apology to Australia’s Indigenous
Peoples, particularly to the Stolen Generation who suffered the unimaginable effects of forced
separation from their families in view of the government’s policy of indigenous assimilation.76
When human agents commit to imaginatively contemplate using these stories and many others,
immersing themselves in these narratives open the ‘mind’s eyes’ to possible values or moral
lessons that stories possess. The human mind should work by coalescing past experiences
embedded in phantasms and stored in one’s memory with new stories recalled and
imaginatively re-created. Additional data are accrued from memory and imagination. Memory
and imagination contribute by introducing phantasms of events bearing moral lessons, both
implicit and implicit, to the narrative. It is worth noting that the preparative elements found in
acquired moral virtues in view of the infused virtues could very well inhere in non-religious
contexts. Aquinas reminds us where God is: “[A]ll things are in God; inasmuch as they are
contained by Him.”77
From the perspective of those inclined to prayer, imaginative contemplation of the Gospel
stories may be introduced quite easily. Having them to do it, of course, is another concern. For
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those who have no or little religious background at all, the scenario might be more challenging.
Be that as it may, if initial groundwork is made to focus on day-to-day human stories, whether
personal or otherwise, this will have more appeal since identification and resonance with the
meaning of those stories would be more than likely proximate. This also implicitly addresses
the fact that Aquinas himself understands that knowledge of God is not immediately known.
For those who have religious background, the contemplation of the truth in the Gospel story of
the Good Samaritan78 will be a truly developmental exercise for virtue-formation and would
likewise be a wonderful source of moral knowledge in general. Through imaginative
contemplation, immersing in the story and engaging with the Good Samaritan’s thought
process of seeing a near-dead person lying on the road while on his way to Jericho, human
agents may engage with his character on a personal dimension and discover how he is
prudentially weighing up the good and the evil, i.e., to help the injured person or to ignore him.
Contemplation and mindfulness exercises are not meant to be a one-off thing; rather, it is
supposed to be an ongoing element of moral development. Akin to the formation of moral
virtues through the repetition of appropriate habits, the truth may come to the awareness of the
human agent immediately or perhaps after some period of time.
Narvaez’s Ethic of Engagement can provide the rationale as to why the Good Samaritan was
disposed to help the injured man. His possession of a well-educated executive functions (e.g.,
emotion system and self-control) and a well-constructed companionship care experience79
would have to be Narvaez’s neurobiological explanation to his behaviour. Under these
conditions, human agents demonstrate behaviours that match the EDN responsible for human
flourishing for thousands of years prior to the last one percent of human genus history. Narvaez
considers this type of social sphere as the optimal environment for virtue-formation and virtueenhancement. Suboptimal conditions may also promote flourishing but not as stable and
enduring as when the normative optimum is established during early years of children’s life.
Furthermore, Narvaez subscribes to the neurobiological finding that the Ethic of Imagination
“emerges from the Ethic of Engagement.”80 The Imagination Ethic is understood to manifest
humanity’s highest capacities such as an ethic of love, sympathic action, and egalitarian
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respect.81 Imagination fosters these behaviours since it “provides the fodder of possibility” 82
to various forms of social relations which the Ethic of Engagement lays the foundation. Under
these social relationships, empathy and perspective-taking, among many others ethical roots of
Engagement Ethic, provide a spectrum of basic behaviours which imagination is able to take
to another level.83 Relationships and being therefore benefit when imagination upshifts through
various social triggers. The sight of an injured man on the road would have triggered an
upshifting of behaviour and which then would have caused the Good Samaritan to exhibit
compassion (empathy) and ‘to feel for the man” (perspective-taking). Empathy, according to
Narvaez, refers to the “attunement with another’s feelings and needs”84 while perspectivetaking is “the ability to imagine another’s viewpoint and understand what might be motivating
their behaviour.”85 Narvaez concludes that these ethical roots are developed during early life
where “mutually responsive and intersubjective relationships”86 are fostered between
caregivers and young children. She accounts the neurobiological basis of a human agent’s
imagination of another person’s mental state to quality companionship care during children’s
early life.
The Ethic of Imagination has several elements in the mind of Narvaez and one of them strikes
at the heart of this research: “Communal imagination employs abstraction capabilities to solve
moral problems.”87 Principally akin to the basic notion of abstraction in the Thomistic sense of
extracting the universal essence from sensible species, abstraction by imagination purports the
capacity similar to discernment, i.e., to discriminate between truth from error, good from evil,
right from wrong. Imagination accomplishes this by surveying the contingent landscape of
human historicity which eventually discloses those which are truthful against falsehood, moral
against immoral, accurate against fallacious. Imagination permeates the human consciousness
of a “sense of bondedness to the other as part of the self”88 (an ethic of love), “compassion for
others and concern for their well-being”89 (sympathic action), and the “relational awareness
and expectations for equal treatment and the capacities for intersubjectivity and perspective
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taking”90 (egalitarian respect). Imaginative prudence specifically underscores these
behaviours as authentically expressive of those primal goods accruing from the natural law.
It is discernible in Narvaez’s neurobiology that when optimal social interactions and
environment are present in the sensitive early life of children, a ‘secure attachment’ develops
out of the parent-child relationship where trauma has not been experienced. In this social
environment, children develop not only self-regulation and self-autonomy capacities (Ethic of
Safety), but they also grow socially connected and intersubjectively present. Narvaez adds:
“Under conditions of companionship care, the self is not divided but coherent as shown in the
alignment of intuition and reasoning, implicit and explicit knowledge, procedural and
deliberative skills.”91 Trauma is most likely experienced when companionship care is absent.
A traumatic childhood upbringing has lasting consequences where downshifts in behaviours
can occur as immediate responses to social stimuli. Hence, ethical and social downshifting can
occur nullifying behavioural homeostasis.
Communal imagination is the assumed ethical mindset when optimal social conditions are inplay during the early years of childhood. A traumatic upbring (as well as an underdeveloped
emotional system) will likely impede the natural emergence of communal imagination. The
downshifts in behavioural responses to social stimuli could either be vicious imagination and/or
detached imagination. Both responses could also be brought upon by cultural reasons and not
just neurobiological.92 As will be shown below, either response indicates a shifting away from
prosocial affordances, hence, a departure from the primal wisdom and the primal goods that
Narvaez and Aquinas construe as integral to moral development respectively.
Vicious imagination sees the downshift of both the Ethic of Safety and Ethic of Engagement
to behaviours that are characterised by strong withdrawal from communal engagement and
consequently the elevation of the superiority of the ego. Narvaez describes vicious imagination
as “those moments of intentional separation from others – a planful divorce from engagement
based on deep-seated anger or fear.”93 The resulting superiority or ego inflation is also referred
to by Narvaez as pride. It is interesting that Catholic traditional teaching identifies pride as the
reason for the fall of humanity due to humanity’s first parents’ desire to be more superior to
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God.94 Viewed as “combative morality”95 by Narvaez, vicious imagination is accompanied by
anger (and fear) due to a sense of injustice and resentment. On this basis, the human agent
rejects these forms of maltreatment and decides to take the superior stance. Alongside, the
element of manipulative control of people and the distrust of them are embedded in the notion
of superiority. Germany’s Adolf Hitler’s antisemitism is considered as a scapegoat excuse for
the German defeat in the First World War which irresponsibly created the myth that Jews were
responsible for their demise.96 Hitler’s Nazi ideology which claimed the superiority of the
Aryan race is believed to have been born out of this myth.97 Likewise, Australian Pauline
Hanson’s fear of Australia “in danger of being swamped by Asians”98 is believed to be based
on her personal perception of being a victim of anti-white racism. Her espousal of a certain
form of ‘reverse racism’ calls for an ideology of ‘us-versus-them’ that views Asians as
existential threats to Australian security and lifestyle.99 In consideration of these ideologies,
Hitler’s superiority claim and Hanson’s perception of threat are behavioural manifestations
typical of vicious imagination. Discernment’s discrimination against what is false, evil, and
wrong trumps what is true, good and right in vicious imagination. If it were to influence the
primal goods, it will reject the natural law as a whole since the stance of ‘me versus them’ that
vicious imagination espouses does not express the other-centred dimension of human nature.
Aquinas, himself, will reject this on the basis of his understanding that the human person is
naturally a social being.
Another type of behavioural withdrawal is what Narvaez labels as an emotionally-detached
imagination (iced morality). This type of withdrawal is understood be to a disassociation from
social emotion. It can likely be expected that when companionship care in the early years of a
child’s life is deprived, human development in the realm of the affect will be severely
undernourished and underdeveloped. Such is the underlying principle in this type of
imagination where the “intellect alone is used to make moral decisions.”100 Emotionally94
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detached imagination may appear to be contentious due to the consideration of the affect in
decision-making. Emotions (passions) are generally discredited due to their perceived
instability and insecurity. However, should this same argument be applied to reason, it begs
the question as to why the intellect can be trusted over imagination when it certainly can be
likewise a source of error and falsehood? In her strongest assertion, Narvaez claims that
“[d]etached imagination might be the greatest source of evil today as we have undermined
emotion development in early life, denigrated emotion generally and promoted detached
imagination in nearly every realm of life.”101 Aquinas’s omission of imagination referred to
earlier reveals how moral knowledge can be deprived of the input of imagination as a vehicle
of human emotions which conveys human passions that are naturally attached to certain
knowledge. Socially, when there is an exclusive emphasis on reason, there can be an
expectation of a lack of deep relationships. Relationships are vital in community life without
which moral disengagement arises. Aquinas’s natural law is very clear about relationship since
it is on this basis that the natural law presents human agents as relating to all substances, to all
created animals, and to all rational beings. Someone who displays an ‘iced morality’ may find
it uneasy to go through some form of contemplation or mindfulness exercises since these forms
of mental exercises may involve the affect. Certainly, the contemplation on the truth cannot be
fully achieved without the element of passion in the process of having a loving relationship
with God. That said, Narvaez has already stated earlier that humans have the capacity to change
even if they have been subjected to a traumatic upbringing. Claims in neurobiology underlines
the scientific outcome that “[d]evelopmental plasticity emphasises the general malleability of
an individual’s brain and body…[exhibiting] the capacity…to reorganise its structure or
function, generally in response to a specific event or perturbation.”102 On this basis, selfauthorship and self-organisation are possible in remaking human agents in many ways.103
In circling back to the ethical significance that was intimated earlier concerning the motions of
the spirit, the notion of sin in Catholic morality comes to the fore. This term is, however,
considered a nondescript in psychology due to the fact that it does not posit a deity against
whom a sin is committed. Aquinas attests to this: “The theologian considers sin chiefly as an
offense against God; and the moral philosophy, as something contrary reason.”104 Psychology
will certainly not consider downshifts in human behaviours as expressive of sin or evil and the
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upshifts in human behaviours as determinants of virtues or even holiness. In Narvaez’s mind,
these are merely indicators of either the presence or absence of, among others, trauma that
promotes or vitiates human flourishing. In Catholic morality, however, these maybe evaluated
on the basis of the natural law whose origin is God’s eternal law. Of interest in this research is
the earlier alluded state of incontinence (weakness of will). In view of this, Narvaez asserts:
Human brains seem easily to morally downshift when threat is
perceived, making the safety, detached, and vicious mindsets easy
pathways for moral decisions and action. This is especially so for those
whose early experience did not fully foster the engagement and
communal ethics – they are incontinent (not interested and not able),
using Aristotle’s term, in terms of prosocial morality. The “want self”
must be reeducated after a childhood of misdevelopment, and it takes
time.105
Further, Narvaez suggested that moral agents can learn to upshift their morality, both
personally and culturally. She adds: “We can learn to be continent (interested but struggling to
behave), controlling our self-protective instincts when they occur. With practice, we can go
beyond continence toward virtue (desire with capacity to act).106 Narvaez’s observation of the
incontinent person appears to be consistent with Aquinas’s since this behaviour which affects
the will is fleeting unlike the intemperate person’s behaviour which is entrenched. The
intemperate person’s behaviour would probably fall under extreme trauma in Narvaez’s books
where this behaviour would have been “fostered in a corrosive or eroded social system that
emphasises detachment and intellect, manipulation and control, and lead to lowest-commondenominator morality.”107 This observation somehow echoes Pasnau’s comment on the
intemperate person: “The intemperate person seems to have somehow lost the disposition of
synderesis, or at least to have driven it into hiding.”108 All things considered, what truly is
indicative of the seriousness of this behaviour, or vice for that matter, is that the person knows
that it is wrong or evil and yet still decided to do it. Generally speaking, this is certainly the
kind of behaviour that will make the acquisition of human ends problematic and, at a larger
scale, raises questions regarding what sort of values are being imparted by today’s generation
to the next.
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It is apparently clear from the discussion above that moral exemplars or virtue-enablers have
an essential role in shaping the future of the present generation. In his publication, The
Spirituality of the Church of the Future, Rahner beautifully states that “the Christian of the
future will be a mystic or he will not exist at all.”109 By a mystic, he refers to human agents
who dare go through an authentic experience of God by discerning the motions of the Spirits
in their lives. The fruit of synderesis is the opportunity to journey through the discovery of the
moral good that defines the ontology and teleology of human existence.
Towards the end, imagining the natural law today is the indispensable responsibility of modernday mystics, most prominently but not exclusively, contemporary moral exemplars or virtueenablers who possess the task of forming the current generation in their future role and
responsibility of looking after the community. It needs to be stressed, however, that this is
fundamentally a communal responsibility in view of advancing the capacities and potentials of
universal humanity. The important thing in the mystic’s life is the continual nourishing of
imagination: “For the education of the imagination and feelings, in which values are
apprehended, is as critically important for authentic human living.”110

Summary and Conclusion
To understand the ontology of Aquinas’s synderesis and how the first principles of natural law
it intuits and apprehends can foment in the life of human agents have been the noble task of
this research project. Though every human agent has immediate awareness of the first
principles of natural law upon contact with the social environment, its initial epistemic form
remains obscure and feint. The practical good that synderesis apprehends is essentially
inchoative, which means human agents would require time and experience, a lifespan for that
matter, for the notion of the good to mature in them. The notion of the practical good has many
forms and complexities; a lifetime would not be sufficient to exhaust its meaning owing
temporal contingencies which affect the moral appropriation of what is ethically good. Moral
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education is therefore indispensable for the good to flourish and effectuate the acquisition of
human ends within the limits of human conditions and capacities.
Moral formation encompasses moral education which commences the moment a young child’s
reasoning capabilities are actuated. Due to the nature of synderesis, moral education is
necessary in intuiting and apprehending the first principles of natural law. In the act of
synderesis, phantasms that bear raw moral epistemic materials are crucial if moral agents,
particularly young children, are to be assisted metaphysically and subconsciously in the
discovery of the universal and particular good. It is in this respect that moral imagination is
vital in leading the human mind, albeit non-cognitively or pre-cognitively, to begin inclining
towards the moral good. Virtue habituation enables natural inclination to foment in and through
the dynamism of human experiences.
The habituation of moral virtues is envisaged by moral education. Based on Aquinas’s
teachings, virtues are responsible for both forming human agents as virtuous people and for
informing their actions as perfective of their being. Moral virtues, although considered as
merely preparative in view of the infused virtues, are not devoid of any practical significance
for moral development. As hylomorphic individuals, human agents are constituted to live as
historical beings in a socially dynamic contingent world. Their historical existence means that
acquiring natural ends cannot be ignored as human ends. Though natural ends are imperfect by
nature, they lay the foundation for the grace of God to work through human nature in realising
the supernatural ends. Human agents by their own means are not capable of obtaining the
supernatural ends.
Among the acquired moral virtues, prudence stands apart owing to its dual nature of being both
a moral and intellectual virtue. Moreover, it has the specific capacity when lived to guide
human agents to make decisions in accord with their human nature. It does so by allowing the
hermeneutical dialoguing in moral inquiries between the first principles of natural law and the
contingent historicity of human conditions. Through this dialogue, human agents penetrate the
infinite horizon of intelligibility where the intellectus agens illumines human awareness of the
primary moral principles which synderesis intuits and apprehends. This process of illumination
contextually takes into consideration whatever moral quandaries or dilemmas human agents
need resolving. It is in this respect that this thesis has argued for the consideration of
imagination in prudential inquiry. Aquinas’s treatment of imagination does not seem to
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demonstrate the true potential of prudence in moral deliberations. One of imagination’s
marvellous capacities is to be able to mentally re-create situations which facilitate the
presentation of possibilities for human actions prior to judgment. This capacity enables the past
to have a part in mapping out future moral judgements that could be pivotal for acquiring
natural ends.
The value of imagination in the moral development of the first principles of natural law in
human agents is essential and salvific, understood in both secular and theological terms.
Narvaez affirms through her observations based on numerous scientific fields such as
evolutionary psychology and human anthropology that imagination is the height of mammalian
evolutionary development. Studying her Triune Ethics Theory against Aquinas’s doctrine on
the natural law, a parallel understanding can be adduced. Narvaez propounds that evolution has
produced three global ethical mindsets which are behaviourally expressed via social triggers.
The Ethic of Safety, the most primitive of the mindsets, is exhibited when human life or security
is threatened. This generally aligns with Aquinas’s first natural inclination where, in common
with all substances, human agents seek the preservation of life. The unrehearsed alignment
confirms that through neurobiology, the inclination to life’s preservation is indeed a natural
disposition in human beings.
The second global ethical mindset is the Ethic of Engagement where, as the name implies,
manifests the disposition of human agents to form human relationships. In Aquinas’s thinking,
the second natural inclination, which is in common with all animals, addresses the natural
disposition of human agents towards sex and the education of offspring. On several points, the
second natural inclination expresses Narvaez’s Ethic of Engagement which demonstrates the
human agents’ propensity for intersubjective relationship, including sexual relationship and
friendship. The ancestral lifestyle of what Narvaez labels as the small-band hunter-gatherers
exhibits the aspect of communal living as necessarily integrative within their personal lives.
And lastly, the third global mindset, the Ethic of Imagination points to the highly developed
human capacity to synthesise and integrate acquired data and information by forming images
in the human mind. One of the several functions of imagination is the capacity to discriminate
data helpful in sorting out what is beneficial or not to human flourishing. In common with all
rational beings, Aquinas assigns the third natural inclination for the human capacity to know
the truth about God. While there is no concept of God in the Triune Ethics Theory, the capacity
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for imagination reveals the power of the human mind for moral deliberation and for moral
development.
Not only do Narvaez’s scientific observations posit the plausibility of a theoretical co-operation
between theology and science, but it likewise verifies the credibility of Aquinas’s assertion
when it comes to the natural law. As a law that expressively governs human nature, it does
emphatically articulate an order of nature that is underscored by an order of reason which
guides moral order in society. The ethical contents of natural law are maintained and pursued
for practical observance and realisation since the order that it sustains is for the common good.
Through the affirmed complementarity between Aquinas’s theological teachings and
Narvaez’s scientific observations, imagination’s role for moral development must always be
utilised in moral deliberations, most particularly by moral exemplars or virtue-enablers who
hold the essential responsibility of forming society’s future generations through quality
caregiving and companionship care. Specifically, imaginative prudence is the key habit in
moral deliberations that could determine the realisation of human telos.
Rahner proffers that it will be mystics who will be compositive of future generations. These
mystics will be those who dare to explore and experience the great mystery behind the primal
goods and the origin of human essence. Our global society indubitably needs them to be as
bold and confident as St. Paul who said: “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ.”111 Mysticism
is the moral pathway that should lead human agents to contemplate on the Truth who is God:
the origin, cause and goal of synderesis. From the anthropological perspective, mysticism will
ensure the inseparability and continuance of the divine-human relationship. And beyond
mysticism, synderesis will sustain the relational order that bespeaks the divine-human
relationship. After all, synderesis is inextinguishable. To do and pursue the good is undeniably
natural. By doing so, moral agents come to the knowledge of the biblical truth that “we are
from God”112 and “we are what God has made us, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which
he prepared beforehand to be our way of life.”113
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